CHAPTER 16

TO OBTAIN RELIEF FROM VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW

A. Introduction

1. Overview

The U.S. Constitution and federal law confer numerous individual rights that you can use to protect yourself from unfair government actions. For example, the Eighth Amendment protects your right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, while the First Amendment protects your right to practice your religion. Prisoners may bring lawsuits challenging violations of either their constitutional or federal statutory rights using the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (“Section 1983”). Section 1983 allows you to sue state and local officials, and to challenge state prison rules and regulations, that violate your constitutional and statutory rights. For example, you can use Section 1983 to challenge prison rules that violate your practice of religion, or to challenge prison officers who assault you in prison. (For more information on your right to practice religion and your right to be free from assault, see Chapters 24 and 27 of the JLM).

Section 1983 does not allow you to sue federal officials. However, you can use a different law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, to challenge violations of your constitutional rights by federal officials. Section 1331 provides federal courts the power to hear civil claims involving the Constitution or federal laws, and these claims can include lawsuits against federal officials. These lawsuits are called “Bivens” actions. Section 1331 and Section 1983 are closely related, and Bivens actions often rely on case law, which is law based on judicial decisions and precedent, that interprets Section 1983.

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1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Figure 1 of this Section for a list of other important rights granted to you by the Constitution.

3. Constitutional rights are rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Section 1983 may allow you to sue someone who violates your constitutional rights if that person is acting “under color of law,” meaning that person was acting under the state’s authority. Section 1983 cases usually involve constitutional rights found in the first ten amendments to the Constitution (also called the Bill of Rights) or in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Bill of Rights originally limited only the power of the federal government. Using the legal theory of “incorporation” and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has ruled that most of its guarantees also protect citizens against state governments. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1414 n.42, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711, 731 n.42 (1977) (noting that the Fourth Amendment was incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment). This means that state actors have to respect most of the rights found in the Bill of Rights as well. Federal statutory rights are those rights created by federal laws passed by Congress. Many federal statutes include their own “enforcement provisions,” which means that the statute gives you a particular right and allows you to sue the person violating that right. If a federal statute has its own enforcement provision, you must use that statute rather than Section 1983 to bring your lawsuit. See Part B(3) of this Chapter for more information about statutory rights and Section 1983.


5. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174, 81 S. Ct. 473, 477, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492, 498 (1961) (explaining that Section 1983 gives a federal remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by an official’s abuse of his position), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). If an official deprives you of constitutional or federal statutory rights, you may also be able to sue that official under state law. However, Section 1983 allows you to sue that official under federal law regardless of whether a state remedy is available. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–74, 81 S. Ct. 473, 477, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492, 498 (1961) (detailing several reasons you might prefer to use federal law instead of state law to seek your remedy).

6. See, e.g., Chapter 27 of the JLM; “Religious Freedom in Prison”: Chapter 24, “Your Right to Be Free from Assault by Prison Guards and Other Prisoners.”


8. Bivens actions are named after Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d. 619 (1971) (holding that an implied cause of action may exist where an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated by federal agents).
This Chapter is organized into several Parts. This Part, Part A, is the introduction, and includes seven essential tips to follow when bringing Section 1983 and Section 1331 claims. Part B explains how to use Section 1983 to challenge state prison conditions and other practices that violate your constitutional or federal statutory rights. Part C explains what you can sue for (the types of relief, like money damages, injunctions, etc.): who to sue; typical defense arguments you will have to defeat; when to sue; where to sue; and how to proceed with your Section 1983 suit. Part D describes other ways to bring lawsuits, including class actions and state court lawsuits. Part E explains Bivens actions against federal officials under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Remember, Bivens actions closely rely on case law that interprets Section 1983, so you should still read this entire Chapter if you want to bring a Bivens action. Finally, the Appendices to this Chapter have sample forms that you can use as examples when preparing your case.

Figure 1 below explains your rights, the source of these rights, and which chapters of the JLM you should read if you think one of these rights has been violated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Prisoner Rights</th>
<th>Source of Constitutional Right</th>
<th>JLM Chapter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mail, visitation, telephone use, and other communications</td>
<td>First Amendment</td>
<td>Chapter 19: “Your Right to Communicate with the Outside World”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious practices</td>
<td>First Amendment</td>
<td>Chapter 27: “Religious Freedom in Prison”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Searches and seizures of pretrial detainees: body searches</td>
<td>Fourth Amendment</td>
<td>Chapter 25: “Your Right to Be Free From Illegal Body Searches”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prison conditions: overcrowding, cleanliness, etc.</td>
<td>Eighth Amendment</td>
<td>Chapter 16 (This Chapter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical care</td>
<td>Eighth Amendment</td>
<td>Chapter 23: “Your Right to Adequate Medical Care”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault/failure to protect</td>
<td>Eighth Amendment</td>
<td>Chapter 24: “Your Right to Be Free From Assault by Prison Guards and Other Prisoners”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy of medical information</td>
<td>Fourteenth Amendment</td>
<td>Chapter 26: “Infectious Diseases: AIDS, Hepatitis, Tuberculosis, and MRSA in Prisons” &amp; Chapter 23: “Your Right to Adequate Medical Care”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due Process in disciplinary hearings</td>
<td>Due Process Clause of the Fifth &amp; Fourteenth Amendments</td>
<td>Chapter 18: “Your Rights at Prison Disciplinary Proceedings”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, etc.</td>
<td>Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment</td>
<td>Chapter 16 (This Chapter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination on the basis of gender</td>
<td>Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment</td>
<td>Chapter 16 (This Chapter)</td>
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9. This chart is only a simple outline for what parts of the Constitution establish these rights. Some of these rights may also be protected by federal statutes. Your case will depend on your particular facts, so you should use this chart to begin your research, not end it.
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<th>Types of Prisoner Rights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rights of prisoners with mental illness</td>
<td><em>Eighth &amp; Fourteenth Amendments</em></td>
<td>Chapter 29, “Special Issues for Prisoners with Mental Illness”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination on the basis of disability</td>
<td><em>Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment</em></td>
<td>Chapter 28, “Rights of Prisoners with Disabilities”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity</td>
<td><em>Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment</em></td>
<td>Chapter 30: “Special Information for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Prisoners”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to courts—law libraries or legal assistance</td>
<td><em>First, Sixth, &amp; Fourteenth Amendments</em></td>
<td>Chapter 3: “Your Right to Learn the Law and Go to Court”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Seven Essential Tips for Bringing Section 1983 and Section 1331 Actions**


The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) is a federal law that significantly affects Section 1983 cases. You should be aware of the PLRA’s “three strikes” rule. This rule gives you a “strike” whenever you have a case dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a valid legal claim. If you have three cases dismissed as “strikes,” you will not be able to use the *in forma pauperis* procedure unless you are under imminent danger of serious physical injury, or you may lose good time credit. Accordingly, you must be sure that you meet all of the PLRA requirements before you begin any lawsuit. In particular, you should be careful about the PLRA requirement that you need to exhaust (use up) all your administrative remedies—such as prison grievance procedures and appeals—before you go to court. In other words, you need to figure out what procedures exist within your prison to protest your situation and use all of those procedures before you file a lawsuit. Although some courts used to require that you describe what you have done already to exhaust your remedies in your complaint, the Supreme Court recently said that such rules are not allowed.

(b) Your Constitutional Rights Are Not Absolute.

In most cases, your constitutional rights will be balanced against the state or federal government’s interest in maintaining a secure prison environment. In many situations, your constitutional rights may be outweighed by the government’s interest in prison security. For most constitutional claims, courts use a test established in a case called *Turner v. Safley* to determine whether your constitutional rights have been violated. This test is discussed in detail in Part B(2)(a) of this Chapter.

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10. *In forma pauperis* allows you to file a lawsuit as a “poor person.” In this way, you can avoid paying many of the normal court fees and costs or pay them on an installment plan.
12. *See, e.g.*, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825, 149 L. Ed. 958, 967 (2001) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s Section 1983 complaint for failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies because prisoner did not appeal an unfavorable administrative decision to the highest level of review).
14. *Turner* does not apply to claimed violations of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual
(c) Do NOT Use Section 1983 to Challenge Your Original Criminal Conviction, Your Sentence, Loss of Good Time, or Denial of Parole.

You cannot use Section 1983 to claim that your constitutional rights were violated based on the fact that you were convicted or the length of your sentence except in very limited circumstances. Instead of Section 1983, you can challenge your conviction or sentence by appealing or, if your appeal is denied, by filing for a writ of habeas corpus or other post-conviction relief. You also cannot use Section 1983 to challenge a loss of good time credit, a parole denial, or other official actions that directly affect how much time you spend in prison. You should use state procedures to challenge these losses. For example, in New York, prisoners can challenge the loss of good time credit or denial of parole through an Article 78 proceeding. For information about Article 78 proceedings, see Chapter 22 of the _JLM_.

However, you can usually use Section 1983 to challenge administrative decisions that do not directly affect the length of your sentence. This Chapter mostly focuses on how you can use a Section 1983 suit if government officials have abused or denied your constitutional or federal statutory rights while you have been in prison. Again, you should not use Section 1983 to challenge the amount of time to be spent in prison.

(d) Be Sure That All Defendants in Your Section 1983 Lawsuit Had Personal Involvement in the Violation of Your Rights.

Pro se litigants (people who file a suit without a lawyer) often want to include everybody they can think of as defendants, including supervisory prison officials like wardens or the head of the state department of corrections. You may want to do this too, but naming everybody is often not a good idea. Courts usually dismiss all claims against supervisory officials unless you provide enough facts in your complaint to show that the supervisory officials you name were involved in violating your rights. If you make claims against particular defendants that the court quickly dismisses because they were not personally involved, the judge may be less likely to trust the rest of your claims. Try your best to find out which officials were involved.

punishment.” Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510-11 (2005). See Part B(2)(a) of this Chapter for more information about _Turner_. Remember that you may have a better claim under a different federal statute than under Section 1983 and _Turner_.

19. See _Heck_ v. _Humphrey_, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383, 393-94 (1994) (holding that Section 1983 suits are not available if the outcome of the suit would imply that a prisoner’s conviction or sentence is invalid, unless he proves that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus).


21. See _Edwards_ v. _Balisok_, 520 U.S. 641, 648, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1589, 137 L. Ed. 2d 906, 915 (1997) (holding that a Section 1983 claim alleging that the prisoner was deprived of good time credits without procedural due process could not go forward, because if successful it would imply that the deprivation of good time credits was invalid).

22. If you are a prisoner in New York and your prison is not following its own rules or policies, you can file an Article 78 petition. For more information, see Chapter 22 of the _JLM_, “How To Challenge Administrative Decisions Using Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.”

23. See _Wilkinson_ v. _Dotson_, 544 U.S. 74, 82, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1248, 161 L. Ed. 253, 262-63 (2005) (allowing prisoners to use Section 1983 to challenge parole procedures to request new reviews of parole eligibility, where winning the lawsuit would not necessarily result in prisoners’ obtaining earlier parole): _Muhammad_ v. _Close_, 540 U.S. 749, 754-55, 124 S. Ct. 1303, 1306, 158 L. Ed. 2d 32, 38 (2004) (holding that a Section 1983 claim may challenge an administrative decision as long as it does not dispute the validity of the underlying conviction): _Leamer_ v. _Fauver_, 288 F.3d 532, 543 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding valid a Section 1983 claim that challenged a disciplinary action which could affect the granting of parole, but would not directly affect length of sentence): _Jenkins_ v. _Haubert_, 179 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that Section 1983 may be used to challenge a prisoner’s term of disciplinary segregation, which did not implicate the length of confinement).

24. Part B(1)(a) of this Chapter explains how you can prove a defendant official was personally involved in violating your rights.

25. See _Monell_ v. _Dep’t of Soc. Servs._, 436 U.S. 658, 663 n.7, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2022 n.7, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 619 n.7 (1978) (holding that supervisory officials are not automatically responsible for the actions of their employees). However, sometimes you can name supervisory officials as defendants even if they were not directly involved in violating your rights. See Part C(2)(b) of this Chapter (“Supervisor Liability”).
(e) Explain the Facts of Your Case in as Much Detail as Possible.

The most common mistake made by *pro se* litigants is not stating the facts clearly and adequately. Remember, the court already knows something about the law, but it knows *nothing* about the facts of your claim. Make sure that you tell the court exactly *what* happened to you, *when* and *where* it happened, *who* was involved, and *how* it happened. If you know *why* your rights were violated, you should explain that too. More than anything else, the facts of your case will determine the success of your claim. For an example of a written complaint, see Appendix A-29 of this Chapter.

Here’s an example. Imagine that you are claiming that your access to the prison law library has been unfairly restricted. The court will want to know the details. When did you want to get into the library? Why did you need access to the library? Are there any set rules in your prison for library access? Exactly how did the denial of access hurt you? Were you unable to meet a filing deadline or respond to a legal argument? Did you have a case pending or a court date? What research were you trying to do? Who stopped you? How many times did this happen, and when? Include as much of this information as possible in your complaint. Of course, the kinds of questions you will want to ask yourself and answer for the court depends on your claim. Give as much relevant detail as possible.

If possible, try to get sworn, written statements—also known as affidavits or declarations—from witnesses who saw your rights being violated. Try to get as much proof as possible that supports the factual claims you are making in your case.

(f) Confirm the Information in This or Any Other Chapter of the *JLM* Through Library Research.

Remember that the cases discussed in this Chapter are only examples to use as starting points in your research. There are many court decisions relating to Section 1983 claims. It is essential that you research and make sure the courts still follow the cases in the footnotes of this Chapter. We have tried to make the *JLM* as up-to-date as possible, but some cases may not be good law anymore if a higher court has made a different decision.

(g) *Bivens* Actions Against Federal Officials are Similar to Section 1983 Claims Against State or Local Officials.

If you want to sue federal officials, you cannot use Section 1983. Instead, you can bring a type of lawsuit called a *Bivens* action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Most federal prisoners bring *Bivens* actions, which are described in Part E of this Chapter. *Bivens* actions are very similar to Section 1983 claims, so you should still read Parts B and C of this Chapter discussing Section 1983 claims.

B. Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Challenge State or Local Government Action

1. Essential Requirements for Obtaining Relief Under Section 1983

Section 1983 states:

`Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within`

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26. *Relevance* is a legal idea. “Relevant evidence” is evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining your claim.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Basically, relevant evidence is anything that helps to prove your story or your legal claim.

27. *See* Chapter 6 of the *JLM*, “An Introduction to Legal Documents.”

28. *See* Chapter 1 of the *JLM*, “How to Use the *JLM*,” and Chapter 2, “Introduction to Legal Research,” for more information.

29. It is very important that you read the full footnoted cases. You should also try to read any cases cited in those cases. If possible, look up 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States Code Annotated (U.S.C.A.) or United States Code Service (U.S.C.S.). The U.S.C.A. and U.S.C.S. are commercial publications of the United States Code that include the federal statutes and summaries of cases interpreting those statutes. You should also look at the Federal Practice Digest and other digests that have case summaries organized by subject matter. The process of making sure a case is up-to-date is called “Shepardizing.” *See* Chapter 2 of the *JLM*, “Introduction to Legal Research,” for more information on how to Shepardize a case.
the jurisdiction thereof to the *deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws*, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.30

The words and phrases in italics state the three essential requirements (also known as elements) that you must fulfill when bringing a lawsuit under Section 1983. In your complaint, you need to show that *all three* elements of Section 1983 are met.

(a) First Requirement: Person

Section 1983’s first requirement is that you must show that your rights were violated by a “person.” The legal definition of “person” for Section 1983 claims includes more than actual people (prison wardens, guards, etc.). A city, county, or municipality can also be a “person” under Section 1983.31 The definition of “person,” however, does not include state governments or their agencies.32 For example, you cannot sue the State of New York or the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision under Section 1983.33 Thus, while officials (actual people) at any level of government (including state government)34 may be sued under Section 1983, only non-state governments and their agencies (such as cities, counties, local agencies, and private corporations) may be sued as a “person” under Section 1983. See Part C(2) of this Chapter, “Whom to Name as Defendants” for more information on whom you can sue using Section 1983.

You should name all “persons” who violated your rights as defendants. This includes individuals, local government agencies, or both. You may name as many defendants as you choose, as long as each of them is personally involved in violating your rights. Courts consider officials and local government agencies to be personally involved if they:

1. Directly participated in the wrong; or
2. Knew about the wrong but did not try to stop or fix it; or
3. Failed to oversee the people who caused the wrong, for example by hiring unqualified people or failing to adequately train the staff; or
4. Created a policy or custom that allowed the wrong to occur.

The situations listed in (1), (2), and (3) are most common in cases where you are challenging defendants’ specific behavior or failure to act. The fourth situation occurs when you challenge general rules of the prison.

An example of a type (1) situation could be a guard refusing to get help for an injured prisoner who asks him for medical care. An example of a type (2) situation could be a guard seeing a prisoner being attacked by other prisoners and not trying to stop the attack. In a type (3) situation, prison officials may be held liable for hiring unqualified people35 or failing to properly train or supervise their staff.36

34. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31, 112 S. Ct. 358, 365, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 313 (1991) (finding state officials, sued in their individual capacities, to be “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983, and not absolutely immune from personal liability or barred from being sued under the Eleventh Amendment).
35. See Bd. of the Cty Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1392, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 644 (1997) (holding that a municipality may be liable for hiring decisions under a deliberate indifference standard if adequate screening of the employee alleged to have violated the plaintiff’s rights would have made it clear to a reasonable policymaker that hiring the employee was highly likely to result in the particular type of constitutional violation alleged by the plaintiff).
36. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204–05, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 426–27 (1989) (holding that a city could be liable under Section 1983 for failing to train employees if the failure amounted to deliberate
Finally, in a type (4) situation, prison officials can be liable for creating rules, policies, or customs that violate your rights. These rules and policies can be written or unwritten. You should always be specific about what kind of rule or practice you are challenging and who was responsible for creating the rule or practice (if you know). If you are arguing that an unwritten policy or custom violated your rights, you need to gather as much evidence as possible to show that it is widely followed in your jail or prison. This will show the court that it is an actual policy or custom. An example of a type (4) situation could be guards making sure that prisoners who violate a prison rule do not receive medical care for a month, even if they are sick or injured.

Sometimes, several people or agencies will be involved in violating your rights, and they will all be involved in different ways. For example, if a prison guard assaults you, you can sue that guard because he violated your rights. If another guard sees the assault but does not try to stop it, you can sue that guard as well, because he did not try to stop or fix the wrong. If you complain to the warden that this guard has assaulted you several times, and the warden does nothing, you might also be able to sue the warden. If you can show there is an informal prison policy of allowing guards to assault prisoners, or if you find out that the guard had a history of assaulting prisoners at his previous job, then you might be able to sue the local department of corrections for creating an unconstitutional policy or hiring an unqualified guard. In this situation, it is probably obvious to you that the guard who assaulted you and the guard who watched the assault were personally involved in violating your rights. However, it is much more difficult to figure out whether the warden and/or the local department of corrections were personally involved. Remember, if you cannot give specific facts showing that a defendant was personally involved, the judge will dismiss your claims against the defendant. For more about showing personal involvement, see Part C(2)(b) of this Chapter, “Supervisor Liability,” and Part C(2)(c) of this Chapter, “Municipal or Local Government Liability.”

(b) Second Requirement: Under Color of State Law

The second requirement for suing under Section 1983 is that the person who violated your rights must have been acting “under color of state law.” This means that the person you sue must be someone who was acting under the state’s authority. States have authority over their own agencies and employees. They also have authority over cities, counties, and municipalities, as well as over the employees of cities, counties, and municipalities. In prison, persons acting under color of state law include:

1. Employees of state or local prisons or jails, like prison doctors and guards; and
2. Private parties who make contracts with the state to perform services.

indifference to the constitutional rights of persons coming into contact with those employees).

37. See, e.g., Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a prison’s written policy of strip searching all persons arrested for misdemeanors without requiring reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional); Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287 (D.N.H. 2003) (allowing a prisoner who suffered from gender identity disorder to proceed with a claim that a prison’s written policy of refusing to consider surgical or hormonal treatment for any prisoner regardless of medical condition violated her Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care).

38. See, e.g., Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that city’s failure to have procedures in place to verify warrants was an unwritten policy that violated right to due process of plaintiff who was mistakenly held on outstanding warrants for the arrest of his twin brother); Garrett v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clark Cty., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1279–80 (M.D. Ga. 2003) (noting that even when there is no formal written policy, supervisors can be held liable where there is enough use of an unconstitutional practice that it becomes an unconstitutional custom), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Garrett v. Athens-Clark Cty., 378 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 141 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that an unwritten city policy of strip searching all detainees prior to court action was unconstitutional).

39. See, e.g., Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that if there is no formal written policy, “the plaintiff must allege a specific pattern or series of incidents that support the general allegation of a custom or policy: alleging one specific incident in which the plaintiff suffered a deprivation will not suffice.”); Gailor v. Armstrong, 187 F. Supp. 2d 729, 734 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (holding that one incident of failure to follow a jail’s excessive force policy plus thirty to forty other instances of excessive force over a ten-year period for which officers were punished was not enough to show a custom of failing to follow the excessive force policy).

Be aware that a person may act under color of state law even though the person does something that is illegal under state law. In other words, for something to be done under color of state law, it does not have to be legal to do it. For example, state law forbids a prison guard from assaulting you. But, if a prison guard assaults you, he is acting under color of state law because the guard carries a “badge of authority” from the state. Thus, “under color of state law” loosely means “as a representative of the state.”

(c) Third Requirement: Deprivation of Federal Right

The third and final requirement is that each person you sue must have deprived you of a right, privilege, or immunity you have under the Constitution or federal laws. In simpler terms, he must have violated one of your constitutional or federal statutory rights. Part B(2) explains the general rules for determining whether the constitutional rights of prisoners have been violated. It also gives examples of violations of constitutional rights. Part B(3) discusses Section 1983 claims for violations of rights that have been created by federal statutes.

2. Constitutional Bases for Section 1983 Claims

Not every violation of state law or prison regulations is a constitutional violation that you can challenge using Section 1983. For example, a prison may have a regulation stating that all general population prisoners are allowed five phone calls each week. This “right to five phone calls” is not a constitutional right. If the prison suddenly allows prisoners to make only one call each week, you won’t be able to sue using Section 1983. Instead, you may want to challenge that change in privileges through your prison’s grievance system or in a state court. Similarly, if a prison guard harms you or your property by acting negligently (carelessly), you won’t be able to sue using Section 1983. Instead, you may be able to sue using state tort law. For example, the Supreme Court has said that in a case where a prisoner ordered a package through the mail and the package was lost because a prison official didn’t follow proper mail procedures, the official’s action wasn’t enough for a Section 1983 claim because this wasn’t a failure of the state’s procedures but rather one person’s failure. Instead, the Court said that the prisoner should sue through state tort law, because the state already had a process that covered situations like this where state actors did something carelessly or recklessly that resulted in a prisoner losing property. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that where an inmate was injured because he slipped on a pillow that a sheriff’s deputy negligently left on a stairway, this was not a constitutional violation that could lead to a Section 1983 case, but a case that was better left to state tort law. On the other hand, if a prison guard were to intentionally push you down the stairs, or you could prove that

there was no contractual relationship between the prison and the physician); Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that private corporation under contract with the state to operate its prisons may be sued under Section 1983); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that defendant Prison Health Services workers, while not public employees, were clearly state actors); Christy v. Robinson, 216 F. Supp. 2d 398, 412 (D.N.J. 2002) (noting that doctors employed by a private medical association that contracts with the state to provide medical services to prisoners acts under color of state law); Mauldin v. Burnette, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1376–77 (M.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that a private individual who was responsible for signing a prisoner in and out of prison and supervising him on work release acted under color of state law). However, some courts have found that independent contractors were not acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Styles v. McGinnis, 28 F. App’x 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (holding that a doctor who was an independent contractor providing emergency services at a hospital where he treated plaintiff was not acting under color of state law); Nunez v. Horn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that doctor who treated the prisoner was not acting under color of state law because the treatment was provided at a non-prison hospital and the doctor was not under contract with the state or Bureau of Prisons to treat prisoners).


42. If a New York state prison is not following its own rules or policies, prisoners can also file an Article 78 petition. See Chapter 22 of the JLM for information on filing Article 78 petitions.

43. See Chapter 17 of the JLM for information on bringing a tort claim.


the guards in a prison had an unofficial game of intentionally leaving objects on stairs to injure people and you were injured as a result, you might be able to bring a Section 1983 claim in that case.

The next part of this Section begins with a general discussion of prisoners’ constitutional rights and the “reasonably related” test (Turner test). Parts B(2)(b) through B(2)(g) explain different constitutional rights that prisoners have and which specific constitutional amendments give them those rights. Make sure you read the other chapters of the JLM that also talk about these particular rights. Also, remember that your claim might involve violations of more than one constitutional right. Think about your situation from as many different angles as possible.

(a) General Framework for Prisoners’ Constitutional Rights

As discussed earlier, keep in mind that your constitutional rights are not absolute. The government is allowed to take away some of your rights in order to run the prison more safely or smoothly. When you sue government officials or agencies for violating your rights, the officials or agencies must explain to the court why they acted that way. The reasons they give must have some rational relationship to the violation of your rights. The court then balances your constitutional rights against the reasons given by the defendants for taking away some of those rights. Most of the time, courts accept the prison officials’ explanation for the violation and rule against the prisoner.

In your claim, you should emphasize why your right is important and reasonable and why the prison officials’ actions were unnecessary or unreasonable. Just saying that your rights were violated is usually not enough. You must try to expect and respond to the arguments that the prison will make about the need for security or order.

One of the leading Supreme Court cases dealing with prisoners’ constitutional rights is Turner v. Safley. In Turner, the Supreme Court held that when a prison regulation has an impact on a prisoner’s constitutional rights, the regulation is still valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” To be related to a “penological interest” means to be related to the punishment or crime and prison management. A penological interest is legitimate if it is a valid and justifiable concern for the prison and/or the officials operating the prison. Legitimate penological interests may include concerns for safety, discipline, effective punishment, and other management issues. Under the Turner test (also called the “reasonably related” test), a court will compare the importance of the state’s valid penological interests to the impact of the state’s actions on your rights.

The Turner test has been used in cases challenging both formal and informal prison policies and practices. It has also been used in cases challenging individual actions. The test applies both to prison regulations and to actions taken by prison officials. Note that Turner does not apply to claims of racial discrimination, Eighth Amendment violations, restrictions on private religious exercise, or some procedural due process claims.

49. See, e.g., Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 208 F. Supp. 2d 520, 529–31 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (applying Turner test to an individual chaplain’s decision to exclude a prisoner from religious services after the prisoner disrupted the service); Youngbear v. Thalacker, 174 F. Supp. 2d 902, 914 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (applying Turner test to administrative decision resulting in year-long delay in building a sweat lodge).
50. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510–11, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149, 160 L. Ed. 2d 949, 961–62 (2005) (holding that the Turner test could not be applied to evaluate prison policy of assigning new prisoners cellmates of the same race, and noting that Turner has never been applied to racial classifications). For more information on equal protection rights in prison, including the right against racial discrimination, see Part B(2)(d) of this Chapter.
51. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply Turner test to prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim); Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (refusing to apply to Turner test to prisoner’s 8th Amendment claim and noting that the Supreme Court has never used Turner for an 8th Amendment claim). For information on 8th Amendment claims for “cruel and unusual punishment,” see Part B(2)(d) of this Chapter.
52. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012), increased the protection for religious freedoms of prisoners and people in other institutions. Under RLUIPA, when the government restricts the exercise of religion in institutions like prisons, it must show that those restrictions serve a “compelling government interest” and are the “least restrictive means” of doing so. This is a higher standard than Turner’s “legitimate penological interest” test for restrictions on constitutional rights. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005).
To use the Turner test, courts ask if a regulation (or action) is “reasonably related” to the government’s interests. They do this by looking at four factors:

1. Whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the government’s reason for it;\(^{54}\)
2. Whether you still have other ways of exercising your constitutional right despite the regulation;\(^{55}\)
3. Whether there will be a “ripple effect”\(^{56}\) on the rights of others if you are allowed to exercise the right;\(^{57}\) and
4. Whether there is an easy way to meet the regulation’s goal without limiting your constitutional right.\(^{58}\)

In most cases challenging prison regulations, the government wins. This is because the Turner test only requires the government to have a rational explanation (one that makes sense) for the regulation. This is not a very high standard for the government to meet. The government needs to show that there is a connection between the regulation you are challenging and the purpose it is supposed to accomplish.\(^{59}\) However, it does not need to show that the regulation is better than other regulations that would be less restrictive. This means that even if there are other potential regulations that would help the government achieve its goals without impacting prisoners’ rights, the government can still pass the Turner test.

In the Turner case, the Court applied this test to a prison regulation banning prisoners from sending or receiving letters from prisoners at other prisons (not including family members). The prison argued that letters between prisoners could be used to plan escapes or assaults. Looking at factor (1), the Court first found that preventing escapes and assaults was a valid government interest, and that banning letters between prisoners was a rational way to help prevent escapes and assaults. As for factor (2), the Court noted that prisoners still had other ways to exercise their First Amendment rights to express themselves, since prisoners could write to others in prison and allow prisoners to pray together in community rooms.

A “ripple effect” means that you being able to exercise this right could affect the use of prison resources, affect the safety of guards, affect other prisoners, etc. For example, if a large group of religious prisoners are allowed to pray in the chapel while everyone else is on lockdown, this might either mean that too many guards have to be there to watch the chapel and leave other parts of the prison unguarded, or that the prison would have groups of unguarded prisoners in violation of safety procedures. This in turn might make the non-religious prisoners who do have to be in lockdown resentful and demand that they also be allowed special privileges, and this could cause a domino effect.

55. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 79 (1987) (explaining “[w]here ‘other avenues’ remain available for the exercise of the asserted right courts should particularly conscious” of giving weight to prison officials’ decisions (citation omitted)). For example, in McRoy v. Cook County Department of Corrections, 366 F. Supp. 2d 662, 676–77 (N.D. Ill. 2005), a court upheld a prison’s cancellation of Muslim services on certain occasions, in part because the court found that the prison had provided other opportunities for a prisoner to observe his religion, such as allowing him to keep religious materials and allowing prisoners to pray together in community rooms.
56. A “ripple effect” means that you being able to exercise this right could affect the use of prison resources, affect the safety of guards, affect other prisoners, etc. For example, if a large group of religious prisoners are allowed to pray in the chapel while everyone else is on lockdown, this might either mean that too many guards have to be there to watch the chapel and leave other parts of the prison unguarded, or that the prison would have groups of unguarded prisoners in violation of safety procedures. This in turn might make the non-religious prisoners who do have to be in lockdown resentful and demand that they also be allowed special privileges, and this could cause a domino effect.
57. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 79–80 (1987) (“A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally . . . . When accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials.”).
58. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262–63, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 79–80 (1987) (“[T]he absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation . . . . By the same token, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”). A prison that is able to meet a goal by using one of several different rules is not required to choose the rule that has the least impact on your rights. However, the fact that there are alternative rules that accomplish the same goals may be considered evidence that the rule you are challenging is unreasonable, especially if the alternative rules do not have additional drawbacks. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 80 (1987).
59. See Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 48 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding the factual record provided by the prison was too “skimpy” to determine whether the prison’s refusal to provide a pork-free meal to a prisoner was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest); Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385–87 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that prison officials must provide support for the justifications of their regulations: assertions made without explanation or factual support are not enough). But see Whitmire v. Arizona, 298 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that a plaintiff's case should not be dismissed unless the prison has provided evidence supporting a rational relationship between a policy and the policy’s justification, or unless there is a “common-sense connection” between the policy and the prison’s penological interests); Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1235 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (refusing to require “evidence of a valid, rational connection” between the claimed goals of a policy and the policy itself, and instead using a “common sense” approach to whether a policy is reasonably related to legitimate correctional interests).
and receive letters from anyone besides other prisoners. Under factor (3), The Court found that allowing prisoners to correspond with other prisoners would have a significant “ripple effect” on others, because it might threaten the safety of other prisoners and prison guards. Finally, looking at factor (4), the Court found that there was no simple alternative way of ensuring that escapes and assaults were not planned through letters between prisoners. After going through the four factors, the Court held that the regulation was “reasonably related” to legitimate interests in security. As a result, the Court held that the prison could keep the rule in place even though it interfered with prisoners’ First Amendment rights to free expression and communication.60

However, Turner also decided that a regulation preventing prisoners from marrying unless the superintendent found “compelling circumstances” was not “reasonably related” to legitimate security concerns.61 The prison had claimed that the regulation was justified because “love triangles” among prisoners might lead to violence. The Court stated that there was no reasonable relationship between preventing marriage and preventing violence, since “love triangles” were just as likely when prisoners were unmarried. The Court also mentioned that a prisoner’s marriage was generally a private decision that would not have a “ripple effect” on others. The Court said that less restrictive regulations on prisoner marriages, such as those used at many other prisons, would still meet the concerns of prison officials.

As you can see from these examples, you need to carefully consider how to argue your claim in terms of the four factors. You have a better chance of success if a regulation completely deprives you of the ability to exercise your right, since such a regulation fails factor (2). In these cases, you should suggest other rules that could accomplish the same prison goal without completely violating your rights. Comparing the bad practices of your prison with the better practices of other prisons may also be helpful.

Parts B(2)(b) through B(2)(g) address specific constitutional rights and give examples of claims brought under Section 1983 by prisoners. Many of these rights are addressed in other parts of the JLM in much more detail. Make sure you read any other relevant JLM chapters.

(b) First Amendment Claims

The First Amendment to the Constitution states that:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.62

In other words, the First Amendment protects your rights to practice your religion, express yourself, and communicate with others. Your rights under the First Amendment can take many forms, and several chapters of the JLM address these rights in detail. For a summary of your right to freedom of expression and your right to communicate, see Chapter 19 of the JLM, “Your Right to Communicate with the Outside World.” If your religious rights are being violated, you may want to sue under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)63 or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)64 instead of Section 1983.

60. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2263–64, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 81–82 (1987) (“The prohibition on correspondence is reasonably related to valid corrections goals. The rule is content neutral, it logically advances the goals of institutional security and safety . . . and it is not an exaggerated response to those objectives.”). But see Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a prison had not established a valid reason for a regulation banning newspaper clippings sent through the mail).

61. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97–98, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2266, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 84 (1987) (“The Missouri prison regulation . . . [restricting prisoner marriage] represents an exaggerated response to . . . security objectives. There are obvious, easy alternatives to the Missouri regulation that accommodate the right to marry while imposing a [minimal] burden on the . . . security objectives.”). Although the right to marry comes from the substantive due process part of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not from the First Amendment, the analysis on how to balance the rights is the same.

62. U.S. Const. amend. I.


64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012). Note that you can only use RLUIPA if the agency that operates your prison receives
It is more difficult for the prison to defend a regulation against a RLUIPA or RFRA lawsuit than a Section 1983 lawsuit.\(^{65}\) See Chapter 27 of the *JLM*, "Religious Freedom in Prison," for more information.

(c) Fourth Amendment Claims

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”\(^{66}\) It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of pretrial detainees and other individuals confined by the state who have not been convicted of a crime.\(^{67}\) The Fourth Amendment also protects convicted prisoners from unreasonably intrusive body searches\(^{68}\) (but, in most cases, this does not apply to cell searches\(^{69}\)). Illegal body searches are discussed in Chapter 25 of the *JLM*, “Your Right To Be Free From Illegal Body Searches.”

(d) Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”\(^{70}\) Most cases prisoners bring under the Eighth Amendment relate to “cruel and unusual punishment.” There are several types of claims courts will consider under the cruel and unusual punishment part of the Eighth Amendment. These claims include alleged harm resulting from prison conditions, inadequate medical care, and assault. The cases below provide some specific examples of Eighth Amendment claims that courts have recognized.

Note that you should read Chapter 14 of the *JLM*, “The Prison Litigation Reform Act” (“PLRA”), if you plan to file a claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The PLRA prohibits federal lawsuits by prisoners for compensatory damages\(^{71}\) for mental or emotional injury without accompanying physical injury,\(^{72}\) with limited exceptions\(^{73}\).

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\(^{65}\) See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that RLUIPA was designed to enhance protection of prisoners’ religious freedom by replacing the *Turner* “legitimate public interest” test with a “compelling interest” test).

\(^{66}\) U.S. Const. amend. IV.

\(^{67}\) See Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 63–66 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing a pretrial detainee to challenge a prison’s strip-search policy).

\(^{68}\) See, e.g., Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609, 611 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that invasive strip searches of a prisoner’s private areas without probable cause outweighed the prison’s security justifications).

\(^{69}\) See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 590–91, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3235, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438, 450 (1984) (holding searches of pretrial detainees’ cells in their absence to be constitutional because government interest in conducting prisoner searches and maintaining security in this manner outweighed contrary interests of detainees); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 402–03 (1984) (holding that the 4th Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches does not apply to prison cells because “[t]he recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions”); Willis v. Artuz, 301 F.3d 65, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that prisoners are not protected from cell searches by prosecutors or police even though such searches are not related to prison security). But see United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that a search of a pretrial detainee’s cell, solely to gather information for the prosecutor, violated the 4th Amendment).

\(^{70}\) U.S. Const. amend. VIII (emphasis added).

\(^{71}\) Compensatory damages are awarded to make you “whole” by putting you back in the same position you were in before you suffered the wrong. An example of compensatory damages would be the cost of medical bills. They are different from punitive damages which are meant to punish the wrongdoer rather than to compensate you for your injuries. See Part C(1)(a) of this Chapter for a more complete explanation of compensatory damages.

\(^{72}\) 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2013). The statute states that “no Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” Courts have held that the statute only prohibits compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury, so prisoners can still claim other forms of damages or injunctive relief for mental or emotional injuries.

\(^{73}\) Courts are split on the applicability of Section 1997e(e) to 1st Amendment claims. *Compare* Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir.1998) (“The deprivation of First Amendment rights entitles a plaintiff to judicial relief wholly aside from any physical injury he can show, or any mental or emotional injury he may have incurred.”); and Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA is unconstitutional as applied to 1st Amendment claims to the extent that it bars recovery of damages for emotional harms without physical injury); with Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir.2001) (“[T]he plain language of the statute does not permit alteration of its clear damages restrictions on the basis of the underlying rights being asserted.”).
A claim that prison conditions or practices constitute cruel and unusual punishment must satisfy two tests. These tests are referred to as “objective” and “subjective” tests:

1. The objective test requires that prison conditions be objectively bad enough to be considered cruel and unusual. Conditions must amount to “unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs” or deprivation of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” or they must include the “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”  

2. The subjective test requires that prison officials had a certain state of mind when they created the conditions you are challenging. In most prison conditions cases, the standard is “deliberate indifference,” which means that the officials must have had actual knowledge that they were subjecting you to an excessive risk of harm or other objectively unconstitutional conditions.

Under the objective test, as mentioned above, if your complaint is about the conditions of your imprisonment, you have to show that, “alone or in combination,” the conditions deprived you of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Life’s necessities (or basic human needs) include “food, clothing,

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74. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347–48, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399–2400, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 69–70 (1981) (finding that a practice of placing two prisoners in a single cell did not violate the 8th Amendment, when the practice was necessary due to an increase in prison population and the practice did not cause “unnecessary and wanton pain”).


76. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3202, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 405 (1984). Note that in Hudson the Court found that the conduct did not rise to the level of calculated harassment.

77. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 168 (1992) (allowing claim to go forward even where there was no significant injury or need for medical attention).

78. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1522, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a policy of “random, non-emergency, suspicionless clothed body searches on female prisoners” by male guards violated the 8th Amendment).

79. See, e.g., Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that, if true, allegation that corrections officer brandished a gun and threatened to kill prisoner could be an 8th Amendment violation); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a prisoner has a right to be free from “the terror of instant and unexpected death at the whim of his allegedly bigoted custodian”).

80. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 35–36, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2480–82, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22, 31, 33 (1993) (explaining “[w]e have great difficulty agreeing that prison authorities may not be deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s current health problems but may ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year” and allowing prisoner assigned a cellmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day to make a claim of future harm from secondhand smoke).

81. See, e.g., Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that prisoner who was threatened with a knife, denied requests for medical attention, and continuously aggressively taunted by guard could claim a violation of the 8th Amendment).


shelter, medical care and reasonable safety,” warmth, exercise and the “basic elements of hygiene.” If you are trying to show that several conditions combined to deprive you of a life necessity, keep in mind that the conditions must have a “mutually enforcing [combined] effect that [deprives] you of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.” For example, you may suffer cruel and unusual punishment if the inadequate heat in your cell-block, combined with the prison’s failure to issue blankets, deprives you of warmth.

Under the subjective test, as mentioned above, you must show that the prison officials had a certain state of mind when they injured you or failed to provide for your basic human needs. The exact state of mind needed will depend on whether your claim is for inadequate prison conditions, inadequate medical care, assault, or issues related to work or exercise. These issues are described in the next few sections.

The amount of harm that the court will require you to show also varies depending on the type of Eighth Amendment claim that you bring. For example, if you are complaining about prison guard brutality, you may not have to show that your injury was “serious.” Instead, you may only have to show that it was more than minor and that the assault was unjustified under the circumstances. On the other hand, if your claim is that you were deprived of medical care, you will have to show that your medical needs were sufficiently “serious” and that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to them.

(i) Prison Conditions

Poor prison conditions may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. If they do, then they violate the Eighth Amendment. Such conditions can include a lack of basic necessities or the presence of safety hazards, like poor fire prevention safety measures. Excessively long confinement in a small cell and denial of outdoor

86. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271, 283 (1991); Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352–53 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that overnight exposure to winds and cold with no means of keeping warm could violate the 8th Amendment). But see Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that only exposure to “extreme” cold could violate the 8th Amendment, and that a prisoner with two blankets and layers of clothes was not exposed to such “extreme” conditions).
88. Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1971)) (holding that depriving 49 prisoners of toilet facilities in a small area could violate the 8th Amendment); see also Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025–26 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant who alleged an inability to bathe for several months resulting in a fungal infection requiring medical attention stated an 8th Amendment claim). But see Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that confinement in cell with blood on floor and excrement on wall was not unconstitutional because it was only for three days and cleaning supplies were available).
89. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271, 283 (1991) (“Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.”).
90. See, e.g., Wilson v. Schomig, 864 F. Supp. 789, 795–96 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that lack of heat in prison cells may, combined with other circumstances such as cold temperatures, violate 8th Amendment principles).
91. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000–01, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 168 (1992) (holding that an assault on a prisoner by prison guards resulting in a cracked dental plate and minor bruises and swelling was enough harm to constitute a valid 8th Amendment claim).
93. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a state must provide “prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety so as to avoid the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment”) (quoting Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S. Ct. 3057, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1114 (1978); Nicholson v. Choctaw County, 498 F. Supp. 283, 308–11 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (finding that 8th Amendment rights had been violated through, among other things, the unsanitary conditions in the jail, the lack of adequate medical care, unsafe conditions, and the lack of religious services or instruction).
94. See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783–84 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that hazardous work environment, inadequate lighting, plumbing, fire safety, and ventilation, and vermin infestation could constitute inhumane conditions in violation of the 8th Amendment); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a state must provide
exercise can also violate the Eighth Amendment.\(^9\) Other conditions that may be cruel and unusual punishment include unsanitary facilities, overcrowding, and inadequate heating and ventilation.\(^9\) Some courts have held that failing to protect prisoners from secondhand smoke may violate the Eighth Amendment.\(^7\) However, secondhand smoke cases usually require prisoners to show that the secondhand smoke poses an unreasonable risk of future harm to their health.\(^8\) For more information about addressing secondhand smoke exposure, see Chapter 23 of the JLM, “Your Right to Adequate Medical Care.”

Overcrowding is not unconstitutional in itself,\(^9\) but courts have found that it can violate prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights when it leads to harmful consequences.\(^10\) For example, prisoners have successfully sued because a prison’s failure to check newcomers for contagious diseases, combined with overcrowding, increased the risk of infection.\(^10\)

Some Section 1983 claims challenge prison housing arrangements. Courts have generally held that double-celling (placing two prisoners in each cell) is constitutional as long as both prisoners are provided with their basic needs. These needs include having enough space to sleep and a clean interior. Double-celling is not a constitutional violation by itself because prisoners may still enjoy their rights and because prison officials have strong administrative concerns in providing housing for all prisoners.\(^10\) Similarly, administrative segregation does not violate a prisoner’s rights.\(^10\) However, it is unconstitutional for prison officials to put you in

“prisoners with reasonably adequate . . . personal safety so as to avoid the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment”) (quoting Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S. Ct. 3057, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1114 (1978)). But see Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 938–39 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring more than a single defective piece of equipment to create inhumane conditions).

95. See Perkins v. Kan. Dept. of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 810 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding allegation of prolonged denial of outdoor exercise could violate the 8th Amendment): Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that with the exception of “inclement weather, unusual circumstances, or disciplinary needs that [make it] impossible,” outdoor exercise is required when prisoners are otherwise confined to small cells 24 hours per day).

96. See, e.g., Palmer v. Johnson, 195 F.3d 346, 352–53 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that the combined circumstances of overnight outdoor confinement without shelter, blanket, heating, or access to bathroom facilities were a denial of necessities in violation of the 8th Amendment); DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that prisoner stated sufficient 8th Amendment claim in Section 1983 complaint alleging unsanitary and dangerous conditions): French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1252–53, 1257 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that overcrowding, medical neglect, and failure to protect prisoners from threats to safety violated the 8th Amendment): Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez Colon, 697 F. Supp. 37, 40–45 (D.P.R. 1988) (ruling that overcrowding, vermin-infestation, and otherwise unsanitary conditions violated the 8th Amendment): Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388, 1409–11 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding constitutional violation due to certain conditions, including double-celling, insufficient ventilation and heating, and inadequate and unsanitary clothing and bedding supplies, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986).

97. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 262–66 (3d Cir. 2003) (allowing prisoner to go forward with 8th Amendment claim that exposure to secondhand smoke posed a substantial risk of future harm); Gill v. Smith, 283 F. Supp. 2d 763, 769 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (allowing prisoner with asthma to go forward with 8th Amendment claim that exposure to secondhand smoke posed an unreasonable risk of future harm to his health).


99. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2400, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 69–70 (1981) (finding no constitutional violation when double-celling “did not lead to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” and did not “increase violence among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for prison confinement”).

100. See, e.g., Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 427–28 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that double-celling due to overcrowding, in combination with other factors, such as the physical condition of the cell, violated the 8th Amendment): Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804, 807–08 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting prisoners an injunction against the closing of a facility that would result in overcrowding in other prisons): Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1561, 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the level of both prisoner-prisoner violence and staff-prisoner violence resulting, in part, from overcrowding violated the 8th Amendment), aff’d, 902 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1990).


102. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2400, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 70 (1981) (holding that double-celling did not violate the 8th Amendment since it did not lead to deprivations of basic needs, and did not “increase violence among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for prison confinement”).

103. See, e.g., Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 589–90 (2d. Cir. 1999) (finding that administrative confinement, after a required factual determination that plaintiff posed a threat to prison safety, was not an “atypical and significant hardship” when compared to the ordinary conditions of prison life). Note that Sealey is not an 8th Amendment case, but was brought under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
administrative segregation in order to get back at you for filing a complaint or claim. Cases complaining about administrative segregation are brought as substantive due process claims, not Eighth Amendment claims. For a discussion of substantive due process, see Part B(2)(e)(i) below. Claims for inadequate cell assignments often overlap with Eighth Amendment claims for assault. If you think you have these claims you should be sure to review the cases cited in this section and Chapter 24 of the JLM, “Your Right to be Free From Assault by Prison Guards and Other Prisoners.”

(ii) Inadequate Medical Care and Other Health Risks

Inadequate medical care can also violate the Eighth Amendment. Unreasonable risks to your health may violate the Eighth Amendment even if you have not been harmed yet. For information on your right to medical care, see Chapter 23 of the JLM, “Your Right to Adequate Medical Care.”

(iii) Assault

In at least one Section 1983 case, the Supreme Court has held that the infliction of pain on prisoners by guards through practices such as handcuffing prisoners to hitching posts for prolonged periods of time violates the Eight Amendment. Further, many Section 1983 cases have claimed that prison officials’ failure to protect prisoners from assaults by other prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment. For more detailed information, see Chapter 24 of the JLM, “Your Right To Be Free From Assault by Prison Guards and Other Prisoners.”

(iv) Exercise, Work, and Education

Eighth Amendment claims challenging deprivations of exercise and recreation have had mixed results. Whether a prisoner’s right to exercise has been violated depends on whether he has been deprived of his basic needs. Because prison officials are constitutionally required to provide for the health of prisoners, they must generally allow prisoners to have certain minimum levels of exercise. This right is violated only if a prisoner’s movement is denied, his muscles are allowed to waste, or his health is threatened. Most courts will not find that a deprivation of recreation time violates constitutional rights, since general recreation, unlike exercise, does not necessarily affect prisoners’ health.

Eighth Amendment claims challenging deprivations of meaningful work or educational programs have not been very successful. The Supreme Court has said that limited work hours or delays in accessing education do not cause pain and are not punishments, and thus that deprivations like these generally are not protected by the Eighth Amendment.

104. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2000) (allowing a prisoner to go forward with a due process claim that he was kept in administrative segregation in retaliation for filing civil rights suits).

105. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2482, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22, 33 (1993) (holding that exposure to extreme levels of environmental tobacco smoke that pose an unreasonable risk to future health may be an 8th Amendment violation, and that the plaintiff did not need to wait until he was actually harmed to ask a court to correct unsafe conditions). But see Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 540 (8th Cir. 1988) (denying a prisoner’s 8th Amendment claim based on exposure to HIV in prison, because it was based on an “unsubstantiated fear”).

106. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738, 745, 746, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2514–15, 2518, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666, 682 (2002) (reversing judgment that guards were entitled to qualified immunity and holding that defendants could be liable under Section 1983 for violating a prisoner’s 8th Amendment rights by handcuffing the prisoner to a hitching post for seven hours in extreme heat, without bathroom breaks or an adequate supply of drinking water).

107. See Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding an 8th Amendment violation where prisoners in a segregation unit were allowed only one hour each week of exercise outside of their cells); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255–56 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that lack of physical exercise may be a constitutional violation); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979) (“the denial of fresh air and regular outdoor exercise and recreation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment . . . .” (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 547 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979)). But see Anderson v. Coughlin, 757 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[N]either an occasional day without exercise when weather conditions preclude outdoor activity nor reliance on running, calisthenics, and isometric and aerobic exercises in lieu of games is cruel and unusual punishment.”).

108. French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255–56 (7th Cir. 1985) (when “movement is denied and muscles allowed to atrophy, the health of the individual is threatened and the state’s constitutional obligation” is affected); see also Mitchell v. Rice, 854 F.2d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that prisons may restrict exercise only in exceptional circumstances, such as when an adult prisoner is in disciplinary segregation).

Courts have routinely applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to say that the state cannot “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Courts have said that this creates two separate types of protections: “substantive due process” and “procedural due process.”

Substantive Due Process

The substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause says that the government may not interfere with your fundamental individual rights in a way that is not “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” The idea of liberty in the Constitution includes some rights that you keep even when you become a prisoner. In general, your substantive due process rights are violated when state officials deprive you of this liberty. For example, you have a right to bodily privacy, a right to informational privacy and confidentiality, a right to get married, and a right to refuse medical or psychiatric treatment. All of these rights are protected under substantive due process. This protection has limits, however. The government only violates your substantive due process rights when it acts in a way that is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal. Whether a government action reasonably relates to a legitimate goal is determined using the Turner test, described above in Part B(2)(a).

As mentioned above, the right to bodily privacy is one of the liberty rights you keep while in prison. This right includes a limited right to not be viewed unclothed or strip-searched by members of the opposite sex. This right is often, but not always, outweighed by prison security interests. Bodily privacy also includes the right to an abortion, which some courts have upheld for prisoners.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment says that the state cannot “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Courts have said that this creates two separate types of protections: “substantive due process” and “procedural due process.”

(e) Fourteenth Amendment Claims: Due Process Clause

See, e.g., Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the right to bodily privacy may have been violated where male prisoners were subject to unclothed observation by female guards); Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding parolee’s privacy right not to be under surveillance by a guard of the opposite sex while giving a urine sample). But see Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 745–46 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that security concerns justified a prison’s use of female prison guards to monitor male prisoners in showers and bathrooms); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1216–17 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that issuing suitable sleepwear and covering cell windows during changing times adequately protects female prisoners’ privacy interest in not being viewed by male guards). See Chapter 25 of the JLM, “Your Right To Be Free From Illegal Body Searches,” for more information.

110. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. The 14th Amendment applies to state government action. The 5th Amendment contains an identical prohibition: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” and applies to the federal government. U.S. Const. amend. V. Federal prisoners therefore usually use the 5th Amendment instead of the 14th Amendment to challenge due process violations.

111. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87, 89 S. Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 77–79 (1987) (finding that prison regulations that affect constitutional rights can only be upheld if they have a rational connection to a legitimate government interest); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224–26, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1038–39, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 200–01 (1990) (reasoning that the right to be free of psychotropic medication had to be balanced against the state’s duty to treat mentally ill prisoners and run a safe prison).

112. See, e.g., Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the right to bodily privacy may have been violated where male prisoners were subject to unclothed observation by female guards); Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding parolee’s privacy right not to be under surveillance by a guard of the opposite sex while giving a urine sample). But see Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 745–46 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that security concerns justified a prison’s use of female prison guards to monitor male prisoners in showers and bathrooms); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1216–17 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that issuing suitable sleepwear and covering cell windows during changing times adequately protects female prisoners’ privacy interest in not being viewed by male guards). See Chapter 25 of the JLM, “Your Right To Be Free From Illegal Body Searches,” for more information.

113. Courts have routinely applied the Turner reasonableness test to determine if a prisoner’s right to an abortion is violated by prison rules that prohibit all abortions or that allow them only if the prisoner obtains a court order. See Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 794–98 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Missouri Department of Corrections’ policy of prohibiting transportation of pregnant prisoners off-site for elective, non-therapeutic abortions violated prisoner’s 14th Amendment due process rights); Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 338–44 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the county’s administrative and economic reasons for limiting access to elective abortions for prisoners did not meet the Turner reasonableness standard); Doe v. Arpajo 150 P.3d 1258, 1262–65, 214 Ariz. 237, 241–44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a prisoner’s policy requiring a prisoner to obtain a court order to receive an elective, non-therapeutic abortion off-site served no “legitimate penological interest”). But see Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 486–89 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a prison’s policy of requiring prisoners to obtain a court order before receiving elective medical procedures, including abortions, was reasonable under the Turner framework); Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 536–37 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that prison officials’ negligent failure to provide a prisoner with a requested abortion was not unconstitutional); Bryant v. Maffucci, 729 F. Supp. 319, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding no constitutional violation in a policy of scheduling requested abortions that, because of a misread sonogram, resulted in a prisoner’s appointment being set after the legally permissible time period and prevented her from obtaining an abortion). For more information on female
The right to informational privacy and confidentiality is another substantive due process right. Some courts have said that this gives HIV-positive prisoners a right to not have their HIV status disclosed to non-medical personnel. Segregation of HIV-positive prisoners can also violate the substantive due process right to informational privacy. However, not all courts agree that disclosure of prisoners’ HIV status impacts a constitutionally protected right.

The Supreme Court has also held that the right to marriage and the right to marital privacy are fundamental and protected by substantive due process.

There are two important points that you should know if you are thinking of bringing a Section 1983 lawsuit based on a substantive due process violation. First, if the “liberty” that you feel was violated is specifically protected by another constitutional amendment, you should make a claim that your rights were violated under that amendment rather than under substantive due process. For example, if you are not given proper access to medical care, you should not argue that you are suffering a substantive due process violation of life or liberty, since inadequate medical care is specifically covered by your right under the Eighth Amendment not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

Second, to bring a lawsuit for a substantive due process violation, you must show that the officials who violated your liberty rights acted with “deliberate indifference” to your rights. If your claim is related to risk to safety or health, Farmer v. Brennan suggests that the standard for a violation is even higher. Here, the Court stated that “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” The definition of deliberate indifference varies from circuit to circuit, so be sure to look at cases raising similar claims in your circuit to see how your circuit defines deliberate indifference.

These cases and provisions protect your right to informational privacy and confidentiality.

Prisoners’ access to abortions, see Part D(2) of Chapter 23 of the JLM, “Your Right to Adequate Medical Care.”

114. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the 14th Amendment protects a prisoner’s right to medical privacy, subject to legitimate penological interests); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (finding prisoners’ substantive due process rights violated when prison officials allowed non-medical employees and other prisoners to learn their HIV status), aff’d 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990); Nolley v. Cnty. of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 731 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that prisoners are protected by a constitutional right to privacy from the unwarranted disclosure of their HIV status), withdrawn in part and modified in part on other grounds, 798 F. Supp. 123 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that prisoners must be afforded some protection against nonconsensual disclosure of their HIV status).

115. For information and cases on segregation of prisoners with HIV, see Chapter 26 of the JLM, “Infectious Diseases: AIDS, Hepatitis, Tuberculosis, and MRSA in Prisons.”

116. Reed v. Allen, 379 Fed. App’x 879, 883 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner challenging a policy of requiring HIV-positive prisoners to wear white wristbands had not “clearly established” a violation of a constitutional right); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1514–15 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a prison’s policy of segregating HIV-positive prisoners from the rest of the general population, and thereby disclosing their HIV-status to other prisoners, served a legitimate penological goal).

117. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2265, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 83 (1987) (holding that the right to marry is subject to substantial restrictions due to incarceration, but that it is still a constitutionally protected right in the prison context).


119. See Jackson v. Hamm, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1242 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under substantive due process.”).


121. For claims concerning medical care, prisoners must show that they were denied medical care for a “serious medical need” and that the denial was the result of an official’s “deliberate indifference”. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291–92, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 260 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835–40, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977–80, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 824–27 (1994) (defining “deliberate indifference” in context of risk to safety and health); Marshall v. Crandall, 20 Fed. App’x 633, 634 (9th Cir. 2001) (mem.) (unpublished) (holding that a prisoner failed to show deliberate indifference where prison nurses responded to his fractured rib with non-prescription painkillers); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a difference of medical opinion does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference); Lloyd v. Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a prisoner asserted a plausible claim of deliberate indifference where prison officials failed to give him an MRI nearly one year after he suffered a torn rotator cuff and ripped tendon in his shoulder). For claims concerning personal liberty and security, prisoners need only show that officials’ conduct amounted to deliberate indifference to their personal security. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a jury could find prison officials’ decision to place a heterosexual male in a cell with an “aggressive homosexual,” resulting in his rape, to be deliberate indifference to the
Finally, claiming a violation of one of the fundamental liberties described in this section is not the only way to sue under substantive due process. Courts have also held that state officials violate substantive due process when they act in a way that "shocks the conscience." However, courts have not clearly defined what that phrase means. In *Rochin v. California*, the Supreme Court found that forcibly pumping a person's stomach to obtain evidence was shocking to the conscience. But, in high-speed police car chases, the Court has stated that a police officer's behavior only shocks the conscience if the officer acts "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." In general, you will probably only be able to bring this type of claim if a state official has harmed you by intentionally acting in a way that is truly outrageous.

(ii) Procedural Due Process

You have a right to procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This means that the government cannot deprive you of life, liberty, or property without going through certain procedures ("due process"). In order to argue that your procedural due process rights were violated, you must show two things. First, that you were deprived of liberty or property. And second, that the deprivation occurred without enough procedural protection. Demonstrating that you were deprived of liberty or property means showing that either your liberty or your property was taken from you in a way that is not typical of prison life. You must also show that the prison officials' actions were not accidental or simply careless, and that instead, they were deliberate decisions to deprive you of liberty or property.

Prisoners often file procedural due process claims after a prison administrative procedure or hearing happens in a way that is unfair to them. For example, a prisoner may bring a claim if he was not told about the hearing in advance or was deprived of an opportunity to defend himself in some other way. For a discussion of due process claims relating to disciplinary and administrative segregation and loss of good time credits, work release programs, and parole, see Chapter 18 of the *JLM, Your Rights at Prison Disciplinary Proceedings,* Chapter 18 also explains the Supreme Court's important decision in *Sandin v. Conner.* *Sandin* sets the procedural due process requirements in prison settings.

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prisoner's personal security): Mertwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that prison officials' failure to act to prevent abuse of prisoners allegedly involved in a violent insurrection rose to the level of deliberate indifference because the officials should have known that the prisoners' reputations would expose them to hostility from guards).


124. Procedural protection refers to the requirement that if you are deprived of due process, you are at least granted certain procedural safeguards. These safeguards include the right to a hearing, the right to counsel, and an opportunity to speak in one's own defense, all of which serve to protect the prisoner or the accused. *See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner,* 515 U.S. 472, 487, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2302, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 432 (1995) (holding that a parole hearing to explain the circumstances behind a prisoner's misconduct record sufficed to afford "procedural protection" for a parole board's decision not to grant parole); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 952 (1974) (holding that the determination of prisoners' guilt of "serious misconduct," for which they could lose "good-time credits," requires some sort of hearing to safeguard the minimum requirements of procedural due process). You should be aware that the Court's discussion of due process requirements for solitary confinement in *Wolff* is not good law. *See* Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 431 (1995) (holding that solitary confinement "did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest").

125. *See* Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 430 (1995) (holding that due process liberty interests created by prison regulations will generally be limited to freedom from restraints that impose an atypical and significant hardship on the prisoner in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life).

126. *See* Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–32, 106 S. Ct. 662, 664–65, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 668 (1986) (holding that negligence is not enough to constitute a violation under the Due Process Clause). There, a prison official negligently (or carelessly) left a pillow in a stairwell, which created an unsafe environment for prisoners.

127. *See, e.g., Jones v. Ray,* 279 F.3d 944, 946 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that a parole board's reliance on false information in a parole file can violate procedural due process, if the parolee can present evidence to support that claim); Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding 305 days in segregation to be an adequate departure from normal prison life so as to require procedural due process protections); Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 394 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that a 90-day confinement in segregation may require due process protections).

The amount of procedural protection required to protect your rights and the exact procedures that prisons must use depend on the situation. For example, if prison officials know in advance that they are going to take away your liberty or property, then they have to provide some type of procedure (such as a hearing) before the deprivation occurs. If they do not, you may be able to bring a claim under Section 1983. However, if the deprivation is necessary because of an emergency situation or if it occurs accidentally, then process (such as a hearing) is not required until after the deprivation occurs. Some courts have held that the availability of a remedy (such as compensation for lost property) under state tort law is enough to meet the requirement of due process even if you cannot actually win the state claim because of governmental immunity. If there is a remedy for the deprivation of liberty or property under state law, you may not be allowed to bring a suit under Section 1983.

(f) Fourteenth Amendment Claims: The Equal Protection Clause

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees all persons in the United States, including prisoners, “the equal protection of the laws.” This means that the state may not treat you differently or discriminate against you because you belong to a particular group or “class” of people. In general, a prisoner must meet two requirements to make a claim under the Equal Protection Clause: First, your claim must state that you were treated differently from other prisoners who were in a similar situation or similar circumstances. Second, your claim must state that the unequal treatment resulted from intentional process liberty interests created by prison regulations will generally be limited to freedom from restraints that impose an atypical and significant hardship on the prisoner in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

129. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 139, 110 S. Ct. 975, 990, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100, 122 (1990) (holding that plaintiff had made a sufficient due process claim when it was shown that a deprivation of his rights was foreseeable and pre-deprivation safeguards could have prevented the harm suffered).


131. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 585 n.3 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that adequate state law remedies are not made inadequate by defendants’ ability to raise immunity defenses); Jackson v. Hamm, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that a state tort claim for false imprisonment was an adequate remedy even if the defendants were immune from being sued); Irshad v. Spann, 543 F. Supp. 222, 928–29 (E.D. Va. 1982) (finding a state remedy could be adequate even if defendants were immune from suit). But see Larramendy v. Newton, 994 F. Supp. 1211, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that state tort law is not sufficient to satisfy due process where a state defendant would be absolutely immune from being sued under state law, thereby making recovery impossible); Soto v. Lord, 693 F. Supp. 8, 15–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); Madden v. City of Meriden, 692 F. Supp. 1160, 1169 (D. Conn. 1985) (noting that state remedy is inadequate for procedural due process purposes if defendant cannot be sued); Harper v. Scott, 577 F. Supp. 15, 17–18 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that state law remedies are inadequate where defendants are immune from suit).

132. See City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 119 S. Ct. 678, 142 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999) (holding that police seizure of private property during a criminal investigation did not violate due process where the police gave plaintiffs a list of the property seized, and where information regarding state law remedies for the return of seized property were published and publicly accessible, even though the police did not actually notify plaintiffs that they could retrieve their property). For more information, see Chapter 17 of the JLM, “The State’s Duty to Protect You and Your Property: Tort Actions.”

133. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

134. See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730–31 (4th Cir. 2002) (naming the two requirements that must be met for a prisoner to make an equal protection claim); Wilson v. Taylor, 515 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472 (D. Del. 2007) (same); Williams v. Manternach, 192 F. Supp. 2d 980, 990 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (same).

135. Klinger v. Dept. of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause requires the state to treat people alike when they are in similar situations).
or purposeful discrimination.\textsuperscript{136} You are most likely to be able to make an equal protection claim if you have been discriminated against because of your race,\textsuperscript{137} gender,\textsuperscript{138} ethnicity,\textsuperscript{139} or disability.\textsuperscript{140}

You may also have an equal protection claim if you are discriminated against because of your custodial status (the type of custody you are in, such as protective custody, general population, etc.).\textsuperscript{141} However, in practice, equal protection claims for discrimination based on custodial status are difficult to win. This is because treating different types of prisoners in different ways is allowed as long as the prison has some reasonable explanation.\textsuperscript{142}

The Supreme Court has also said that it may be possible to make an equal protection claim if you are singled out as an individual for “arbitrary and irrational treatment,” even if you are not being discriminated against as a member of a certain group.\textsuperscript{143} However, like other constitutional rights, the right to equal protection is balanced against the state’s legitimate interests. One of these legitimate interests is keeping prisons safe and orderly.

\textsuperscript{136} McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1767, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 278 (1987) (noting that a successful equal protection claim must prove that there was purposeful discrimination). This means that it is not enough to argue that you were treated differently, but that you must also argue that you were intentionally treated differently (treated differently on purpose).

\textsuperscript{137} See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1150, 160 L. Ed. 2d 949, 963 (2005) (finding that a prisoner's 14th Amendment rights to equal protection are violated if the prison discriminates on the basis of race, unless the prison can demonstrate that such discrimination is necessary in order to achieve a compelling government interest): Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 191–92 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding equal protection violation where prisoners were segregated by race in their cells, because a general fear of racial violence could not justify segregation): Santiago v. Miles, 774 F. Supp. 775, 777 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that plaintiffs had proven the existence of equal protection violations based on a pattern of racism affecting job placement, housing assignments, and discipline). But see Wilson v. Taylor, 515 F. Supp. 2d 469, 473 (D. Del. 2007) (dismissing equal protection claim based on race discrimination in prison discipline because prisoner did not provide evidence that the discipline was racially motivated or that white prisoners who were similarly situated were treated differently): Hill v. Thalacker, 399 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (dismissing prisoner's claim of race discrimination in promotion policy because he did not provide any evidence that the white prisoners who were promoted before him were similarly situated): Bass v. Becher, No. 04-C-033-C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2372, at *12 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 17, 2004) (unpublished) (dismissing claim of equal protection violation based on race because the plaintiff did not provide facts to show how his treatment was different from that of a white prisoner in the same position): Brown v. Byrd, No. 00-3118, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17354, at *15–19 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2000) (unpublished) (finding that defendants’ policy of assigning cells based on whether they thought prisoners would get along, even if shown to have a racial impact, if not a discriminatory purpose, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because, even if prisoners were treated differently, it was reasonably related to the prison's legitimate interests in safety and security): Giles v. Henry, 841 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (finding African-American plaintiff’s argument that defendants treated similarly situated white prisoners more favorably than him to be unpersuasive because there was no clear pattern of discrimination in the evidence).

\textsuperscript{138} For information on and cases regarding equal protection violations based on gender, see Chapter 41 of the JLM, “Special Issues of Women Prisoners.”

\textsuperscript{139} See Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1458 n.29 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that “[a] claim of discrimination based on nationality does not differ from a claim based on race”), vacated on other grounds en banc, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984): Parisie v. Morris, 873 F. Supp. 1560, 1562–63 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (finding that a plaintiff's claim that the parole board had impermissibly considered his ethnicity in denying him parole was valid).

\textsuperscript{140} See, e.g., Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1125 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting restrictions on movement and access based on disability may violate equal protection if no possible justification is shown). See Chapter 28 of the JLM, “Rights of Prisoners with Disabilities,” for more information on disability discrimination.

\textsuperscript{141} Williams v. Manternach, 192 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989–92 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (finding that plaintiff made a valid equal protection claim by stating that “as a lifer” he was treated differently with regard to jobs and classification). But see Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (finding no equal protection violation for a life prisoner barred from providing his wife with a sperm sample for the purposes of artificial insemination because keeping up with contacts outside of prison is not as important for prisoners who will never be released from prison).

\textsuperscript{142} See, e.g., Little v. Terhune, 200 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452 (D.N.J. 2002) (rejecting plaintiff's equal protection claim because the lack of programming available to prisoners in administrative segregation compared with those in the general population was rationally related to the prison’s security concerns and budgetary constraints).

\textsuperscript{143} Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074–75, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060, 1063 (2000) (finding that equal protection claims can be made by a “class of one” if the plaintiff has been arbitrarily and irrationally singled out and treated differently from others in similar situations and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment).
(g) First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment Claims: Access to Courts

A prisoner’s right to court access comes from several constitutional provisions, including the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. For a discussion of your right to access the courts, see Chapter 3 of the JLM, “Your Right to Learn the Law and Go to Court.”

3. Federal Statutory Bases for Section 1983 Claims

Sometimes you can also bring a Section 1983 claim if a right created by certain federal statutes has been violated by a state actor. However, only a few federal laws can be enforced using Section 1983. These laws include 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a), which deals with the payment of veteran’s benefits. You may also be able to bring a Section 1983 claim if your rights under certain international treaties have been violated. For example, a few courts have held that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”) can be used as the basis for a Section 1983 claim. The VCCR describes foreign nationals’ right to consular access. Consular access means granting permission to contact one’s nation’s embassy. When a foreign national is arrested or detained, the federal, state, or local law enforcement agency responsible for arresting or detaining him must ask him whether he would like to notify his embassy of his arrest. If so, then a consular official from his embassy must be immediately notified, and must be granted access to the detained foreign national. Also, some federal statutes that cannot be enforced through Section 1983 have their own enforcement provisions.

Sometimes it is easier to show that your rights under a statute have been violated than it is to show a constitutional violation. If courts have already found that a particular statute can be used as the basis for a Section 1983 claim, you should examine the cases interpreting that statute to see if your case is similar to them. You should pay special attention to which cases rely on Section 1983 and which do not.

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144. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555, 559 (1980) (holding that Section 1983 may be used to sue for violations of a right created by a federal statute).

145. Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 689–90 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (2012), which prohibits veterans benefits from being seized or attached, creates a right that can be enforced under Section 1983). In Higgins, a prisoner brought a Section 1983 claim against the New Jersey Department of Corrections and other defendants for taking a portion of his veteran’s disability check to pay a fine the prisoner owed to the Victims of Crime Compensation Board. Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 685–87 (3d Cir. 2002).

146. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 100, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292. Article 36 of the VCCR creates a right enforceable by an individual who has been arrested. Compare Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 834 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that Article 36 of the VCCR confers individual rights on detained nationals), with Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 827–828 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that Article 36 of the VCCR does not create individual rights); De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (same); and Cornejo v. Cnty. of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (same). The majority of federal courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that the Vienna Convention does not create enforceable individual rights. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether Article 36 can provide the basis for a Section 1983 claim. United States v. Perez-Sanchez, No. CR02-4065-MWB, 2006 WL 2949503, at *8 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 17, 2006) (unpublished). For more information on consular access, see the Immigration and Consular Access Supplement to the JLM.


148. Courts generally decide on a case-by-case basis which statutes can be used as the basis for Section 1983 lawsuits, depending on how the court thinks that Congress intended the statute to work. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41, 117 S. Ct. 1353, 1359, 137 L. Ed. 2d 569, 581–82 (1997) (discussing how courts have traditionally determined whether federal statutes create rights that are enforceable using Section 1983). For example, courts have held that juvenile offenders who are illegally housed with adult offenders in adult prisons can use Section 1983 to enforce their right to be housed separately. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (2012) (providing that “juveniles . . . will not be detained or confined in any institution in which they have contact with adult inmates”); Hendrickson v. Griggs, 672 F. Supp. 1126, 1136 (N.D. Iowa 1987). However, if you are an adult whose criminal history is wrongfully disclosed, you cannot sue under Section 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 3789g (2012); Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 1983). Sometimes, different courts do not agree on whether a particular statute can be used as the basis for a Section 1983 claim. You should research your jurisdiction’s case law about bringing Section 1983 claims based on federal statutory rights.
C. Your Lawsuit

1. Types of Relief a Court May Grant

Whether your Section 1983 claim is based on a violation of constitutional or federal statutory rights, you may generally ask a federal district court for several types of relief. These types of relief include damages (money payment), injunctive relief (an order from the court to the person you sued to do something or to stop doing something), and declaratory relief (a court statement of what your rights are). You may ask for more than one type of relief in your suit. However, the type of relief you can ask for may be different depending on whom you sue or name as defendants.\(^\text{150}\)

(a) Money Damages

The court may require the individual defendants (such as a warden, guard, or employee) to pay you money damages. You generally cannot get a judgment for money damages against states or state agencies, such as state prisons.\(^\text{151}\) However, you can get a judgment for money damages against municipalities and private corporations. If you are suing for damages, either you or the defendant can demand a trial by jury.

There are three general categories of money damages: compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages. Compensatory damages, also known as actual damages, are awarded to make you “whole.” This means that they put you back in the same position you were in before you suffered the wrong. For example, imagine that an item of your property has been unlawfully damaged by a prison official and the property was worth seventy dollars. If you win your suit, you could receive seventy dollars in damages or a lesser amount that is sufficient to repair or restore the property to its original condition. Or, if you were physically injured by the defendant’s conduct, a court or jury might award you enough money to cover your medical expenses or to compensate you for a resulting disability. In addition, compensatory damages may include pain and suffering damages. These try to compensate you financially for the physical pain and suffering you experienced because of the wrongful conduct. When you ask for compensatory damages, you must state and prove the nature, extent, and cause of your injuries in detail.

The second type of money damages is punitive damages. These are not awarded very often. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for what he did, rather than just to compensate you for what happened. Punitive damages are available when the defendant acted with “evil motive or intent” or “reckless or callous indifference” to your federal rights.\(^\text{152}\) A court cannot award punitive damages against governmental agencies,\(^\text{153}\) like the prison or jail, but it can award them against individual officials or employees.

The third type of money damages is nominal damages. Nominal damages are a form of symbolic relief that is usually no more than one dollar.\(^\text{154}\) A prisoner who proves that his rights were violated, but does not prove that any harm resulted from that violation, will generally be able to get a judgment for nominal damages but

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\(^\text{150}\) For a list of the types of relief available from different defendants, see Figure 2 in Part C(3)(c) of this Chapter.

\(^\text{151}\) As a practical matter, it is often the case that if you sue state employees in their individual capacity (as opposed to the actual state or state agency), the state will voluntarily pay the damages for the employees. This is called “indemnification.”

\(^\text{152}\) Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L. Ed. 2d 632, 651 (1983) (holding that a prisoner may be awarded punitive damages for recklessness or serious indifference to his rights, as well as for “evil intent”); see also Reilly v. Grayson, 310 F.3d 519, 521 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding punitive damages award against prison officials whose refusal to house asthmatic prisoner in smoke-free environment was found to be a reckless disregard for his rights); Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531, 535–536 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding jury award of punitive damages against prison guards for assault and unlawful confinement of prisoner).

\(^\text{153}\) See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616, 635 (1981) (holding that punitive damages are not available against a municipality in a Section 1983 suit): Ciraco v. City of N.Y., 216 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing an award of punitive damages against New York City in a Section 1983 action based on City of Newport and holding that municipal immunity from punitive damages is absolute, with no “outrageous conduct” exception).

\(^\text{154}\) Courts may award more than one dollar. See, e.g., Hatch v. Yamauchi, 809 F. Supp. 59, 61 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (awarding nominal damages in the amount of ten dollars for violation of prisoners’ right to access the courts (including access to the law library and trained legal assistance)).
not compensatory damages. If you are awarded nominal damages, you may be able to get punitive damages as well.156

No matter which type of damages you ask for, you should read Chapter 14 of the JLM, “The Prison Litigation Reform Act.” The PLRA limits the types of damages you can recover in different situations.157

(b) Injunctive Relief

Another type of relief the court can award in a Section 1983 action is an injunction. An injunction is an order to prison officials either to take certain actions—for example, to improve the conditions of your confinement—or to not take certain kinds of actions against you in the future—for example, to stop censoring your mail.158 An injunction is often referred to as “equitable relief.”

In order to get an injunction, you must be able to show two things. First, you must show that there is a likelihood of substantial, immediate, and irreparable (irreversible) injury without an injunction. Second, you must show that the “remedies at law,” such as money damages, are inadequate.159 To meet the immediate injury requirement, you must be able to prove that your injury is likely to happen to you again in the foreseeable (likely) future and was not a single, isolated incident.160 One of the most effective ways to show

155. See Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) claims for constitutional violations without physical injury need not be dismissed outright, but recovery is limited to nominal and punitive damages (as well as injunctive and declaratory relief) because allowing compensatory damages without physical injuries would amount to recovery for mental or emotional injury, which the PLRA prohibits); see also Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 722–23 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the compensatory damages limitation of the PLRA applies to all federal prisoner lawsuits, including those for 1st Amendment violations); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 875–76 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a prisoner could not recover compensatory damages for the violation of his constitutional rights without first showing a physical injury). However, some courts do not require any showing of physical injury where the deprivation involves the 1st Amendment. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 747 n.20 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the court applies the physical injury requirement to claims of cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment, but declining to reach the issue in a 1st Amendment case); Williams v. Ollis, No. 99-2168/99-2234, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23671, at *5–6 (6th Cir. Sept. 18, 2000) (unpublished) (stating that the plaintiff’s 1st Amendment claim for money damages was not precluded by PLRA); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781–82 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a “deprivation of First Amendment rights standing alone is a cognizable injury,” and therefore “[a] prisoner is entitled to judicial relief for a violation of his First Amendment rights aside from any physical, mental, or emotional injury he may have sustained”); Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that “[t]he deprivation of First Amendment rights entitles a plaintiff to judicial relief wholly aside from any physical injury he can show”).

156. See Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that in appropriate cases, both nominal and punitive damages may be awarded for a violation of constitutional rights without an accompanying injury). There, the plaintiff sought punitive damages for the alleged violation of his constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, but not for any emotional or mental distress that he may have suffered as a result of that violation. However, his claims for compensatory damages were barred by the court. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 253.

157. See Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 984 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that the PRLA’s language “no action shall be brought” operates as a bar to a prisoner’s suit absent physical injury). Note that Harris v. Garner was specifically about lawsuits that are filed while the plaintiff is in jail, prison, or some other correctional facility, but which are not decided until after he is released. Compare Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348–49 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“§ 1997e(e) precludes claims for emotional injury without any prior physical injury, regardless of the statutory or constitutional basis of the legal wrong.”), with Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1999) (“§ 1997e(e) applies only to claims for mental or emotional injury. Claims for other types of injury do not implicate the statute.”) (citation omitted), and Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The deprivation of First Amendment rights entitles a plaintiff to judicial relief wholly aside from any physical injury he can show, or any mental or emotional injury he may have incurred. Therefore, § 1997e(e) does not apply to First Amendment claims regardless of the form of relief sought.”).


159. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502, 94 S. Ct. 669, 679, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674, 687 (1974) (noting that to obtain equitable relief, plaintiff must prove “likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law”); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46, 91 S. Ct. 746, 751, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 676 (1971) (stating that proof of an irreparable injury is required for any injunction). These requirements are often referred to as the requirements for “standing” (the right to make a legal claim before the court) to seek injunctive relief.

160. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 109 S. Ct. 1660, 1669, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 688 (1983) (holding that injunctive relief is unavailable where plaintiff has not shown that “he is realistically threatened by a repetition of [the violation],” where the plaintiff sought to enjoin the general use of chokeholds by police); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 518,
that you are likely to suffer future harm is to show that the harm is ongoing due to either a written policy or to a pattern or custom of officially sanctioned behavior (behavior approved by officials). You also have to prove that your injury is substantial and irreparable. You can show that your injury is substantial (serious) by pointing out the specific ways you are being harmed. Demonstrating that your injury is irreparable means showing that you are being harmed in a way that cannot be fixed in the future. Many courts say that the ongoing violation of a constitutional right causes substantial and irreparable harm. Lastly, you have to show that no other available legal remedy will address your injury. In other words, you must show that an injunction is the only way to prevent and correct the source of your injury.

If you can show that an injunction is necessary to protect your rights until your trial is over, you may be able to get a temporary injunction before the trial is completed or even before it starts. This is called a preliminary injunction. In order to get one you must follow the procedures described in Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Most courts also require you to show that:

1. You are likely to succeed on the merits of your claim,
2. You are likely to suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is denied,
3. You will suffer more if the injunction is denied than the defendant will suffer if it is granted, and

59 S. Ct. 954, 965, 83 L. Ed. 1423, 1438 (1939) (granting injunctive relief because the threat of continued police misconduct in the enforcement of a municipal ordinance made the threat of constitutional deprivations ongoing); Kritenbrink v. Crawford, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1053 (D. Nev. 2004) (“The mere fact that a plaintiff has suffered an injury in the past is not sufficient to allege standing for injunctive relief.”).

161. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 861 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a realistic threat of a repeating injury may arise from a written policy or a pattern of officially sanctioned behavior).

162. See Williams v. Cozza-Rhodes, Civil Action No. 12-CV-01580-BNB, 2012 WL 5448182, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) (denying an order enjoining prison guards from banging on prisoner’s cell door at night and confiscating his property because the prisoner failed to “demonstrate that he will suffer substantial and irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not issued”); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1670, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 690 (1983) (finding injunction unavailable “where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again—a ‘likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury’” (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502, 94 S. Ct. 669, 679, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674, 687 (1974))); Heron v. City of Denver, 317 F.3d 309, 311 (10th Cir. 1963) (explaining that “the injury incurred or impending under the circumstances here existing must be substantial and irreparable; it must be clear and imminent.”).

163. See, e.g., Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that there is a “presumption of irreparable injury that flows from a violation of constitutional rights”); Nat’l People’s Action v. Village of Wilmette, 914 F.2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Even a temporary deprivation of first amendment freedom of expression rights is generally sufficient to prove irreparable harm.”); Ross v. Meese, 818 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that deprivation of a constitutional right amounts to irreparable harm); Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that where an alleged violation of a constitutional right is shown, it’s not necessary to show irreparable harm). But see Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis., 95 F.3d 1359, 1372 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that where the only constitutional right at issue related to the procedures for receiving compensation for a governmental taking of property, irreparable harm was not shown because plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of the available procedures); Pinckney v. Bd. of Educ., 920 F. Supp. 393, 400–01 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that although courts will usually find irreparable harm when substantive constitutional rights are violated, when procedural due process violations are involved, “courts must consider the nature of the constitutional injury before making such a conclusion.”).

164. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501–02, 94 S. Ct. 669, 679, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674, 686–87 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for injunctive relief because there were state and federal remedies that could provide them with adequate relief for their alleged wrongs); Pinckney v. Bd. of Educ., 920 F. Supp. 393, 400–01 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that irreparable harm was not shown by alleged procedural due process violation where plaintiff could be compensated with money damages).

165. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding preliminary injunction that prohibited closing a prison where prisoners proved that if the prison were closed they would be moved to prisons that were already too crowded); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 23–24 (2d Cir. 1971) (granting preliminary injunctive relief to prisoners after extended mistreatment by prison guards, where prison officials had not taken sufficient steps to ensure that such mistreatment would not continue during trial), overruled on other grounds Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (allowing prisoners to wear religious beads); Dean v. Coughlin, 623 F. Supp. 392, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (ordering prison officials to provide “adequate dental care to inmates with serious dental needs”), vacated on other grounds, 804 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1986). But see Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1037 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiff was not entitled to a preliminary injunction since he was unable to show that there was a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims); Espinal v. Goord, 180 F. Supp. 2d 532, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction because plaintiff had not made a “substantial showing of likelihood of success on the merits of his due process claims”).
(4) Granting the preliminary injunction is consistent with the public interest. 166

In general, you can only receive a preliminary injunction after a hearing in which your opponent has the opportunity to argue against the injunction. However, there is one type of injunction that can be granted before a hearing. This type of injunction is a temporary restraining order (TRO). Courts will only grant a TRO in exceptional and urgent situations. To get a TRO, you must show that you will suffer “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage” if you have to wait for a hearing.167 If you are granted a TRO, the court will set a date for a hearing as soon as possible. At this hearing you must convince the court to convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction.168

If the court grants a TRO, it may require you to provide money for assurance purposes. You can, however, ask the court to waive this requirement. To take advantage of this waiver, you should file your TRO request in forma pauperis.169 See Appendix A-5 of this Chapter for sample in forma pauperis documents.

If you believe you are eligible for a TRO, you must file an “Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order” with the court. See Appendix A-4 of this Chapter for an example. If possible, you must also notify the prison officials that you are requesting a TRO and send them copies of your request. You must also submit to the court an affidavit that describes your efforts to contact the prison officials, and a short memorandum stating the reasons why the court should grant your request for a TRO.170

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) of the PLRA, any preliminary injunction that is granted will automatically expire after 90 days, unless the court finds that an injunction should be granted171 and issues a final order for an injunction before the 90-day period is over.172 It is often difficult or impossible for the parties to complete discovery and for the court to complete a trial and issue a decision within 90 days. However, the court can issue a new preliminary injunction if it finds that you still face irreparable harm.173

(c) Declaratory Relief

Finally, the court may issue a declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment is a statement about the nature and limits of your rights. The court can issue a declaratory judgment before your rights have been violated.174 A declaratory judgment can be useful if prison officials threaten to take some action that you believe would violate your rights. In these cases, you may use Section 1983 to ask the court for a declaratory judgment saying that it would be illegal for the prison to take the action. You may ask for a declaratory

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166. Consistency with the public interest is the standard for a preliminary injunction in most federal courts. See Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2006); Jochner v. Vill. of Wash. Park, Ill., 378 F.3d 613, 619 (7th Cir. 2004); Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2004); Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003); Shire U.S., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2003); Newsom v. Alibemarle County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir. 2003); In re Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 340 F.3d 749, 758 (8th Cir. 2003); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 2001); Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001); Wenner v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 123 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1997). However, some courts modify the test slightly. Courts in the Second Circuit require you to show that: (1) you are likely to suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is denied, and (2) either (a) you are likely to succeed on the merits of your claim, or (b) your claim raises sufficiently serious questions to justify litigation and you will suffer more if the injunction is denied than the defendant will suffer if it is granted. See Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding preliminary injunction that prohibited the closing of a prison where prisoners proved that if the prison were closed they would be moved to prisons that were already too crowded).

167. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).

168. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).

169. “In forma pauperis” is Latin for “in the manner of a poor person.” It means that you cannot afford the fee or costs and are asking the court to waive them. See Black’s Law Dictionary 849 (9th ed. 2009). Some states use the English “Poor Person Status” instead of the Latin term.

170. There are no technical rules that you must follow in writing your supporting memorandum. Simply state your arguments as clearly as possible and stress what will happen if the court does not grant your request. Be sure to tell the court why you need action immediately and why you cannot wait for a hearing. Chapter 2 of the JLM, “Introduction to Legal Research,” explains how to conduct research for a memorandum of law. Chapter 6 of the JLM, “An Introduction to Legal Documents,” will also help you in writing your memorandum.


173. See, e.g., Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding a district court’s second preliminary injunction allowing prisoners to attend religious services without being punished).

judgment even if you are not seeking any other type of relief. Later on, you can still ask for an injunction if you find that the declaratory judgment is not enough to protect you.

2. Whom to Name as Defendants

Figuring out exactly whom to name as a defendant in your Section 1983 lawsuit can be confusing. As noted in Part B(1)(a) above, you can only sue a “person” who violated your rights while acting “under color” of state law. For the purposes of Section 1983, the definition of a “person” includes individual people (like prison wardens, guards, and other employees), as well as cities, counties, or municipalities that adopts policies, rules, or regulations that violate your rights. However, the definition of a “person” does not include state governments and their agencies (including your state’s department of corrections).

(a) Individual Defendants

If any of your defendants are individuals, you must decide in what “capacity” you will sue them. You can sue them in their “individual capacities,” in their “official capacities,” or both. When you sue someone in his individual capacity, you are suing him personally. When you sue someone in his official capacity, you are suing his office (for example, suing the county prison warden’s office rather than suing the individual who happens to be the county prison warden). Whether you sue a particular individual in his individual capacity, his official capacity, or both, will affect the type of damages you can receive. It will also affect the defenses that the individual can raise.

In general, if you want to get an injunction (described in Part C(1)(b) of this Chapter), you should sue defendants in their official capacities. If you are seeking money damages, you should usually sue defendants in their individual capacities. If you are seeking money damages against a high-ranking local official, like a sheriff or a warden, then you should probably sue him in both his official and individual capacities. If you are confused about which capacity to use for a particular defendant, you always have the option of suing that defendant in both capacities. However, you should be aware that suing defendants in both capacities may lead the defendants to file motions asking that part of your lawsuit be dismissed. These motions can delay your lawsuit.

Sometimes you may not know the name of the person who violated your rights. In such a case, you must refer to the defendant as “John (or Jane) Doe.” This tells the court that you do not know the person’s name. You must, however, locate and identify all John and Jane Does at some point or the claims against them will be dismissed. Once the lawsuit is started, you should be able to learn the defendants’ identities through discovery. For more information on discovery, see Chapter 8 of the JLM, “Obtaining Information to Prepare Your Case: The Process of Discovery.”


178. See Part C(3) of this Chapter for an explanation of how individual and official capacities affect potential defenses and the types of damages you can receive.

179. See Roper v. Grayson, 81 F.3d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that it is permissible to name John or Jane Doe as a defendant “so long as the plaintiff provides an adequate description of some kind which is sufficient to identify the person involved so process can eventually be served”); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215–16 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding plaintiff adequately identified unnamed defendant such that he could be added later when his identity was determined).

180. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 82–83 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding dismissal without prejudice of a claim where plaintiffs had made no attempt to identify or to serve John Doe defendants 17 months after filing the lawsuit). Note that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(m), “a district court may dismiss a complaint without prejudice as to a particular defendant if the plaintiff fails to serve that defendant within 120 days after filing the complaint.” Figueroa, 147 F.3d 77 at 83.
(b) Supervisor Liability

A supervisory official who causes or participates in a violation of your rights may be liable in some cases. However, the concept of “respondeat superior” does not apply to Section 1983 lawsuits. Instead, supervisory officials can only be charged with responsibility for lower officials’ acts if they were “personally involved” in them. A supervisor is considered to be “personally involved” in a constitutional violation if:

1. The supervisor, “after learning of [a] violation [of your rights] . . . failed to remedy the wrong”;
2. The supervisor “created a policy or custom under which” your constitutional rights were violated, “or allowed such a policy or custom to continue”; or
3. The supervisor was “grossly negligent” in that he did not adequately supervise the subordinates who violated your rights.

To hold a supervisor liable in any of the above situations, you must show that the supervisor acted with “deliberate indifference.” The definition of deliberate indifference can vary from circuit to circuit. It may also depend on the type of supervisor liability you are claiming. Be sure to look at cases in your circuit to see how your circuit defines deliberate indifference for the purposes of supervisor liability. Most courts say that a supervisor acts with deliberate indifference when he knows or should know that there is a substantial risk of harms that violate your constitutional rights and he fails to prevent or remedy those harms.

To win in a supervisor liability claim, you must be able to show two things: (1) that your constitutional rights were actually violated, and (2) that there was a clear connection between the violation of your rights and the supervisor’s actions or failure to act. What follows is a discussion of the three types of situations in which you may be able to hold a supervisor liable.

181. See, e.g., Worrel v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Under § 1983, a defendant may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.”); Aponte Matos v. Toledo Davila, 135 F.3d 182, 192 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat theory, but only on the basis of the supervisor’s own acts or omissions.”) (citation omitted).


183. See Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323–24 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing the ways in which supervisors may be found liable under Section 1983).


185. See, e.g., Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2002) (defining supervisor “deliberate indifference” with respect to his subordinates’ actions as occurring when a supervisor “fail[s] to act on information indicating unconstitutional acts were occurring . . . provided that the plaintiff can show an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and her injury”); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 913 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining supervisor “deliberate indifference” as occurring when an official is “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 825 (1994)); Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997) (defining supervisor “deliberate indifference” in an 8th Amendment context as occurring where the supervisor knows “he is creating a substantial risk of bodily harm”) (quoting Billman v. Ind. Dept. of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)).

186. See Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1998) (“To demonstrate deliberate indifference a plaintiff must show (1) a grave risk of harm, (2) the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of that risk, and (3) his failure to take easily available measures to address the risk.”). The Second Circuit has applied a lower standard in cases involving a supervisor’s deficient management of staff or failure to respond to constitutional violations, holding that the supervisor need only have been “grossly negligent.” See, e.g., Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[S]upervisory liability may be imposed where an official is ‘grossly negligent’ or ‘deliberate indifference’ to the constitutional rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional practices are taking place.”); Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323–24 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A] supervisory official may be personally liable if he or she was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event.”). If you are filing your complaint within the Second Circuit, however, you should still plead “deliberate indifference” in your complaint.

187. See Aponte Matos v. Toledo Davila, 135 F.3d 182, 192 (1st Cir. 1998) (“There is supervisory liability only if (1) there is subordinated liability, and (2) the supervisor’s action or inaction was ‘affirmatively linked’ to the constitutional violation caused by the subordinate.”); Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997) (“To establish a supervisor’s liability under § 1983 plaintiff must show that an affirmative link exists between the [constitutional] deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.”) (citations...
(i) Failure to Act to Remedy a Wrong

Prior to 2009, a supervisor could be liable under Section 1983 if he became aware of a violation of your rights but did not take steps to remedy the violation. Under this old rule, a supervisor would typically be found liable for violating your constitutional rights if he acted in at least one of five ways:

1. Participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation; or
2. Failed to remedy the violation after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal; or
3. Created or allowed the continuation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred; or
4. Acted with gross negligence in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts; or
5. Exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of prisoners by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.

However, in 2009, the Supreme Court made it more difficult to assert supervisor liability. Under the current law, a supervisor will only be held liable under Section 1983 when you can show that he actually participated in the constitutional violation.

(ii) Creating or Allowing an Unconstitutional Policy or Custom

A supervisor may be personally involved in a violation of your rights if he develops an unconstitutional policy or if he allows an unconstitutional policy to continue. Supervisors can be liable for an unconstitutional policy even if it is unwritten as in the case of an informal policy or custom. Supervisors generally cannot be held liable for a constitutional policy that a subordinate simply fails to follow. However, the supervisor can be held liable, however, if subordinates fail to follow the policy because the supervisor did not do a good enough job of hiring or training them. This exception is discussed in Part C(2)(b)(iii), below.

and internal quotations omitted).

188. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) (permitting supervisor liability where “[t]he plaintiff . . . demonstrated that the communication, in its content and manner of transmission, gave the prison official sufficient notice to alert him or her to a constitutional violation). See, e.g., Taylor v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81–82 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that the warden could be found to have known of the possibility that prisoner would be raped because warden knew that there were problems in the classification procedures and that young prisoners were more vulnerable to sexual assaults); Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a supervisor who affirmed a prisoner’s disciplinary conviction when the prisoner was not permitted to call witnesses may be liable for violating the prisoner’s due process rights); Boone v. Elrod, 706 F. Supp. 636, 638 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding valid Section 1983 claim where plaintiff claimed that defendants ignored complaints of prior attacks by other prisoners).

189. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a supervisor was personally involved for the purposes of Section 1983 liability when he fulfilled any one of these five factors).

190. In 2009, the Supreme Court held that “because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 882 (2009) (emphasis added). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that “a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 883 (2009).

191. See Taylor v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 84 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that a warden could be liable for failure to adopt reasonable policies to insure that transferees were not placed in grave danger of rape); Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446–49 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (noting that sheriff could be liable for prisoner’s rape where sheriff approved a faulty classification policy); Williams v. Coughlin, 875 F. Supp. 1094, 1014 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that the superintendent of a prison could be liable for policy of withholding food from prisoners who committed disciplinary infractions if the supervisor knew such a policy was in place and failed to take actions to remedy it).

192. See Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1247–48 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that a sheriff may be liable for an unwritten policy of deliberate indifference to detainees’ serious medical needs).

193. See Buffington v. Baltimore Cnty., 913 F.2d 113, 122–23 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the county was not liable for a subordinates’ violation of a suicide prevention policy); Vasquez v. Coughlin, 726 F. Supp. 466, 473–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that a supervisor was not liable for subordinate’s violation of prisoner’s rights where a policy existed that was designed to prevent such violations).
(iii) Deficient Management of Subordinates

A supervisor may be liable if a subordinate violates your constitutional rights as a result of that supervisor’s mismanagement of the subordinates. A subordinate is an individual who works under the command of the supervisor. This type of liability can occur when the supervisor:

1. Knew of a subordinate’s past misconduct and failed to take action to fix it; or, 194
2. Failed to set up policies that help guide subordinates’ conduct to prevent violations of constitutional rights; or, 195
3. Failed to inform and train staff on policies designed to avoid violations of constitutional rights; 196 or,
4. Failed to properly supervise staff to make sure that they followed policies. 197

If your complaint alleges that the violation of your rights was the result of a failure to train staff (situation (3), described above), you must show “a complete failure to train, or training that is so reckless or grossly negligent that future misconduct is almost inevitable.” 198

(c) Municipal or Local Government Liability

A municipality or local government—such as a county, city, or town—can be held liable under Section 1983. You must show that the violation of your constitutional rights was either (1) caused by a policy or custom of the municipality or (2) caused by a municipal policymaker’s failure to take certain actions, like properly training employees. In the first situation, the municipality has “direct liability” for violating your rights. In the second situation, the municipality has “indirect liability” for violating your rights. The requirements for each type of liability are discussed in detail in Parts C(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of the Chapter below.

There are several benefits to naming a municipality as a defendant. First, while you cannot recover punitive damages from a municipality, 199 you can sue it for both compensatory damages and injunctive relief. 200 Second, municipalities, unlike individuals, cannot claim qualified immunity. 201 Third, if you are successful in your suit, the municipality will likely make broad changes in handling situations similar to yours in the future.

(i) “Direct” Municipal Liability

In order to hold a municipality directly liable for violating your rights you must meet the regular requirements for a Section 1983 claim and also show that:

1. A policy or custom of the municipality caused your rights to be violated; 202 and
2. The policy was created by someone who is a final policymaker for the municipality. 203

194. See Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1396 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming a finding that the superintendent of a prison was liable for a guard’s use of excessive force where the superintendent knew of the guard’s propensity for excessive force and failed to take steps to investigate and correct the problem).
196. See Gilbert v. Selsky, 867 F. Supp. 159, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that a Director of Inmate Discipline may be liable for failing to train disciplinary hearing officers who violated prisoner’s rights at a disciplinary hearing).
201. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1409, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673, 685–86 (1980) (holding that qualified immunity is not available to a municipality). Qualified immunity is discussed in Part C(3)(c) of this Chapter.
202. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791, 804 (1985) (holding that a finding of municipal liability requires showing of an actual connection between the policy or custom and the violation).
A policy or custom is considered to cause your rights to be violated if it is “unconstitutional on its face” which means that the policy or custom itself directly causes your rights to be violated. For example, a municipality will not be liable for failing to provide medical care if a prison guard simply refuses to get medical help for you when you are injured. However, the municipality can be held liable if the prison has a known policy of denying medical help to some or all prisoners or if it has unwritten policies such as a custom or settled practice that is unconstitutional. A municipality may also be held liable for the actions of policymakers. For example, if a policymaker fires an employee for an unconstitutional reason, the firing may be considered a “policy.” A municipality can also be held responsible for a custom or settled practice of the municipality that is unconstitutional. In all of these situations, you must be able to show a clear link between the existence of the policy or custom and the constitutional violation.

Under the second requirement for “direct” municipal liability, the person who created the policy must be someone who has final authority to make that particular policy for the municipality. A court will look at the law in your state to see if your state gives that individual the authority to make policy. If you are claiming that a municipal custom, rather than an official policy, caused a violation of your rights, you generally must show that the custom was so widespread that policy-makers knew of or should have known (noting that municipalities can only be held liable under Section 1983 for policies made by officials who had final authority to make the challenged policy).

204. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037–38, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 638 (1978) (holding that a municipality can be held liable when an unconstitutional official policy is the “moving force” behind a violation); Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a municipal policy of delaying medical care to prisoners who are “combative, uncooperative or unable to effectively answer questions due to intoxication” may create municipal liability for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners (internal quotation marks omitted)).

205. See Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a municipal policy of delaying medical care to prisoners who are “combative, uncooperative or unable to effectively answer questions due to intoxication” may create municipal liability for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners (internal quotation marks omitted)).

206. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 639 (1997) (observing that a policy or custom need not be formal or written so long as a plaintiff can demonstrate that the alleged unwritten policy or custom is “so widespread as to have the force of law.”); Paige v. Coyner, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15239, 27 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] policy or custom does not have to be written law: it can be created by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.”) (quoting Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037–38, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 638 (1978)).

207. See Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 196 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a school board that had final authority to make firing decisions could be liable for the unconstitutional firing of teacher); Bowles v. City of Camden, 993 F. Supp. 255, 268–69 (D.N.J. 1998) (allowing plaintiff to go forward with claim against city and mayor for unconstitutional firing). Note, however, the requirement that the municipality must, in some way, have deliberately caused the injury.


209. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 639 (1997) (“[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”). This is a high standard to meet and you may have to prove that the municipality’s legislative body or authorized decision maker intentionally deprived you of a federally protected right or that the action itself violated federal law. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791, 804 (1985) (finding that municipal liability requires a showing of an actual connection between the policy or custom and the constitutional violation).


211. See McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 786, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 1737, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1, 8 (1997) (finding that state law determines whether an individual is an authorized policymaker for a municipality).
of it. In other words, you will be arguing that, because the custom was so widespread, policymakers must have approved of it.

(ii) “Indirect” Municipal Liability

There are two “indirect” ways that a municipality can be held responsible when its employees violate your rights. First, a municipality may be liable when its failure to adequately train, supervise, or discipline its employees results in an employee violating your rights. Second, a municipality may be liable for failing to adequately screen (look at the background of) an employee during hiring if that employee later violates your rights. For both of these, you will need to show that an employee of the municipality violated your constitutional rights and that the municipality showed “deliberate indifference” to your constitutional rights. To prove “deliberate indifference” in this context, you must show that the municipal policy-makers knew that their actions were likely to cause someone’s rights to be violated in a particular way.

(d) Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline

There are some types of training that are so obviously necessary to avoid having employees violate your rights that a municipality can be held liable for not providing such training. For example, failing to train armed prison guards on when they may use deadly force would create an obvious risk that a prisoner’s rights will be violated and can amount to deliberate indifference.

In other situations, there may be a pattern of repeated unconstitutional behavior by municipal employees. At some point this pattern makes it obvious that more or better training, supervision, or discipline is needed. A municipality may be held liable for failing to address these obvious needs. In all cases, you must be able

212. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Absent a formal governmental policy, [the plaintiff] must show a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992)).

213. See, e.g., Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that in order for a municipality to be liable for a widespread custom, the municipality or a municipal policymaker must have “actual or constructive knowledge” of the custom); Sorlutto v. N.Y. City Police Dept., 971 F.2d 864, 871 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding a plaintiff may establish a municipality’s liability by showing that the actions of subordinate officers are sufficiently widespread to amount to “constructive acquiescence” (implied approval) by senior policymakers).

214. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 426 (1989) (noting that a city could be liable under § 1983 for failure to train its employees, if the failure “amount[ed] to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [employees] come into contact”).

215. See Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The plaintiff must show that the municipality was on actual or constructive notice that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation.”); Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) (“To survive summary judgment on a failure to train theory, the [plaintiffs] must present evidence that the need for more or different training was so obvious and so likely to lead to the violation of constitutional rights that the policymaker’s failure to respond amounts to deliberate indifference.”).

216. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 427 (1989) (“It may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”).

217. Bd. of the Cnty. Commrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1390, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 641 (1997) (noting that policymakers’ awareness of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by employees, along with a failure to address the problem, may demonstrate conscious disregard for a need to train, which would give rise to municipal liability); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 427–28 (1989) (“Municipal liability for failure to train may be proper where it can be shown that policymakers were aware of, and acquiesced in, a pattern of constitutional violations involving the exercise of police discretion. In such cases, the need for training may not be obvious from the outset, but a pattern of constitutional violations could put the municipality on notice that its officers confront the particular situation on a regular basis, and that they often react in a manner contrary to constitutional requirements.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

218. See, e.g., Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2005) (concluding that municipal liability might be established where a city failed to train police officers in avoiding misidentifications of off-duty police officers because problems with misidentifications occurred in the past and a failure to train officers in the area posed “obvious risk.”); Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1320 (10th Cir. 2002) (leaving it up to jury to decide whether a county’s failure to train its officers to recognize detainee’s symptoms of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, which the court noted is a fairly common disease, amounts to deliberate indifference); Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dept., 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that six reports and complaints alleging potential unconstitutional conduct of a police officer could “demonstrate an obvious need for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vann v. City of N.Y., 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995)); Perin v. Gentner, 177 F. Supp,
to show that the inadequate training polices were the direct cause of, or “moving force,” behind your injuries.\(^{219}\) You should note that the fact that training is imperfect or not in the precise form you would prefer is not enough to establish municipal liability.\(^{220}\)

(e) Inadequate Screening

In an inadequate screening claim you are claiming that the municipality knew or should have known that it was highly likely that the individual it hired would violate your rights.\(^{221}\) For example, imagine that a prison hired a guard that had been fired from a previous job for assaulting prisoners. If the guard then assaulted you, you could claim that the municipality was responsible because any reasonable person should have known that there was a high risk that this guard would engage in the specific act of assaulting prisoners.\(^{222}\)

In order to win on an inadequate screening claim, you must show that the decision to hire the individual who violated your rights shows “deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the [hiring] decision.”\(^{223}\) It is not enough to show that the city or town hired someone who committed bad acts in the past.\(^{224}\) Instead, you must show that an adequate look at the job applicant’s background would cause an “objectively reasonable policymaker” to conclude that it was “plainly obvious” that hiring that person would result in a violation of someone’s federal rights.\(^{225}\) You must also show that it was highly likely—not simply possible or probable—that the particular harm you suffered would be the result of hiring the person.\(^{226}\) In other words, the violation of your rights must have a strong link to the bad acts that the supervisor knew or should have known that the employee committed in the past, and it must have been highly likely that the employee would repeat those bad acts.\(^{227}\)

Making a successful claim for inadequate screening during hiring is very difficult. A court will demand a very close connection between the information available to the person making the hiring decision and the

\(^{220}\) See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 427–28 (1989) (“Failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury.”) (emphasis added).

\(^{221}\) See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1206, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 428 (1989) (observing that imperfect training cannot itself be the basis for § 1983 liability): Grazier v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the scope of failure to train liability is narrow where plaintiffs “merely allege that a different program than the one in place would have been more effective.”): Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1345 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that where a town gave police officers some training on handling suspects exhibiting abnormal behavior, the argument that even more training should have been given was unpersuasive).

\(^{222}\) See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1392, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 644 (1997) (“[A] finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any constitutional injury. Rather, it must depend on a finding that [the particular] officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff.”)

\(^{223}\) See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 428 (1989) (holding that the decision to hire reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that the violation that occurred would follow the decision).

\(^{224}\) See Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence that an officer had committed nonviolent offenses in the past is not enough to show that the municipality knew or should have known that the officer would engage in violent acts in the future): Waterman v. City of New York, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17087, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y 1998) (unpublished) (concluding that a plaintiff could not prevail on an inadequate screening claim where the only evidence offered to support the claim was that the police officer in question had been arrested once for assault prior to being hired).

\(^{225}\) See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1392, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 644 (1997) (“[A] finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any constitutional injury. Rather, it must depend on a finding that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff.”) (emphasis in original).

\(^{226}\) See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1392, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 644 (1997) (holding that municipal liability for inadequate screening requires a strong connection between the job applicant’s background and the specific harm he inflicted).
violation that took place. These claims are not likely to succeed unless the person who violated your rights engaged in similar behavior before he was hired, and the supervisor knew or should have known about it.

3. Defenses That May Be Raised Against Your Claim

There are several ways that the people you are suing might be able to defend themselves against your Section 1983 lawsuit. For example, the defendants might claim that the facts in your complaint are false or that your legal arguments are incorrect. You will not know how the defendants will choose to defend themselves until after you file your complaint. You do not need to respond to their defenses until after you receive either an answer or a motion to dismiss from the defendants.228 However, your lawsuit is more likely to succeed if you can organize your complaint to avoid some of the defenses that you think they might use.

The rest of this Part will explain some of the defenses that are most likely to come up in a Section 1983 lawsuit. Most of the following sections focus on the different kinds of immunities that are almost always an issue in Section 1983 suits. Immunities are rules that protect certain individuals or agencies from liability even when they may have done something wrong.

(a) Eleventh Amendment Immunity

In general, the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects states and their agencies from being sued in federal court.229 This means that you cannot name the state itself as a defendant in your Section 1983 suit.230 You also cannot name the Department of Corrections or any other state government agency as a defendant.231 Eleventh Amendment immunity is also known as “sovereign immunity.”

This same Eleventh Amendment immunity rule prevents you from suing a state official in his “official capacity” in federal court for money damages.232 This is considered the same thing as suing the state.233 However, this immunity does not apply to suits for injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials sued in their official capacity. In other words, although you cannot sue the state itself for an injunction, you can sue a state official in his official capacity for an injunction.234 Fortunately for you, suing a state official in his official capacity for an injunction is more difficult than it is to sue a state in its own name.

228. See Part C(8) of this Chapter, “What to Expect After Your Legal Papers Have Been Filed in Court,” for an explanation of an “answer” and a “motion to dismiss.”

229. Note these rules do not apply to claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012), which prohibits disability discrimination. These rules also do not apply to some claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159, 126 S. Ct. 877, 882, 163 L. Ed. 2d 650, 659 (2006) (holding that individuals may sue states under the ADA where the conduct alleged to violate the ADA also violates the Constitution). For more information on the rights of prisoners with disabilities, see Chapter 28 of the JLM, “Rights of Prisoners with Disabilities.”

230. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 98 S. Ct. 3057, 3057, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1114, 1116 (1978) (“[S]uit against the State . . . is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). The state must affirmatively raise an 11th Amendment immunity defense. Wis. Dept. of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2052, 141 L. Ed. 2d 364, 372 (1998) (“The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not automatically destroy original jurisdiction. Rather, the Eleventh Amendment grants the State a legal power to assert a sovereign immunity defense should it choose to do so. The State can waive the defense. Nor need a court raise the defect on its own. Unless the State raises the matter, a court can ignore it.”) (internal citations omitted).

231. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S. Ct. 3057, 3057, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1114, 1116 (1978) (“[S]uit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment . . . .”); see also Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1399 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding governmental agency in charge of prison industry is “an arm of the state” and therefore protected by 11th Amendment immunity); Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1044–45 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that even if a state allows itself to be sued in its own courts, the 11th Amendment bars a § 1983 action in federal court against that state unless the state also waives its immunity in federal court).


233. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3107, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114, 123–24 (1985) (noting that official capacity suits for money damages have the same effect as suing the state for money damages, and therefore both types of suits are barred).

Suits for injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities are said to fall within the “Ex parte Young doctrine.” In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court said that state officials can be sued for an injunction in federal court, even though the state itself cannot be sued. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56, 28 S. Ct. 441, 452, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908).

Some states will actually pay any damages awarded against state officials sued in their individual capacities because of state “indemnification” laws. Even though the state will be paying damages, an indemnification law does not turn your lawsuit into a suit against the state that would be barred by the 11th Amendment. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 317 n.10, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.10, 109 L. Ed. 2d 264, 279 n.10 (1990) (“Lower courts have uniformly held that States may not cloak their officers with a personal Eleventh Amendment defense by promising, by statute, to indemnify them for damage awards imposed on them for actions taken in the course of their employment.”).

Notes:

235. Suits for injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities are said to fall within the “Ex parte Young doctrine.” In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court said that state officials can be sued for an injunction in federal court, even though the state itself cannot be sued. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56, 28 S. Ct. 441, 452, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908).

236. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30–31, 112 S. Ct. 358, 363, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 313 (1991) (holding that state officials, when sued in their individual capacities, are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and are not immune under the 11th Amendment). Some states will actually pay any damages awarded against state officials sued in their individual capacities because of state “indemnification” laws. Even though the state will be paying damages, an indemnification law does not turn your lawsuit into a suit against the state that would be barred by the 11th Amendment. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 317 n.10, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.10, 109 L. Ed. 2d 264, 279 n.10 (1990) (“Lower courts have uniformly held that States may not cloak their officers with a personal Eleventh Amendment defense by promising, by statute, to indemnify them for damage awards imposed on them for actions taken in the course of their employment.”).

237. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.54, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036 n.54, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 636 n.54 (1978) (noting that the 11th Amendment does not prevent suits against local governments that are not considered to be part of the state).


239. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1942, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 562 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor’s appearance in court in order to support of an application for a search warrant and to present evidence at hearing were protected by absolute immunity in civil rights action brought by arrestee); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, 143–44 (1976) (holding that a prosecutor was absolutely immune from suit even though he knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information, and failed to make full disclosure of all facts casting doubt upon the state’s testimony). Prosecutors may not have immunity for their conduct when they act as “administrator[s] or investigative officer[s],” and not as “advocate[s].” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, 143–44 (1976). The key factor is whether the prosecutor’s actions were “closely associated with the judicial process.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495–96, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1944–45, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 564–65 (1991) (denying absolute immunity to a prosecutor for giving legal advice to the police). Prosecutorial immunity is also limited to immunity from being sued for money damages. Prosecutors do not have immunity from being sued for injunctive relief. If a prosecutor violates your rights while acting within the scope of his official duties, you can sue him for injunctive relief. See Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of the U.S., 446 U.S. 719, 736, 100 S. Ct. 1967, 1977, 64 L. Ed. 2d 641, 656 (1980) (noting that prosecutors, though shielded by absolute immunity for damages liability, may be subject to § 1983 suits for injunctive relief).

240. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1121, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96, 114 (1983) (holding that a police officer, when testifying in court, is acting as a witness and is therefore entitled to absolute immunity).

241. Prior to 1996, the Supreme Court had held that judicial immunity did not prohibit declaratory and injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in his judicial capacity. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1981, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565, 579 (1984) (allowing an injunction against a state judge’s practice of incarcerating persons awaiting trial for nonincarcerable offenses and stating that “judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity”). However, in 1996, Congress amended § 1983 by enacting Section 309(c) of
money damages under Section 1983 as long as they were acting within the scope of their official duties. You should be aware of these immunities when deciding whom to name as defendants in your lawsuit.

You usually will not be able to sue any of these individuals for violating your constitutional rights if their actions were within the scope of their official responsibilities. To figure out whether an action falls within the scope of an official’s duties, courts look at the nature of the individual’s responsibilities and not just the individual’s title. For example, many officials with state or federal legislative responsibilities will be completely immune from suit even if they are not named legislators.242 Similarly, officials who perform judicial functions within administrative agencies may be completely immune even though they are not technically judges.243 According to the Supreme Court, prison officials on a prison disciplinary committee are not performing judicial functions.244 This means that they are not completely immune from liability for violating your rights.

Keep in mind that no official is absolutely immune from being sued for money damages for actions outside the scope of his official duties. As described above, you must look at the nature of the official’s actions, not just his title, to determine whether his actions are covered by absolute immunity. For example, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit only for actions taken within “the scope of his prosecutorial duties.”245 Therefore, he has absolute immunity for actions related to starting and presenting the government’s case against you. He does not, however, have absolute immunity for investigative or other actions that did not relate to his role as prosecutor.246 In *Buckley v. Fitzsimmons*, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor did not have absolute immunity for making allegedly false statements to the media about the defendant because giving statements to the press was outside his prosecution role.247 Absolute immunity also does not cover a prosecutor’s investigative actions to establish probable cause to arrest a defendant because this work could be done by police officers or detectives, so it does not relate to his role of preparing for trial.248 On the other hand, the Federal Courts Improvement Act, which provided that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was omitted or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)). The Senate report indicates that the amendment “restores the doctrine of judicial immunity to the status it occupied prior to [Pulliam] because Pulliam had departed from “400 years of common law tradition and weakened judicial immunity protections.” S. Rep. No. 104-366, at 36 (1996), *reprinted in* 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4216. Currently, therefore, judicial immunity prohibits injunctive relief from being granted against a judge acting in his official capacity, unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable. While this amendment does not grant judges absolute immunity, it makes securing injunctive relief against a judicial officer extremely difficult for all practical intents and purposes.

242. *See* Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of the U.S., 446 U.S. 719, 734, 100 S. Ct. 1967, 1976, 64 L. Ed. 2d 641, 655 (1980) (holding that defendant judges are absolutely immune from suit because they were acting as the state’s legislators when they created the disciplinary rules at issue); *see also* Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55, 118 S. Ct. 966, 973, 140 L. Ed. 2d 79, 89 (1998) (explaining that “[w]e have recognized that officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions”); Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405, 99 S. Ct. 1171, 1179, 59 L. Ed. 2d 401, 412–13 (1979) (holding that regional officials are entitled to absolute immunity where they were officially acting in a capacity comparable to that of state legislators); Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195–96 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding a governor and committee chair protected by legislative immunity for advocating and signing a law abolishing position of state poet laureate).


246. *See* Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The nature of a prosecutor’s immunity depends on the capacity in which the prosecutor acts at the time of the alleged misconduct. Actions taken as an advocate enjoy absolute immunity, while actions taken as an investigator enjoy only qualified immunity. This immunity law applies to *Bivens* actions as well as actions under section 1983.”) (citations omitted).

247. *Buckley v. Fitzsimmons*, 509 U.S. 259, 277–78, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2617–18, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209, 228–29 (1993) (holding prosecutor’s prejudicial out-of-court statements to the press were not within the scope of his duties and therefore not entitled to absolute immunity); *see also* Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1944–45, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 565 (1991) (holding that absolute immunity from liability for damages under Section 1983 did not apply to state prosecutor giving legal advice to police).

interviewing witnesses and evaluating evidence to prepare for trial are within the prosecutor’s role, so they are always covered by absolute immunity.249

Judges (including certain administrative judges)250 do not have absolute immunity from damages when they take actions that are not judicial in nature.251 They also do not have absolute immunity when they act with a “complete absence of jurisdiction.”252 A judge acts with the complete absence of jurisdiction when he makes a ruling in a case that he had no authority to hear in the first place. For example, a family court judge does not have authority to try felony cases. If he did hear such a case, he would be acting without jurisdiction and would not have immunity.253 If you think that a judge had the power to hear your case, but made a mistake that harmed you, you cannot sue the judge for money damages. Instead, you should try to appeal the judge’s ruling.

(c) Qualified Immunity of Individuals

Officials who are sued in their individual capacity and who are not completely immune from suit may still have a limited form of immunity, known as “qualified immunity.” State, city, and county officials at all levels may claim some type of qualified immunity.254 However, private parties (people who are not government officials) who rely on state law or who act under color of state law usually cannot claim qualified immunity.255

Officials with “qualified immunity” will only have to pay money damages if “their conduct . . . violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”256 To
claim qualified immunity, the official has to show either that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions did not violate the law, or that the law was not clearly established at the time of the violation. In other words, prison officials sued in their individual capacity can have qualified immunity even if their conduct is found to be illegal. But this will only happen if the court finds that it was \textit{objectively reasonable} for the official to believe his conduct was legal or that the \textit{law was unclear} when the violation occurred.

You do not have to allege in your complaint that the law that was violated was clearly established. The defendant is responsible for raising the qualified immunity defense. If the defendant fails to claim qualified immunity at the trial court level, he may lose the right to raise that defense in later proceedings, such as appeals.

Keep in mind that qualified immunity is not a defense to a claim for injunctive relief. Even if an individual has qualified immunity, the court can order that individual to stop doing something that violates your rights. Qualified immunity is also not available as a defense for municipalities or privately employed individuals.

For further reading, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 531–32 (1987) (holding that since defendant could reasonably have believed that the search at issue was lawful, he should have been allowed to claim a defense of qualified immunity), and Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 648–49 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that defendants should have been given the opportunity to attempt to prove that they reasonably believed they were not violating settled law and were therefore entitled to a qualified immunity defense).

There are many cases dealing with the issue of qualified immunity, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 531–32 (1987) (holding that since defendant could reasonably have believed that the search at issue was lawful, he should have been allowed to claim a defense of qualified immunity), and Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 648–49 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that defendants should have been given the opportunity to attempt to prove that they reasonably believed they were not violating settled law and were therefore entitled to a qualified immunity defense).

257. See Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 648 (2d Cir. 1994) (remanding, based on factual dispute related to whether a reasonable officer could believe that his conduct was lawful); Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924, 934 n.13 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that a defendant who “knew or should have known that her conduct violated a constitutional norm” was not entitled to immunity); Fiscus v. City of Roswell, 832 F. Supp. 1558, 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that Supreme Court decision within same month did not constitute clearly established law); Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, 737 F. Supp. 1309, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that qualified immunity did not apply because the prison doctors were aware that alleged conduct implicated the prisoner’s rights).

258. “Objectively reasonable” means that it does not matter whether the officer himself believed that the conduct was legal. Instead, the officer has to prove that a reasonable officer could have believed that the conduct was legal.

259. Whether the law is clear depends on the context of the facts of your case. For example, simply showing that the right to bodily privacy is clearly established is not enough to defeat an officer’s qualified immunity to your claim that by strip-searching you, he violated your substantive due process right to privacy. Instead, you would also have to show that at the time you were strip-searched, clearly established law (from the Supreme Court or a court in your circuit or district) stated that strip-searching violated your right to bodily privacy. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272, 281 (2001) (stating that the question of whether a law is clearly established “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition”); \textit{overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan}, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565, 576 (2009) (holding that the two-step process mandated in \textit{Saucier} for evaluating qualified immunity claims is no longer mandatory).

260. Thomas v. Independence Township, 463 F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] plaintiff has no obligation to plead a violation of clearly established law in order to avoid dismissal on qualified immunity grounds.”). However, if the defendant does raise a qualified immunity defense, the court may require you to allege additional facts so that it is able to decide the issue of qualified immunity. See Thomas v. Independence Township, 463 F.3d 285, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (directing district court to order the plaintiff to provide a more definite statement and, based on the facts they allege, reconsider the qualified immunity issue).

261. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 1924, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572, 578 (1980). Note that Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 427 (1985), allows defendants to immediately appeal a court’s decision to deny them qualified immunity, provided that the denial turns on an issue of law. These immediate appeals are called “interlocutory appeals.” If a defendant brings an immediate appeal of a denial of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” (citation omitted); Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1461 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that an order denying qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal). But see Feagley v. Waddill, 868 F.2d 1437, 1439–42 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding a denial of motion for summary judgment on issue of qualified immunity not immediately appealable because the issue of qualified immunity depended more on facts than law).

262. See Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 800 n.5 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that the qualified immunity defense was waived because it was not raised prior to the second appeal).


264. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1162, 122 L. Ed. 2d 517, 523 (1993) (“[U]nlike various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity...
prison guards.\textsuperscript{265} Qualified immunity is usually (but not always) decided by the judge during summary judgment proceedings.\textsuperscript{266} Summary judgment is described in Part C(8).

Figure 2 below should help you understand which defendants are completely or partially immune from suit in federal court, and what kind of relief you can request. You should note that state courts have different immunity rules. If you want to bring your lawsuit in state court (discussed below in Part D(2)), you should research your state’s immunity rules.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Defendant</th>
<th>Type of Immunity</th>
<th>Relief You Can Obtain</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State or state agency</td>
<td>Eleventh Amendment (sovereign) immunity</td>
<td>None, unless state law authorizes such lawsuits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any officials sued in their \textit{individual} capacities</td>
<td>Qualified immunity</td>
<td>Declaratory judgment; Injunctive relief; or Money damages. Money damages are only available if a) the official does not raise the qualified immunity defense or b) he does raise the defense, but you can demonstrate that a reasonable person would have known his actions violated a clearly established right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State officials in their official capacities</td>
<td>Eleventh Amendment (sovereign) immunity from suit for money damages only</td>
<td>Declaratory judgment; Injunctive relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state (local or municipal) officials in their official capacities</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Declaratory judgment; Injunctive relief; Money damages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnesses</td>
<td>Absolute immunity</td>
<td>None, unless you are alleging that the individual violated your rights at a time when he was not acting as a witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators and individuals authorized to perform legislative functions</td>
<td>Absolute immunity from any suit for actions performed within the scope of official legislative duties</td>
<td>None, unless you are alleging that the individual violated your rights while acting outside the scope of his official legislative duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutors</td>
<td>Absolute immunity from suit for money damages only, for actions performed within the scope of official prosecutorial duties</td>
<td>Declaratory judgment; Injunctive relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from suit—either absolute or qualified—under § 1983. In short, a municipality can be sued under § 1983, but it cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury [because there is no \textit{respondeat superior} municipal liability under § 1983].\textsuperscript{265} Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1409, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673, 685–86 (1980) (holding that a municipality cannot use the defense of qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action by simply arguing its employees acted in good faith); Cote v. Town of Millinocket, 901 F. Supp. 2d 200, 227 n.39 (D. Me. 2012), \textit{But see} City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616, 635 (1981) (holding that punitive damages are not available against a municipality in a Section 1983 suit unless there is a compelling reason for them to be).

265. \textit{See} Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412–13, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2107–08, 138 L. Ed. 2d 540, 552–53 (1997) (holding that private prison guards cannot use the defense of qualified immunity but noting that decision is limited to private firms "organized to assume a major lengthy administrative task (managing an institution) with limited direct supervision by the government"); Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 293–94 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the "distinction between public and private correctional facilities is critical").

266. \textit{See} Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 799–800 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that qualified immunity is ordinarily determined by the judge, but finding that there was no error in allowing the jury to decide the issue when there were facts in dispute relating to qualified immunity); Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The better rule, we believe, is for the court to decide the issue of qualified immunity as a matter of law, preferably on a pretrial motion for summary judgment when possible.”); Halcomb v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 526 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that disposition of the qualified immunity by the judge is ideal but not always practical); \textit{see also} Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S. Ct. 534, 536, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589, 595 (1991) (“We repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”).
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<th>Type of Defendant</th>
<th>Type of Immunity</th>
<th>Relief You Can Obtain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judges (including certain administrative judges)</td>
<td>Absolute immunity from suit for money damages only, for actions performed within the scope of official judicial duties, unless acting with a complete absence of jurisdiction</td>
<td>Declaratory judgment: Injunctive relief, but only if a declaratory judgment has been violated or is not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>Immunity from punitive damages</td>
<td>Declaratory judgment: Injunctive relief: Money damages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private parties acting under color of state law (such as prison guards at a privately-run prison)</td>
<td>Qualified immunity in some circumstances</td>
<td>Declaratory judgment: Injunctive relief: Money damages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2:** Types of Immunity Available to and Types of Damages Available from Different Defendants

(d) Defenses Based on Required Procedure

The defendants may try to persuade the court to dismiss your lawsuit by arguing that you have not met important procedural requirements. For example, the court can dismiss your case if you do not meet the filing deadline established by your state’s statute of limitations. See Part C(5) of this Chapter for an explanation of statutes of limitations. Of course, you can avoid this defense by filing your lawsuit before the deadline.

The defendants may also argue that your claim has already been resolved by an earlier court case or a prior administrative proceeding. If this argument applies to you, the court may refuse to hear your current lawsuit due to one or more of the doctrines of "res judicata," "collateral estoppel," and "preclusion." These doctrines bar the re-litigation of specific claims or issues that have already been litigated in previous cases between the same parties.

To avoid these defenses, you should carefully analyze and understand any claims you have previously filed before making the claims in your current case. You should also consider anything a court may have said about those claims. In general, a claim will be barred because it was "previously raised," if:

1. There was a final judgment on the merits of the claim in the previous case.
2. The ruling court in the previous case was a court of competent jurisdiction.
3. The prior action involved the same parties as the present case, and
4. The prior case involved the same type of claim (cause of action).

Finally, the defendants may argue that your complaint should be dismissed if you did not exhaust (use up) all administrative procedures available to you before filing. This is because under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, you must exhaust all administrative remedies (such as prisoner grievance procedures) that are available to you before bringing a suit. See Chapter 14 of the *JLM*, “The Prison Litigation Reform Act,” for more information on the exhaustion requirement and Chapter 15 of the *JLM*, “Inmate Grievance Procedures,”

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267. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980) (holding that collateral estoppel applied to Section 1983 actions and included both civil and criminal state-court decisions); see Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 n.5, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552, 359 n.5 (1979) (“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.”).

268. See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552, 559 (1979) (explaining that collateral estoppel and res judicata have the “dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party . . . . and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.”).

269. “On the merits” generally means that the previous lawsuit was decided on a motion for summary judgment or after a trial, or was dismissed with prejudice.

270. “Jurisdiction” is a word for a court’s power to hear and decide a case. If the court that heard your original case was not a court with power to hear that case, you can file the same case in another court.

271. See In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 762 F.2d 185, 190–91 (2d Cir. 1985) (describing the factors that prevent re-litigation of earlier decisions).
for information on prisoner grievances. Remember to keep copies of everything that you or prison officials write in this process, so that if a defendant claims that you did not use all required administrative procedures, you will be able to prove that you did.\textsuperscript{272} Note, however, that neither Section 1983 nor the PLRA requires you to exhaust your possible state court remedies before suing in federal court.\textsuperscript{273} This means that you do not have to file a lawsuit in state court before filing one in federal court. Instead, you can go directly to federal court.

4. Where to File

Once you have decided to bring your Section 1983 action in federal district court, you have to figure out which federal district court is the correct court.\textsuperscript{274} For example, New York is divided into four federal judicial districts. Your Section 1983 suit must be filed in the same district where the harm occurred or in the district where any defendant lives if all the defendants live in the same state.\textsuperscript{275} If defendants do not all live in the same state, and there is a reason that you cannot file in the district where the harm occurred, then you can file in a judicial district where any defendant can be found.\textsuperscript{276} In most cases, this means you have to file in the district where your prison is located. If you have been moved to another prison or have been released since the time you suffered the wrong, you must still file in the district where the harm occurred. Appendix I of the \textit{JLM} contains the addresses of all federal district courts. Appendix I also tells you the federal district for each of the New York state prisons.

5. When to File

If you have been harmed, you do not have an unlimited amount of time to bring your lawsuit. Instead, you need to pay attention to the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations is the amount of time you have after the harm occurs until your right to file a lawsuit expires forever. Because there is no federal statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims, this time period is governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury suits in the state where the court is located.\textsuperscript{277} This rule applies because the Supreme Court has found that the harms addressed by Section 1983 claims are similar to the harms addressed by tort claims for personal injuries.\textsuperscript{278}

\textsuperscript{272} It is also a good idea to save all documents related to these procedures because if your complaints are ignored, the writings may be evidence of the prison officials’ indifference that can be used in your Section 1983 suit. Their responses might also admit things, like explanations for their behavior, which you can use later at trial.

\textsuperscript{273} See Jenkins v. Morton, 148 F.3d 257, 259–60 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the PLRA does not require exhaustion of state judicial review procedures and noting that the same is true of Section 1983 claims); see also Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (“A prisoner’s administrative remedies are deemed exhausted [under the PLRA] when a valid grievance has been filed and the state’s time for responding thereto has expired.”).

\textsuperscript{274} Visit http://www.uscourts.gov/court-locator (last visited January 10, 2016) for help in locating your local federal district court.

\textsuperscript{275} 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2012) (describing requirements for where a plaintiff may bring a civil action in terms of appropriate “venue”).

\textsuperscript{276} 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2012).


\textsuperscript{278} City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1638, 143 L. Ed. 2d 882, 904–05 (1999) (finding that “there can be no doubt that claims brought pursuant to § 1983 sound in tort”).
For example, New York law says that personal injury suits have to be brought within three years from the date you suffered the wrong. You must identify yourself as the “plaintiff” (the party who is bringing the suit). You also have to identify the “defendant(s)” (the party or parties you are suing). In addition, you need to “state the grounds” for your complaint, which means you must specify the actions by the defendant(s) that violated your constitutional or other rights. You must specifically state which of your constitutional or federal statutory rights were violated. You also must tell the court what laws give the court “jurisdiction” (the power to hear your suit). This means that if you are suing in federal court, you must state (by law to be commenced by any person: ... To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by an Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States). This means that they have original jurisdiction over § 1983 actions arising in New York, the statute of limitations is three years); Lawson v. Rochester City School Dist., 446 Fed. App’x 327, 328 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that the statute of limitations for these cases in New York was still three years).

6. What to File
(a) Your Complaint

Your lawsuit begins when you file your “complaint.” Many districts provide model complaint forms for Section 1983 actions. After you figure out in which district you have to file, write to the clerk of that district and ask for the model forms (in New York, you should write to the pro se clerk). If you cannot get the forms, make your own using the examples in Appendix A of this Chapter. You should also read the local rules of practice for the federal district court where you decide to file. You can get the local rules for a small fee from the court clerk and possibly through your prison law library. There are several very important things that you must include in your complaint. If you miss some of these things, then your complaint may be dismissed, so you should make sure not to leave any of them out.

You must identify yourself as the “plaintiff” (the party who is bringing the suit). You also have to identify the “defendant(s)” (the party or parties you are suing). In addition, you need to “state the grounds” for your complaint, which means you must specify the actions by the defendant(s) that violated your constitutional or other rights. You must specifically state which of your constitutional or federal statutory rights were violated. You also must tell the court what laws give the court “jurisdiction” (the power to hear your suit). This means that if you are suing in federal court, you must state in your complaint that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343(a)(3) give the federal district courts jurisdiction over cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. You also have to

279.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(5) (McKinney 2015): see Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that “[f]or § 1983 actions arising in New York, the statute of limitations is three years”); Lawson v. Rochester City School Dist., 446 Fed. App’x 327, 328 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that the statute of limitations for these cases in New York was still three years).

280.  See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250–51, 109 S. Ct. 573, 582, 102 L. Ed. 2d 594, 606 (1989) (holding that in New York the time limit on bringing a Section 1983 claim is three years, which comes from the statute of limitations for personal injury suits, rather than the one-year limitation that applies to claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and other intentional torts).

281.  Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387–89, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1094–95, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973, 980–81 (2007) (“[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law . . . governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles . . . accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.”); Hunt v. Bennet, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Section 1983 claims accrue, for the purpose of the statute of limitations, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” (quoting Johnson v. Johnson Cnty. Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991))).

282.  You should name the defendants using their full, proper names. If you do not know a defendant’s full name, write down whatever identifying information you do know, such as his nickname, badge number, official position or duties, etc. Only defendants who have been adequately identified can be served with the summons and complaint. For more information on what you should do if you do not know a defendant’s name, see Part C(2)(a) of this Chapter.

283.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). This means that they have original jurisdiction over § 1983 actions, which are civil actions arising from a federal law.

284.  28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: ... To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by an Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States”).
tell the court the type of relief you are seeking—damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or any combination of these. See Part C(1) of this Chapter for information on the types of relief that are available.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require you to make a “short and plain statement” of your claim in the complaint. In your complaint, you should include a reasonably specific description of the incident or practice that is the basis for your claim. Give the court specific details such as names, dates, locations, and injuries suffered. Details help convince the court that you “state a claim for relief” and that your claim should not be dismissed. In particular, your complaint should explain how each person you name as a defendant was involved in the violation about which you are complaining. Being clear about the facts will allow the court to apply the law more accurately to your claim.

The Supreme Court has held that complaints must be plausible to avoid dismissal. This means that you must include enough facts to describe what happened or is happening to you. It is not enough just to state that the defendant(s) broke the law unless you give facts to support that conclusion. Even though courts still tend to look at pro se complaints somewhat more liberally than complaints they receive from represented parties, your complaint still must be plausible to survive dismissal, even if you are filing it pro se.

Therefore, a detailed complaint account of the facts is essential to making sure that your complaint is considered by the court.

You are not legally required to prove the facts behind your complaint at the time that you file it, but remember, it is very important to explain what happened or is happening to you as clearly as possible. You can use affidavits to do this. If you do, you must refer to the affidavits in your complaint and you must include a copy of each affidavit along with your complaint. Additionally, for each defendant you must make separate copies of your complaint and affidavits. Appendix A-3 of this Chapter contains a sample affidavit.

(b) Including Supplemental State Claims in Your Complaint

You may want to add some supplemental state law claims to your federal claim. A state law claim is “supplemental” to a federal constitutional or statutory violation if it involves the same facts. A federal court will consider a supplemental state law claim if it is included in a complaint with a non-frivolous federal

285. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (“A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds of the court’s jurisdiction ...; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.”).

286. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 883–85 (2009). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Iqbal’s complaint adequately alleged the defendants’ personal involvement in discriminatory decisions regarding Iqbal’s treatment during detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center. The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Citing its recent opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court laid out a two-step approach to determining whether a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, the court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement by providing sufficient facts to make its legal claims plausible.

287. See, e.g., Cohen v. Valentin, Civil No. 11-1942 (PGS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130300, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2011) (unpublished) (explaining that “the sufficiency of this pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of Plaintiff, even after Iqbal”) (however, be careful citing to unpublished cases as many jurisdictions do not allow you to cite to unpublished cases); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 64, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1086 (2007) (per curiam) (reviewing a prisoner’s pro se civil rights complaint shortly after Twombly and holding that “a document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed’” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 261 (1976))).

288. See, e.g., Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting liberal construction of pro se complaints but explaining that “even a pro se complaintant must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 884 (2009))); see also Starr v. Baca, 552 F.3d 1202, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2011) (examining Twombly, Erickson, and Iqbal and finding two common principles: “[f]irst, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action” and, “[s]econd, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief”).

claim. For example, you could file a single complaint claiming (1) that prison officials violated your Eighth Amendment rights by failing to prevent another prisoner from assaulting you and (2) that the officials were negligent under state tort law.

Note that when suing a New York State corrections officer in his individual capacity in federal or state court you cannot add a supplemental claim for acts he committed within the scope of his employment. But if your claim is based on conduct that was not within the scope of the officer’s employment, you can add a supplemental state law claim. You can also add a supplemental state claim when suing county or city corrections personnel. If you want to add supplemental state claims to your lawsuit, you should research whether the law in your state limits your ability to add state claims to Section 1983 suits against particular kinds of defendants.

Bringing a supplemental state claim in federal court can save you time and effort, but there are three potential disadvantages. First, the federal courts cannot grant an injunction against a state official when the claim against that official is based on a supplemental state law claim. Therefore, if you want to get an injunction against a state official based on a state law claim, you must bring that state law claim in state court. Second, just like you cannot use Section 1983 to sue a state official in his official capacity for damages in federal court, you also cannot use state law to sue a state official in his official capacity for damages in federal court. However, most federal courts permit claims for damages based on state law against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Third, if your state claim depends on state law that is unclear, the federal court may refuse to decide both your state and federal claims until a state court clarifies the state law, which takes time. Even if you win

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290. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012) (“[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).

291. For more information on state tort claims, see Chapter 17 of the JLM, “The State’s Duty to Protect You and Your Property: Tort Actions.”

292. This is because New York state law does not permit such suits in regular courts—it requires these claims to be brought in the State Court of Claims. N.Y. Correct. Law § 24 (McKinney 2015) (prohibiting civil suits brought by individuals in state court against employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision in their personal capacities for damages arising out of any act within the scope of their employment); Baker v. Coughlin 77 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that N.Y. Correct. Law § 24 also prohibits bringing such state law actions in federal court); see also Rivello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 303, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1281, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303 (1979) (explaining that when determining an employee’s scope of employment, New York courts have considered such factors as “the connection between the time, place and occasion for the act; the history of the relationship between employer and employee as spelled out in actual practice; whether the act is one commonly done by such an employee; the extent of departure from normal methods of performance; and whether the specific act was one that the employer could reasonably have anticipated.”).

293. See Ierardi v. Sisco, 119 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1997) (allowing plaintiff’s supplemental state law claim because it held that sexual harassment of a co-worker by a state corrections officer is not within the scope of the officer’s employment); Degrafenreid v. Ricks, 452 F. Supp. 2d 328, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding plaintiff’s negligence claim against corrections officers barred, while the officers were negligent in not replacing plaintiff’s hearing aids, such negligence occurred in the course of “doing the employer’s work” on-the-job conduct of DOCS employee will be found outside the scope of employment only where the conduct “was prompted purely by personal reasons unrelated to the employer’s interest” (internal citation omitted)).


295. For more information on suing a state official in his official capacity, see Part C(3)(a) of this Chapter.

296. See Williams v. Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526, 1543 (6th Cir. 1994) (permitting plaintiff to go forward with supplemental state law damages claim against state officials sued in their individual capacity); Wilson v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263, 1271 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that federal courts may hear state law claims for damages against officials sued in their individual capacities).

297. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2012) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction ... if the [state] claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.”); see also San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco,
your state claim in state court in the meantime, the federal court may refuse to decide your federal claim if it
thinks that your state victory has made federal relief “unnecessary.” The bottom line is that you should be
very careful when adding anything but the most routine state claim to your Section 1983 action.

7. How to File Your Complaint

Each court has its own detailed procedures for filing a complaint. You should try to obtain a copy of the
local Rules of the Court for the district where you are filing your lawsuit. You can get a copy of these rules in
your prison’s law library or by writing to the clerk of the court and (sometimes) paying a small fee.

You can also ask the clerk of the district court for model Section 1983 forms and in forma pauperis papers.
Be sure to ask the clerk how many copies of each document you need to file. You may also need to submit a
summons to the court clerk that will be issued to each defendant you are naming in the complaint. A summons
is the document that orders the defendant to respond to or “answer” your complaint with his own legal papers.
Appendix A-1 of this Chapter has a sample summons form.

You should file your complaint by mailing the complaint, your in forma pauperis papers (described below),
the summonses, and as many copies of those documents as the court requires all together in a sealed envelope
to the clerk of the court for the federal district in which the wrongful act took place. The clerk will request a
United States Marshal to deliver a copy of the complaint and a summons to each defendant. The court clerk
will return one copy of each paper to you marked “received by the clerk,” so that you will have a record of all
papers that you have officially filed with the court. Although the amount of time it will take for you to receive
this copy varies among courts, it should range from one to two weeks. Make sure to keep all of the documents
that you receive from the court.

An in forma pauperis declaration is a sworn statement in which you tell the court that you cannot afford
the filing fee and other legal expenses. If the court approves your in forma pauperis declaration, you do not
have to pay certain court expenses, including a fee and travel expenses (a mileage charge) for each summons
delivered by the U.S. Marshal.

In forma pauperis status does not relieve you from having to pay the filing fees associated with filing a
complaint. These fees are no longer waived in the same manner that they were in the past. See Chapter 14
of the JLM, “The Prison Litigation Reform Act,” to determine how you are required to pay filing fees. If you
cannot obtain a form for an in forma pauperis declaration from the clerk of the district court, use the form in
Appendix A-5 of this Chapter as a model (fill in your answers to the questions) and file it with an in forma
pauperis motion, an example of which is also contained in Appendix A-5.

If you wish the court to appoint an attorney for you, you should also make this request when filing to
proceed in forma pauperis. See Appendix A-6 of this Chapter for a sample form to request an attorney.

To summarize, the following are the general steps required to file a complaint:

1. Determine the federal district court in which you must file. This is usually the court in the
district where the harm took place. (See Appendix I of the JLM if you are in New York.)

2. Write to the clerk of that district court (the pro se clerk if there is one), and ask:
   (a) For a model Section 1983 complaint form,
   (b) For in forma pauperis papers,
   (c) For the local rules of practice for that district,
   (d) Whether you need a summons for each named defendant, and

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545 U.S. 323, 339–41, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2502–03, 162 L. Ed. 2d 315, 334–35 (2005) (“[T]he purpose of abstention is not to
afford state courts an opportunity to adjudicate an issue that is functionally identical to the federal question . . . [but] to
avoid resolving the federal question by encouraging a state-law determination that may moot the federal controversy.”);
that federal court should refuse to hear unsettled state law issue until the issue is resolved by the state courts and that,
on the facts of the case, the federal constitutional claim could not be heard by the federal court because the question
of whether a constitutional violation occurred depended on the outcome of the state law issue). In practice, federal courts will
often ask the state’s highest court to resolve unsettled state law issues instead of refusing to hear the state law question
at all. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79–80, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1075, 137 L. Ed. 2d 170, 201
(1997) (encouraging federal courts to certify unsettled questions of state law to state courts). When a federal court asks a
state’s highest court to decide a state law issue, it is called “certification.” Most states have a procedural provision allowing
for certification. Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The Federal System 1072 n.6 (Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et

By mailing these documents to the clerk, you have filed your Section 1983 lawsuit.

8. What to Expect After Your Legal Papers Have Been Filed in Court

Once you file your complaint, your lawsuit has officially begun. However, it is your responsibility to make sure that your lawsuit continues to move forward. It is not enough to simply file your complaint and then wait for something to happen. Nothing will happen unless you stay involved.

After you file your complaint and serve the defendant(s), the defendant(s) must respond by filing an “answer.”299 Defendants are supposed to file answers within twenty-one days of receiving the complaint,300 but some defendants ask for extra time. The defendant’s answer usually denies that your factual statements or allegations are true.

The defendant may also file a motion to dismiss your complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).301 In the motion to dismiss, a defendant may argue that even if your allegations are true, they do not make out a legal claim upon which relief can be granted. Basically, the defendant may argue that your complaints are not violations of statutory or constitutional rights covered by Section 1983. The court should give you the opportunity to amend (make changes to) your complaint if you left something important out of your original complaint. If the district court does not let you amend your complaint, you may have grounds for an appeal.302

If the defendant does not respond to your complaint at all, you can move for a “default judgment.” If the court grants you a default judgment, you win your case because the defendants did not answer. Although the court probably will not grant your motion for a default judgment, it may force the defendant to respond.

Another way a defendant might try to end your lawsuit is by filing for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.303 In a summary judgment motion, the defendant argues that there is no real factual dispute and, on the undisputed facts, they should win. For example, the defendant may claim that he is immune from suit for your claim.304 If the defendant makes a summary judgment motion, you must raise a “genuine dispute as to material fact.”305 To raise a genuine dispute as to material fact, you must provide factual support that would be admissible in evidence for each element of your claim against each defendant. For example, if you are suing supervisory officials, you must provide evidence that the particular officials

299. For more information, see Chapter 6 of the JLM, “An Introduction to Legal Documents.”
300. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (“A defendant must serve an answer—within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint.”).
301. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (“Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”).
302. See Platsky v. CIA, 953 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the pro se plaintiff whose claim was dismissed should be given an opportunity to amend his pleadings and file his complaint). But see Woodard v. Hardenfelder, 845 F. Supp. 960, 969 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that “leave to file an amended complaint is only appropriate when, based on the plaintiff’s first complaint, it is conceivable that an amended complaint could state a cause of action for a violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights”). Taken together, these cases mean that you should be given a chance to amend your original complaint with additional facts that support your legal claim, unless the court determines that based upon what you wrote in your original complaint, there is no possible way that you can prove additional facts to strengthen your legal claim.
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”).
304. For more information on other possible defenses, see Part C(3) of this Chapter.
305. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
are responsible for what happened. Factual support can be your own affidavit or declaration, the affidavit or declaration of other people who witnessed the event, or relevant documents like letters from the defendant(s).\textsuperscript{306} If you need discovery—the opportunity to obtain more information—in order to defend against a summary judgment motion, you can ask to delay the motion, but you will have to explain to the court what discovery you want and why you think it would help. Since statements in response to a summary judgment motion must be sworn to, you cannot just rely on your complaint unless the complaint is verified. If a verified complaint does not address all the relevant issues, you will still need to supplement it with a declaration.\textsuperscript{307}

The defendants in your lawsuit may try to stop your case by making it “moot.” A lawsuit is moot when it includes claims that no longer exist. Courts will not hear lawsuits that become moot. For example, if you ask for an injunction against certain bad prison conditions and the prison then improves the conditions, your lawsuit would be moot. Mootness is usually decided when the defendant files a summary judgment motion. To avoid having your claim dismissed because of mootness, you can request money damages for injuries you have already incurred—a damages claim is never moot.\textsuperscript{308} You can also ask the court to decide if the changes made by prison officials really solve the problem and are not just temporary.\textsuperscript{309}

If your suit is not dismissed, the next stage of the proceedings may be the “discovery” or investigation stage. Discovery is the process by which each party requests information from the other about the case. See Chapter 8 of the \textit{JLM}, “Obtaining Information to Prepare Your Case: The Process of Discovery,” for more information on discovery in a federal civil case. It is your responsibility, not the court’s, to keep your case moving. Once you have filed your complaint, you should begin discovery. Defendants often ignore discovery requests from \textit{pro se} plaintiffs such as prisoners. If the defendants in your case do this, you should write a letter to the defendants, requesting a response “in a timely manner,” and stating that if you do not hear from them you will write to the judge. Most courts now have what are called “meet and confer” requirements. Under these requirements, you must try to settle any discovery disputes with the defendant before you ask the court for help. If you do not hear from the defendants after you write to them, or if you are otherwise unable to resolve a discovery dispute with them, after a week or two you should write to the judge. Judges want cases to move quickly. If your discovery demands are proper, the judge should order the defendants to fulfill these demands or assist you in narrowing the request so they may be met. See Appendix A of Chapter 8 of the \textit{JLM}, “Obtaining Information to Prepare Your Case: The Process of Discovery,” for examples of letters that you may send to defendants and judges.

If you receive discovery requests from the defendants, you should make sure to respond in a timely and honest manner. This is because you are required to follow the rules of the court when you file a lawsuit. In addition, if you ignore discovery requests or delay your response to them, you might hurt your case and make the judge less likely to believe you in the future.

If you are threatened or punished by prison officials for bringing your suit, you should tell the court or your attorney (if you have been assigned one) as soon as possible. You should also tell the court if your appointed attorney has not communicated with you.

If, at any time, the court dismisses your suit, make sure that you understand the reasons for the dismissal. A lawsuit can be dismissed with or without prejudice. If the court dismissed your suit “without prejudice,” you

\textsuperscript{306} If you give the court documents, you must provide a proper “foundation” (explanation) for the documents so the court knows what the document is, when you received it, who gave it to you, etc. You must explain in an affidavit or declaration what the documents are (for example, that the document is the notice the lieutenant gave you that you were found guilty of a particular disciplinary offense, or that it is the grievance you filed and the decision you received, etc.).

\textsuperscript{307} See Chapter 6 of the \textit{JLM}, “Introduction to Legal Documents,” for explanations of documents such as affidavits and declarations.

\textsuperscript{308} See \textit{City of Richmond} v. \textit{J.A. Croson Co.}, 488 U.S. 469, 478 n.1, 109 S. Ct. 706, 713 n.1, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 872 n.1 (1989) (stating that the expiration of an affirmative action program did not make a challenge to the program moot because the plaintiff had asserted a claim for monetary damages).

\textsuperscript{309} See \textit{Weinstein v. Bradford}, 423 U.S. 147, 148–49, 96 S. Ct. 347, 348–49, 46 L. Ed. 2d 350, 352–53 (1975) (holding that the release of the plaintiff prisoner on parole mooted his challenge to earlier parole board proceedings, but also noting that where an issue is so short-lived that it will not continue throughout the time it takes to litigate (“capable of repetition, yet evading review,” the issue will not be declared moot if there is a “reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again”); \textit{see also} \textit{Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n}, 554 U.S. 724, 735, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2769, 171 L. Ed. 737, 749 (2008) (noting that “the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review ... applies where ‘(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again’”).
can file your suit again. If your suit is dismissed “with prejudice,” you cannot re-file your complaint. Instead, you must appeal the court’s decision to dismiss your complaint before the deadline to appeal.

D. Alternate Ways to Bring Lawsuits

1. Filing Your Lawsuit as a Class Action

Section 1983 claims can also be brought as “class action” suits. A class action is a lawsuit brought on behalf of a group of people who experience the same harm or have the same complaint—in other words, all persons are similarly situated.

Class actions are very complicated and can take years. It is also very difficult to bring a class action without an attorney. Losing a class action affects the rights of all class members, so having a good lawyer is very important. Courts will probably not “certify” (recognized by the court) a case as a class action if you do not have a lawyer. If you believe that other prisoners like you are experiencing similar mistreatment, you should talk with a lawyer about whether bringing a class action would be appropriate.

A class action will only be recognized by the court if it meets all of the following conditions:

1. The “class” (group) of persons in a similar position must be too large for each person to bring his own lawsuit or even join individual lawsuits;
2. The prison officials must have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply to the entire class;
3. The personal claims of the main plaintiff(s) (the “class representative(s)”) must be typical of the other plaintiffs; and
4. The class representative(s) must fairly and adequately protect the rights of the other members of the class.

Class actions are appropriate only if the wrong you suffered was also suffered by the other plaintiffs in the suit. All of you together will be considered a “class.” The class members do not need to know each other, but you must have a way to reasonably identify most of them, so they can be given notice of the suit and an opportunity to decide whether to participate in it. Again, in order to have your class “certified”, you will probably need to retain a lawyer or ask the court to appoint one, because class actions are very complicated.

If you decide to proceed on your own and feel that the case fits the requirements of a class action suit, you should name yourself and “all others similarly situated” as the plaintiffs. In the complaint, you should state all the facts concerning the wrongs done to you and also state whatever information you have about similar treatment of other prisoners. The court will then decide, on the basis of the facts you provide, whether or not a class action would be proper. If the court allows the class action, it may appoint an attorney to represent the class. If the court does not recognize the class action, you will be allowed to amend your complaint and sue by yourself.

310. For example, if you filed in the wrong district court, you may be allowed to re-file your complaint in the right court. Your suit could also be dismissed without prejudice because of a technical problem in your pleadings. If the statute of limitations has not ended, you may have the chance to fix your pleadings and re-file your complaint.

311. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. There are two main advantages offered by a class action. First, the suit will not become “moot” if one plaintiff is transferred or released (a suit is “moot” when the suit no longer applies to the person or persons who brought the suit). See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 1212–13, 63 L. Ed. 2d 479, 495 (1980) (holding that the resolution of the named plaintiff’s substantive claim does not necessarily moot all other issues in the case, even if class certification has been denied so far); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401, 95 S. Ct. 553, 558, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 541 (1975) (holding that when a claim is no longer relevant for a named plaintiff in a class action suit, the claim may still be alive and not moot for the class of persons the named plaintiff has been certified to represent). But see Sze v. I.N.S., 153 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting two exceptions to Sosna’s mootness doctrine: where, in a proposed class action, plaintiffs’ claims are “inherently transitory” and “there is a constantly changing putative class,” leaving the court no time to certify the class and where “but for the ‘relation back’ of a later class certification, putative class members’ claims would be barred by the statute of limitations” (quoting Wade v. Kirkland, 118 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1997))), overruled in part on other grounds en banc by United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004). The second advantage of bringing a class action is that, if you win, each member of the class can enforce the judgment or injunction on behalf of the other class members, which avoids separate enforcement actions.


2. Using State Law and/or State Courts

There are certain advantages to suing in federal court, such as easier and more generous discovery rules and potentially higher damage awards. But you may want to file in state court if you have only state law claims or if there are other advantages to bringing your Section 1983 claim in a particular state court.

(a) Turning Your Federal Civil Rights Claim into a State Law Claim

By bringing a state claim (instead of a federal civil rights claim) in state court, you can avoid the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), since the PLRA only applies to claims under federal law.\textsuperscript{314} You can do this by converting your federal civil rights claim into a state tort claim or other state law claim.\textsuperscript{315} For example, a claim in federal court for “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” in violation of the Eighth Amendment could instead be brought in state court as a tort action for medical malpractice. Or, if a disciplinary hearing denied you due process, you could file in state court for violation of the state regulations governing prison disciplinary proceedings.

In addition to avoiding the PLRA, you may have a better chance of winning if you file in state court because of the lower standard that you, as the plaintiff, will have to meet to prove your case. For example, a state court may find that you have a valid state medical malpractice tort claim even if you cannot show the prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” as required in a Section 1983 claim.\textsuperscript{316} However, many state statutes contain PLRA-like restrictions as well.\textsuperscript{317} You need to research the law in your own state before deciding to file a claim in state court.

Another possible advantage of bringing your claim in state court is that you may be able to enforce rights that are not granted under federal law. State constitutions may protect rights that are not recognized by the U.S. Constitution. This is because the Constitution protects a minimum level of individual rights and allows the states to provide greater rights for state citizens through their own “constitutions, statutes, and rule-making authority.”\textsuperscript{318} Again, you will need to research your own state’s constitution and statutes to find out whether you can sue for violations of any of those provisions.

\textsuperscript{314} You may want to avoid the PLRA because it is designed to make it harder for prisoners to take their claim to federal court. For example, the PLRA makes prisoners who file \textit{in forma pauperis} (as a poor person) pay the full $350 filing fee (as well as an additional $450 if you wish to appeal the court’s decision). It will also give you a “strike” if you have a case dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a valid legal claim. If you get three strikes, you will no longer be able to file claims \textit{in forma pauperis} and will have to pay the full amount of court costs and fees.

\textsuperscript{315} For more information on state tort claims, see Chapter 17 of the \textit{JLM}, “The State’s Duty to Protect You and Your Property: Tort Actions.”

\textsuperscript{316} \textit{See} Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291–92, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 260–61 (1976) (concluding that the “deliberate indifference” standard that must be met to prove a Section 1983 claim against a prison official for denial of medical care consists of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or conduct that is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind,” and not merely the “inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 874 (1976)).

\textsuperscript{317} \textit{See}, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 391–91.7 (West 2004) (governing vexatious (troublesome) litigants in general, and preventing those litigants that a court has found to be troublesome from filing future lawsuits without the permission of a judge); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.085(6)–(7) (West 2006) (allowing a court to dismiss a prisoner’s claim if it is frivolous, malicious, or harassing, and requiring that a prisoner who has litigated as an indigent (a person who has demonstrated that he is unable to pay court costs and fees) twice within the previous three years receive permission from a judge before going ahead with another suit); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 42-12-1–9 (1997 & Supp. 2009) (governing payment of certain court fees and costs by a prisoner, and requiring that any prisoner who has filed three or more actions that were later dismissed as frivolous or malicious be barred from filing any future actions unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.001–.014 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2009) (requiring that prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies before filing a claim in state court and that the state court claim be filed within 31 days of when the prisoner receives a written decision from the administrative grievance system, allowing courts to dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, and governing costs and fees that the court may require a prisoner to pay).

\textsuperscript{318} \textit{See} People v. Pavone, No. 199, 2015 N.Y. LEXIS 3926, at *16 (N.Y. Dec. 17, 2015), (“This Court has previously, and repeatedly, applied the State Constitution ... to define a broader scope of protection than that accorded by the Federal Constitution in cases concerning individual rights and liberties .... Thus, our analysis of defendant’s claim is grounded in our recognition of the greater expanse of our State Constitution.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); New York v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 129, 817 N.E.2d 341, 366, 783 N.Y.S.2d 485, 510 (2004) (“It bears reiterating here that on innumerable occasions this Court has given the State Constitution an independent construction, affording the rights and liberties of the citizens of this State even more protection than may be secured under the United States Constitution.”) (internal quotations omitted); Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 79, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1193, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 174 (1979) (“We have not hesitated when we concluded that the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court fell short
(b) Bringing Your Section 1983 Action in State Court

Even if you have a federal law claim, you may want to consider bringing your Section 1983 action in state court. The advantages and disadvantages of federal court compared with state court vary depending upon the state. Some state courts might have more sympathetic judges, more favorable procedural rules, or fewer cases to hear than federal courts. State courts may, however, place restrictions on damages or the amount recoverable for attorney fees. State courts also have different immunity rules than federal courts, which might be helpful or harmful to your lawsuit depending on which state you are in and whom you want to sue. You should research the law and practice of your state to see if it has any of these advantages or disadvantages.

Bringing your Section 1983 action in state court will also avoid some, but not all of the restrictions of the PLRA. For example, the barriers in the PLRA for prisoners filing *in forma pauperis* (filing as a poor person in order to avoid paying many of the normal fees and costs) do not apply in state court (although, as mentioned above, many states have their own PLRA-like laws that may restrict *in forma pauperis* filing). However, the requirement that you exhaust all of your administrative remedies before bringing your Section 1983 claim does apply in state court.

E. Special Concerns for Prisoners in Federal Prisons

1. *Bivens* Actions

There is no statute similar to Section 1983 that explicitly allows individuals to sue federal officials, rather than state officials, who violate federal rights while acting under color of federal law (acting in their official capacity as federal officials). However, the Supreme Court has held that, even without a specific statute, federal officials may be sued for damages and injunctive relief for violations of your constitutional rights.  *See* Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 2001, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619, 622 (1971) (holding that suit for 4th Amendment violation is permitted against a federal agent); *see also* Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–20, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 1471–72, 64 L. Ed. 2d 15, 23–24 (1980) (finding that the widow of deceased federal prisoner had a *Bivens* remedy directly under the 8th Amendment); *but see* FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006, 127 L. Ed. 2d 308, 323–24 (1994) (refusing to extend *Bivens* doctrine to suits against federal agencies).

Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear *Bivens* actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A *Bivens* action is the federal equivalent of a Section 1983 action. Therefore, most of the discussion of Section 1983 in Part B also applies to a federal *Bivens* action under Section 1331. Before proceeding, you should review all of Part B. Appendix A of this Chapter provides a sample Section 1983 complaints, which can also be used for *Bivens* actions. This Part explains the differences between Section 1983 suits and *Bivens* actions.

2. Exhaustion of Remedies

Before filing a *Bivens* suit against federal officials, you must exhaust (use up) any and all available administrative remedies, such as internal grievance procedures, regardless of whether you are suing for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or money damages. *See* Chapter 14 of the JLM, “The Prison Litigation Reform Act,” for more information.

3. Whom You Can Sue

In bringing a *Bivens* action, you are generally limited to suing the federal official who violated your federal constitutional rights. When you sue for money damages (as opposed to a different type of remedy), you can sue

of adequate protection for our citizens to rely upon the principle that that document defines the minimum level of individual rights and leaves the States free to provide greater rights for its citizens through its Constitution, statutes or rule-making authority.”) (internal citations omitted).


320. *See* Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825, 149 L. Ed. 2d 958, 966–67 (2001) (holding that the PLRA requires that all administrative remedies be exhausted before filing suit, regardless of the form of relief sought).
the official only in his individual capacity, not in his official capacity. This is because “official capacity” suits are considered to be the same as suits against the government, and the federal government has “sovereign immunity” (a type of absolute immunity) from being sued. You also cannot bring a Bivens action against a federal agency or a private corporation that contracts with the federal government to operate prison facilities. In Corrections Services Corporation v. Malesko, the Supreme Court held that it would be unfair to allow Bivens suits against private corporations and not federal agencies. Violations by these private corporations, the Court said, are best handled through tort remedies available to prisoners. It is not yet clear whether employees of private corporations contracting with the federal prisons may be sued under Bivens. While some courts have found that Malesko excluded only private entities and not private individuals from Bivens actions, others have found that neither private entities nor their employees can be sued.

4. What You Can Complain About

In a Bivens action under Section 1331, like a Section 1983 action, you may complain about conditions and/or treatments that violate your federal constitutional rights. Part B(2) and (3) of this Chapter, which explain possible Section 1983 actions, also apply to Bivens actions. You can also sue similar types of people in Bivens actions as you can in Section 1983 lawsuits, except you cannot sue federal agencies.

321. To show that a federal official has acted in his individual capacity, it is generally necessary to show personal involvement. See e.g., Goldberg v. Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that “to establish personal liability in a §1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right”); Caider v. Tryon, 11-CV-6379L, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119539, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2011) (noting that “to establish a Bivens claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the individual defendants participated in the alleged constitutional violation”); Volpe v. Nassau County, 915 F. Supp. 2d 284, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that “the complaint [was] devoid of any reference to actions taken by [the defendant] in violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights ... ”).

322. See Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 746 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that Postmaster General cannot be sued in his official capacity under Bivens: Affiliated Prof’l Home Health Care Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that Bivens “provides a cause of action only against government officers in their individual capacities”); Buford v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal official in his official capacity); Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 393, 395 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that Bivens actions must be against federal officials individually); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that a Bivens action “must be brought against the federal officers involved in their individual capacities”).

323. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, an action for damages will not lie against the United States absent consent. Because an action against federal officers in their official capacities is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are also barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”). See the discussion of state sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment in Part C(3)(a) of this Chapter. The discussion generally applies to the federal government as well.


326. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71–73, 122 S. Ct. 515, 521–22, 151 L. Ed. 2d 456, 466–76 (2001) (“Nor are we confronted with a situation in which claimants ... lack effective remedies ... . For example, federal prisoners in private facilities enjoy a parallel tort remedy that is unavailable to prisoners housed in government facilities.”).

327. See Sarro v. Cornell Ctr., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 58–60 (D.R.I. 2003) (finding private prison guards to be federal actors under Bivens because they are considered state actors within the meaning of § 1983 and act under the color of federal law); but see LaCedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Det. Facility, 334 F. Supp. 2d 114, 141 (D.R.I. 2004) (holding that no Bivens action can be brought against employees of a public corporation because they are not federal agents).

328. See Holly v. Scott, 343 F.3d 287, 296 (4th Cir. 2006) (dismissing Bivens lawsuit brought by prisoner in a privately run federal prison because he could seek relief under state law); Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctr., 422 F.3d 1090, 1105 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding Bivens actions are not available against private prison employees because other remedies, such as negligence actions, are available), vacated in part by an equally divided court en banc, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006).

329. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1006, 127 L. Ed. 2d 308, 323–24 (1994) (holding that federal agencies, such as the FDIC, are immune from Bivens actions).
Federal courts may refuse to hear Bivens complaints based on violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause that fall within the category of less serious harms (like removal of personal items). For harms that constitute simple tort violations you should sue using the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), rather than Bivens under Section 1331. The FTCA is a statute that authorizes damages suits against the federal government for actions by federal employees who, within the scope of their employment, negligently or wrongfully inflict harm on persons or their property. You begin a FTCA claim by submitting Form 95, “Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death,” and requesting money damages from the federal agency whose employee allegedly committed the harmful action. Many FTCA cases are resolved at the agency level through negotiation and eventual settlements. However, if your claim is denied, you may file suit in federal court. But remember, the judge will dismiss your case if you go to federal court without exhausting the administrative remedy.

5. What You Should File

If you are suing for injunctive relief or money damages in a Bivens action under Section 1331, you must serve a copy of the summons and complaint to: (1) the named defendants, (2) the U.S. Attorney for the district in which you bring your suit, and (3) the Attorney General of the United States in Washington, D.C. If you are suing in a Bivens action under Section 1331 for only money damages, you need to serve the summons and complaint to: (1) the U.S. Attorney for the district in which you bring your suit, (2) the Attorney General of the United States in Washington D.C., and (3) the officer or employee being sued. You must serve these papers using either registered or certified mail.

6. Where to File

If you are seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, you may file your lawsuit in the federal district where any defendant lives, where the events complained of occurred or are occurring, or where you presently live. If, however, you are suing for money damages only, you must file suit in the federal district in which all the defendants live or the district in which your claim arose (where the events you are complaining about occurred).

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330. The 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution each contain a Due Process Clause. The 5th Amendment’s clause applies to the federal government; the 14th Amendment’s applies to states. The Due Process protections described in Part B(2)(e) of this Chapter apply to federal prisoners through the 5th Amendment rather than the 14th Amendment.

331. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 533, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200, 3204, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 402–03, 407 (1984) (holding that the 4th Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures did not apply to searches of prison cells or seizures of prisoner property, and that such seizures did not violate the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause if a remedy was available after the seizure); Daniels v. Williams 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S. Ct. 662, 663, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 666 (1986) (holding that “the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property”).


333. A person acts negligently when they fail to use the care that a reasonably prudent person would use. A person acts wrongfully when they commit an act that will damage another person’s rights—even if that action is not a crime.

334. You may obtain this form by writing to the clerk of the federal district court in which you plan to file your action. Form 95 is also available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/SF-95.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).


338. Fed. R. Civ. P. 40(f)(1). You can send certified mail by bringing the correspondence to the mail room staff fully prepared for mailing with the appropriate stamps. You must pay for the cost of postage. To determine the price you can review the postal chart(s). You may follow similar procedures for sending registered mail. There are many ways to try to find the addresses for those being served. One way is to send a letter to the last known address with “Return Service Requested, Do Not Forward.” written on the envelope. The letter will be returned to you with the new address if there is a new address on file. Another way is to ask the post office if there is a forwarding address available for the individual you wish to serve. If you are able to use the internet, you may conduct a basic internet search to find the phone number or address of the individual, or call information for this data. Or, you may use social media to find this information.

339. 28 U.S.C. §1391(e) (2012) (“A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States ... may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.”).

F. Conclusion

If your constitutional rights have been violated you may be able to obtain relief by suing state and local officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 or suing federal officials under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. Through these suits, prisoners may receive monetary relief, injunctive relief, and/or declaratory judgment. In a Section 1983 claim against state and local officials you can sue officials in their official capacities as representatives of the state. However, when suing federal officials under Section 1331 you may only sue the federal officials in their individual capacity. (Refer to Part E of this chapter to review the special requirements for filing Section 1331 claims.) Appendix A of this chapter provides helpful examples of forms for making your claim, such as a summons form, a sample temporary restraining order, and a sample full complaint. Remember to read Chapter 14 of the *JLM* on the Prison Litigation Reform Act before starting your Section 1983 claim.
APPENDIX A

Forms and Samples

This Appendix contains the following materials:

A-1. Sample Summons Form
A-2. Sample Section 1983 Complaint Form
A-3. Form for an Affidavit
A-4. Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)
A-5. In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) Papers
   a. Notice of Sample Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
   b. Declaration in Support of Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
A-6. Application for Appointment of Counsel
A-7. Prisoner Authorization
A-8. Sample Language for Statement of Facts
A-9. Sample Full Complaint

Remember, federal prisoners can also use the “Sample Section 1983 Complaint Form” for a Bivens action. Just cross out the reference to “42 U.S.C. § 1983” and replace it with “28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Bivens action).”

Parts B and C of this Chapter contain instructions on when and how to use each of the following forms. DO NOT USE THESE FORMS UNTIL YOU HAVE READ PARTS B AND C OF THIS CHAPTER.

You may obtain free model forms for Section 1983 complaints and supporting papers by writing to the clerk of the district court in which you plan to file your action. These model forms are designed to make your work less confusing, and will help the district court process your case. If for some reason you cannot obtain model forms, draft your own papers based on the samples in this section. The footnotes included with each sample form tell you how to fill in the necessary information. DO NOT TEAR ANY OF THESE FORMS OUT OF THE JLM.

If you are in New York and need to know the name or address of the court to which you should send these papers, consult Appendix I at the end of the JLM for the federal courts in New York and Appendix II for the state courts in New York.

For sample forms for state court In Forma Pauperis Motions and Declarations in Support of Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, see Appendix A of Chapter 9 of the JLM, “Appealing Your Conviction or Sentence.”
A-1. SAMPLE SUMMONS FORM\textsuperscript{341}

[This is based on the official form. You can get as many free copies as you need from the clerk of the U.S. district court for your district.]

United States District Court
for the

\textsuperscript{342}

\[\text{[Names(s) of the Prisoner(s)]} \]
\[\text{Who Are Bringing the Suit,} \]
\[\text{Plaintiffs,} \]
\[\text{v.} \]
\[\text{[Names and Titles of All the People and Governments Whom You Are Suing], individually and in their official capacities,} \]
\[\text{Defendants.} \]

\textsuperscript{343}

\textbf{SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION}

To: [Defendant’s name and address]

\[\text{A lawsuit has been filed against you.} \]
\[\text{Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney, whose name and address are:} \]
\[\text{[Your complete prison address].} \]

\[\text{If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file your answer or motion with the court.} \]


\textsuperscript{342} Name of the federal district where the prison in which the alleged offense occurred is located, for example, “Southern District of New York” or “District of Colorado.”

\textsuperscript{343} Leave this blank. This entry will be filled in by the clerk of the court where you file the form.

\textsuperscript{344} See Part C(2) of this Chapter for information on whom to name as proper defendants.

\textsuperscript{345} Your complete prison address.
CLERK OF THE COURT

Date: __________________________

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
A-2. Sample Section 1983 Complaint Form

In the United States District Court
for the______________________

----------------------------------

[Name(s) of the Prisoner(s)]

:

Plaintiffs,

:

Complaint

v.

:

[Names and Titles of All the People and Governments Whom You Are Suing], individually and in their official capacities,

:

Civil Action No.____

Jury Trial Demanded

----------------------------

I. Complaint

Plaintiff(s), [your name and the name of any other plaintiffs], pro se, for their complaint state as follows:

II. Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue

1. Plaintiff [your name] was confined in the [type of facility: municipal (city) jail, federal penitentiary, state correctional institution], located at [address of the facility] in the city of ____ in the state of ____ from [dates of confinement at that facility] to _______ of 20__. Plaintiff is currently confined at [your current address].

2. Plaintiff [your name] is, and was at all times mentioned herein, an adult citizen of the United States and a resident of the state of ___________.

3. [If other prisoners are complaining, you should repeat paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 with their names and addresses].

4. Defendant [name of first defendant] was at all relevant times herein mayor of the City of ____.

5. Defendant [name of second defendant] was at all relevant times herein the commissioner of adult services for the City of ___, with responsibility for operating and maintaining detention, penal, and corrective institutions within the City of ____, including the city jail.

6. Defendant [name of third defendant] is and was at all relevant times herein the warden or “superintendent” of the municipal prison for the City of ______. As Superintendent of the prison, Defendant manages its day-to-day operations and executes its policies.

7. Defendant [name of fourth defendant] is and was at all relevant times herein an employee of the prison.

8. Defendant ________ is employed as [job of defendant, such as prison guard, mayor, warden or doctor] at [name of prison or other place that this defendant works]. Defendant ________ is employed as [job of ________].


347. Name of the federal district where the prison in which the alleged offense occurred is located. For example, “Southern District of New York” or “District of Colorado.”

348. Leave this blank. This will be filled in by the clerk of the court where you file the form.

349. See Part C(2) of this Chapter for information on whom to name as proper defendants.

350. Add “as a pretrial detainee” if you had not yet gone to trial at the time of the incident about which you are complaining.

351. If you do not know the names of the defendants, you should refer to them as either John or Jane Doe. See Part C(2) of this Chapter for more information.

352. From paragraph 4 onward, use the descriptions and titles of defendants that are correct for your case.

353. Include the type of prison about which you are complaining, such as “federal penitentiary” or “state correctional institute.”
defendant, such as prison guard, mayor, warden or doctor] at [name of prison or other place that this defendant works].

9. Defendant City of ___ is and was at all relevant times herein a municipal corporation of the State of ___.
10. This action arises under and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to remedy the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1343.
12. This cause of action arose in the _____ District of _____. Therefore, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b).

III. Previous Lawsuits by Plaintiff

Use this paragraph if you have not filed any lawsuits relating to these facts before:
13. Plaintiff has filed no other lawsuits dealing with the same facts involved in this action or otherwise relating to his/her imprisonment.

Use these paragraphs if you have filed a lawsuit relating to these facts before:
14. Plaintiff has filed other lawsuits dealing with the same facts involved in this action or otherwise relating to his/her imprisonment.
15. [Describe the lawsuit in the space below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another piece of paper, using the same outline.)] The parties to the previous lawsuit were Plaintiffs [names of all the plaintiffs in that lawsuit] and Defendants [names of all the defendants in that lawsuit] in the [if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county] Court, Docket Number __, under [name of judge to whom case was assigned]. The case was [disposition (outcome) of the cases: dismissed? appealed? still pending?]. The lawsuit was filed on _____, 20 __ and I learned of the outcome on _____, 20____.

IV. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

16. [Read Chapter 14 of the JLM, “The Prison Litigation Reform Act,” to determine whether you need to include any description here of how you exhausted your administrative remedies and in what detail. It may depend on your jurisdiction.]

V. Statement of Claim

17. At all relevant times herein, defendants were “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and acted under color of law to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, as set forth more fully below.

VI. Statement of Facts

18. [State here fully but as briefly as possible the facts of your case. Describe how each defendant is involved. The facts should be in clear, chronological order, like you are telling a story. Try to start out each paragraph with the date of the events you are describing. Include also the names of other persons involved, dates, and places. Do not give any legal arguments or cite any cases or statutes. If you intend to allege a number of related claims, number and give each claim a separate paragraph. Use as much

354. Use the name of the part of the Constitution or federal statute that protects your rights.
355. Fill in the name of the district and state where you are filing, for example, “Southern District of New York” or “District of Colorado.”
356. Whether you will need to include this section and what you will need to include in it varies greatly depending on where you are filing your lawsuit. For an explanation of how to indicate to the court that you exhausted your administrative remedies, see Chapter 14 of the JLM, “The Prison Litigation Reform Act.” Pay particular attention to whether the courts in your jurisdiction require you to plead and prove in your complaint that you exhausted the administrative grievance procedures available to you. Depending on where you are, you may be able to omit this section entirely. However, in some circuits, such as the 6th Circuit, you will need to include quite a bit of information in this section.
357. You should try to write the facts in such a way that they satisfy the appropriate legal standard. See Appendix A-9 of this Chapter for a full sample complaint.
space as you need. Attach extra sheet(s) if necessary. See the examples of language given for each kind of violation in Appendix A·8. You should also look at the full sample complaint in Appendix A·9.]

VII. Prayer for Relief

(State briefly exactly what you want the court to do for you. Make no legal arguments. Cite no cases or statutes. Examples of relief you might want to include are:

19. Plaintiffs request an order declaring that the defendants have acted in violation of the United States Constitution.
20. Plaintiffs request an injunction\(^{358}\) compelling defendants to provide or stop ________.
21. Plaintiffs request $ ___ as compensatory damages.]

Signed this ___ day of _____, 20__. [Name of Plaintiff]

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

PLAINTIFF’S NAME

DATE

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\(^{358}\) An order from the court forcing the defendants to do or stop doing something.
A-3. **FORM FOR AN AFFIDAVIT**\(^{359}\)

[This form is for plaintiffs, other prisoners, or anyone else who wants to make a sworn statement on behalf of plaintiffs.]

In the United States District Court
for the______________________\(^{360}\)

[Name of First Prisoner in Complaint\(^{361}\), et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
[Name of First Defendant in Complaint\(^{362}\), et al.
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF [NAME OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT]

I, [full name of prisoner or other person making the statement], being duly sworn according to the law deprecate and say [that I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled proceeding, if you or another plaintiff are making the statement].

[Write statement here. Use numbered paragraphs.]

All of the information I have submitted [in support of my request, Plaintiff's case, etc.] is true and correct.

__________________________________________________
Sign Here Before Notary Public

__________________________________________________
Sworn to before me this
____ day of ____ , 20__.  


360. Name of the federal district where the prison in which the alleged offense occurred is located, for example, “Southern District of New York” or “District of Colorado.”

361. Your name.

362. Leave this blank.

363. The name of the first defendant against whom you are bringing suit.

364. Leave blank. You should have this affidavit notarized. The notary public will fill in the date here.
A-4. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (“TRO”)

[Be sure to submit, along with this paper, an affidavit (Form A-3) stating how you will be hurt if you do not get temporary relief and how you tried to notify the defendants of your request for temporary relief.]

In the United States District Court
for the ________________

[Name of First Prisoner in
Complaint], et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. [Name of First Defendant in
Complaint], et al.,
Defendants.

Upon the complaint, supporting affidavits of plaintiffs sworn to the ____ day of _____, 20___, and the memorandum of law submitted herewith, it is:

ORDERED that the defendants [names of defendants against whom you need immediate court action] show cause in room ____ of the United States Courthouse, [address] on the ___day of ___, 20___, at ___ o’clock, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, why preliminary injunction should not issue pursuant to Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enjoining the defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees and all other persons acting in concert and participation with them, from [a precise statement of the actions you want the preliminary injunction to cover].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that effective immediately, and pending the hearing and determination of this order to show cause, the defendants [names of defendants against whom you want temporary relief] and each of their officers, agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert or participation with them, are restrained from [statement of actions you want the preliminary injunction to cover].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that personal service of a copy of this order and annexed affidavit upon the defendants or their counsel on or before [date], shall be deemed good and sufficient service thereof.

[leave this space blank for judge’s signature]

Dated: [leave blank]
United States District Judge

_________________________


Name of the federal district where the prison in which the alleged offense occurred is located, for example, “Southern District of New York” or “District of Colorado.”

Leave these blank. The court clerk will fill these in.
A-5. **IN FORMA PAUPERIS (“IFP”) PAPERS**

[You should ask for this form from the district court clerk where you will be filing your complaint. They will also send you the paperwork that is required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (Form A-7, “Prisoner Authorization,” below) for you to fill out regarding your prison account. *Each* plaintiff prisoner must fill out IFP and Prisoner Authorization forms.]

In the United States District Court
for the______________________

[Names(s) of the Prisoner(s) ]
Who Are Bringing the Suit, Plaintiffs,

v.

[Names and Titles of All the People and Other Entities Whom You Are Suing], Defendant.

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS

I am a plaintiff or petitioner in this case and declare that I am unable to pay the costs of these proceedings and that I am entitled to the relief requested.

In support of this application, I answer the following questions under penalty of perjury.

1. **If incarcerated.** I am being held at: __________________________________________________________.

   [If you are employed there, or you have an account in the institution, write:] I have attached to this document a statement certified by the appropriate institutional officer showing all receipts, expenditures, and balances during the last six months for any institutional account in my name. I am also submitting a similar statement from any other institution where I was incarcerated during the last six months.

2. **If not incarcerated.** If I am employed, my employer’s name and address are: ____________________.

   My gross pay or wages are: $________, and my take-home pay or wages are $______ per [specify pay period] ____________.

3. **Other Income.** In the past 12 months, I have received income from the following sources [check all that apply]:

   (i) Business, profession, or form of self-employment YES NO
   (j) Rent payments, interest, or dividends YES NO
   (k) Pensions, annuities, or life insurance payments YES NO
   (l) Disability or worker’s compensation payments YES NO

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369. Name of the federal district where the prison in which the alleged offense occurred is located, for example, “Southern District of New York” or “District of Colorado.”

370. Leave this blank. This entry will be filled in by the clerk of the court where you file the form.

371. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires you to submit a certified copy of your prison account statement showing your balance for the last six months along with this declaration. For more information on complying with the PLRA, see Chapter 14 of the *JLM*, “The Prison Litigation Reform Act.”
(m) Gifts or inheritances
   YES    NO
(n) Any other sources
   YES    NO

If you answered “Yes” to any questions above, describe below or on separate pages each source of money and state the amount that you received and what you expect to receive in the future.

4. Amount of money that I have in cash or in a checking or savings account: $ _____________

5. Any automobile, real estate, stock, bond, security, trust, jewelry, art work, or other financial instrument or thing of value that I own, including any item of value held in someone else’s name [describe the property and its approximate value]:

6. Any housing, transportation, utilities, or loan payments, or other regular monthly expenses [describe and provide the amount of the monthly expense]:

7. Names (or, if under 18, initials only) of all persons who are dependent on me for support, my relationship with each person, and how much I contribute to their support:

8. Any debts or financial obligations [describe the amounts owed and to whom they are payable]:

Declaration: I declare under penalty of perjury that the above information is true and understand that a false statement may result in a dismissal of my claims.

Date: ____________________________________________

______________________________
Applicant’s signature

______________________________
Printed Name
A-6. APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

In the United States District Court
for the______________________

-----------------------------------------

[Name(s) of the Prisoner(s) :]
Who Are Bringing the Suit, : Application for the Court to
Plaintiffs, : Request Counsel

v. : 

[Names and Titles of All the People : Civil Action No.____
and Other Entities Whom You Are Suing], : 

Defendant. :

-----------------------------------------------------------------

(o) Name of applicant _____________________________________________

(p) [Explain why you feel you need a lawyer in this case.]

(q) [Explain what steps you have taken to find an attorney and with what results. Use additional paper if necessary.]

(r) [If you need a lawyer who speaks in a language other than English, state what language you speak.]

(s) I understand that if a lawyer volunteers to represent me, and my lawyer learns that I can afford to pay for a lawyer, the lawyer may give this information to the Court.

(t) I understand that if my answers on my Application for the Court to Request Counsel are false, my case may be dismissed.

(u) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: ___________________

[Your Signature]

---


373. Name of the federal district where the prison in which the alleged offense occurred is located, for example, “Southern District of New York” or “District of Colorado.”

374. Leave this blank. This entry will be filled in by the clerk of the court where you file the form.

375. Your name.

376. For example, you do not know the law well, you do not have access to the law library, you have a disability, your case is very complicated, etc. Use additional paper or include an affidavit supporting your application if necessary. The most common reason prisoners need legal representation is that Section 1983 claims involve complex legal issues that are difficult for non-lawyers to understand and litigate effectively.
A-7. **Prisoner Authorization**

[This is the form that should be sent to you after you submit your complaint to the district court. If you do not receive it within two weeks of submitting your complaint, you should copy the information found here and send it to the court so that your complaint is not dismissed because you did not comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act.]

****************************************************
Mailed to the Plaintiff by the Court on this date:

Case Name: __________________ v. __________________

Docket No: No. __ Civ. _____ ( )

**NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THIS ACTION WILL BE DISMISSED UNLESS PLAINTIFF COMPLETES AND RETURNS THIS AUTHORIZATION FORM TO THIS COURT WITHIN FORTY-FIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE.**

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA" or "Act") amended the *in forma pauperis* statute (28 U.S.C. § 1915) and applies to your case. Under the PLRA, you are required to pay the full filing fee when bringing a civil action if you are currently incarcerated or detained in any facility. If you do not have sufficient funds in your prison account at the time your action is filed, the Court must assess and collect payments until the entire filing fee of $____ has been paid, no matter what the outcome of the action.

**SIGN AND DATE A COPY OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHORIZATION:**

I, ______________, request and authorize the agency holding me in custody to send to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the ____________________ a certified copy of my prison account statement for the past six months. I further request and authorize the agency holding me in custody to calculate the amounts specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), to deduct those amounts from my prison trust fund account (or institutional equivalent), and to disburse those amounts to the United States District Court for the ____________________ This authorization shall apply to any agency into whose custody I may be transferred, and to any other district court to which my case may be transferred and by which my poor person application may be decided.

I UNDERSTAND THAT BY SIGNING AND RETURNING THIS NOTICE TO THE COURT, THE ENTIRE COURT FILING FEE OF $____ WILL BE PAID IN INSTALLMENTS BY AUTOMATIC DEDUCTIONS FROM MY PRISON TRUST FUND ACCOUNT **EVEN IF MY CASE IS DISMISSED OR EVEN IF I VOLUNTARILY WITHDRAW THE CASE.**

________________________________  __________________________________
Signature of Plaintiff  Date Signed

Prisoner I.D. Number: __________________

Name of current facility: __________________

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378. Filing fees may differ depending upon the federal district court in which you file your claim.
379. Fill in the district in which the court is located, such as “Southern District of New York” or “District of Colorado.”
380. Once again, fill in the federal district in which the court is located.
381. Fill in the fee charged by the district court in which your case is filed.
A-8. SAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR STATEMENT OF FACTS

(The following paragraphs are examples of how to explain different types of complaints that you may want to bring.382 DO NOT COPY ANY OF THESE because your facts will be different than the examples.)

INADEQUATE AND UNSANITARY HOUSING383

1. Numerous insects, rats, mice, and other vermin were in the prison throughout the period of plaintiffs' confinement from November 2002 until the time of this complaint.

2. An exterminator did visit the prison in March of 2005, but only the common areas and guard areas were sprayed. Individual cells were never sprayed. When the common areas were sprayed, roaches and other vermin simply moved into the individual cells. Once the fumes disappeared, the vermin returned unharmed to again infest the entire prison.

3. The exterminator wore a mask and gloves, but prisoners remained in their cells and were not given masks or protective clothing.

4. There was no ventilation to prevent prisoners from inhaling the fumes. Plaintiff and fellow prisoner [Plaintiff #2], as well as several others, suffered severe headaches and nausea after the extermination.

5. Inadequate lighting in the cells made reading for more than a few minutes at a time extremely difficult and nearly impossible. Requests for lamps or stronger light bulbs were denied on [insert dates and name of person who denied the light bulb].

INADEQUATE VISITATION AND TELEPHONE ACCESS384

6. Plaintiff attempted to telephone his attorney beginning in March 2005 because he wished to tell him about new evidence in his case. On or about March 3, 2005, plaintiff asked [Defendant #1] to allow plaintiff to make a telephone call to his attorney. Defendant refused.

7. Plaintiff continued to request telephone access throughout the month of March. On April 1, 2005, he was given access to the telephone, but only after 7:30 p.m. Because his attorney works only during business hours, plaintiff was unable to contact him that day.

8. The refusal of the prison staff to allow plaintiff access to telephone contradicted stated prison policy regarding telephone use for prisoners in the general population posted in the cafeteria. Plaintiff was a part of the general population for the entire time that he could not access a telephone.

9. The official prison policy regarding telephone use is also insufficient for purposes of contact with prisoners' attorneys. While confined in the prison, each prisoner was allowed to make only one five-minute call during the week and one ten-minute call on the weekend. The weekday phone calls were restricted to the daytime one week and the evening the next. Each prisoner was allowed only one long-distance telephone call per month, even if that was the only way to contact that prisoner's attorney.

10. On January 17, 2006, plaintiff [Plaintiff #2] met with his attorney in the common area. Despite numerous requests by plaintiff [Plaintiff #2] and plaintiff's attorney for privacy, defendants [Defendants #2 and #4] refused to keep other prisoners away from plaintiff and his attorney. In addition, defendants [Defendants #2 and #4] were also observed to be listening to plaintiff and attorney conversing.

11. The short amount of time allotted for the calls and the complete lack of privacy markedly decreased the quality of discussions between prisoners and their attorneys. The only phone was located in the common area. It was not only difficult to have a conversation over the noise of the guards and other prisoners, but also nearly impossible to have a private conversation. On numerous occasions prisoners complained that the guards were listening to their phone conversations.

12. The prison's attorney visitation policy was overly restrictive during the period of plaintiffs' confinement. Prisoners were forced to converse either in the common area, where other prisoners and guards could overhear conversations, or in a meeting room observed by guards through two-way mirrors. Since attorneys often felt uncomfortable conversing openly in the common area, surrounded by other prisoners, meetings often occurred under the watchful eye of the prison guards.

382. These fact patterns are based in large part upon examples taken from the sample complaints in John W. Witt et al., Section 1983 Litigation: Forms (1994).
INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE

Specific Instance

13. On August 23, 2004, plaintiff injured his ankle and foot while playing basketball with other prisoners. At approximately 2:00 p.m., he asked [Defendant #1] to be allowed to attend sick call at the infirmary. [Defendant #1] denied plaintiff’s request, stating that sick call was at 8:30 a.m. and that plaintiff would have to wait until the following morning. Plaintiff then returned to his cell, his injury untreated.

14. In the early afternoon of August 23, 2004, plaintiff, still in his cell, saw [Defendant #2] making his rounds on plaintiff’s floor. Plaintiff told [Defendant #2] about his foot injury and asked to see the prison nurse. [Defendant #2] replied that in order to see the nurse, his pain would have to be an emergency. Otherwise, plaintiff would have to wait until the next day for sick call. Plaintiff immediately told him it was an emergency. However, [Defendant #2] said that he did not think it was an emergency because plaintiff was not bleeding and told plaintiff to wait for sick call. [Defendant #2] then left to continue his rounds.

15. Later on in the afternoon of August 23, 2004, plaintiff was in severe pain from his foot and noticed that it had swelled and become discolored. He called [Defendant #4], the shift supervisor at the time. He responded to plaintiff’s call and asked him what was wrong. Plaintiff told him about his symptoms and asked to see the prison nurse. Instead, [Defendant #4] went to get some Advil for plaintiff.

16. On the evening of August 23, 2004, [Defendant #3] gave two Advil to plaintiff. Plaintiff took the Advil and told [Defendant #3] that his pain was so bad that he could not stand or walk. [Defendant #3] responded that he could only follow [Defendant #4]’s orders, and told plaintiff that sick call was at 8:30 a.m.

17. On the morning of August 24, 2004, prison staff members found plaintiff in his bed. He was unable to move his foot. Plaintiff was finally seen for the first time by the prison’s staff nurse, at which time plaintiff was moved to _____County Hospital. At _____County Hospital, plaintiff’s foot was examined and operated on. Plaintiff remained hospitalized for the next five days as a result of the prison’s unprofessional and inappropriate treatment of his injury.

18. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #2] experienced earaches in both ears for the entire month of November 2002, and was unable to obtain medical attention.

19. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #2] also suffered severe migraines from approximately December 2, 2005, through February 14, 2005, that were completely crippling. He was denied timely medical care by the prison. When [Plaintiff #2] was finally taken to the hospital on February 14, 2005, he was diagnosed as suffering from cluster migraine headaches resulting from physical problems, namely, his ear infections.

20. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #3] suffered from severe neck pain as a result of a factory work accident prior to plaintiff’s prison confinement. [Plaintiff #3] has been unable to get any medical attention for this physical ailment to date.

21. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #4] had pieces of broken knife lodged in his shoulder. While in the prison, the shards began causing him immense pain. Despite numerous complaints, [Plaintiff #4] has not received any medical attention to date.

22. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #5] suffered from an open, infected sore four inches in diameter on his leg. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #5] showed this sore to defendants [Defendants #1 and #2] on January 12, 2005. Prison authorities did not provide him with treatment or medication until February 1, 2005.

23. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #6] suffered severe migraine headaches resulting from stress and spiritual problems. He also had several stomach ulcers. He was unable to obtain adequate or timely medical care. Plaintiff reported these problems to defendant [Defendant #3] on December 1, December 15, and December 30, 2004. Defendant has not received any medical attention until the present time.

24. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #5] suffered a head wound in a shootout a few years prior to his sentence in prison. When the wound became painful during [Plaintiff #3]’s stay at the prison, he asked defendants [Defendants #2 and #3] on January 25, 2005 for a medical exam. He did not receive any medical care until two months after his first request. As a consequence of the delay in treatment, [Plaintiff #5] underwent a complicated surgical procedure on April 15, 2005, and was hospitalized for two weeks.

385. See John W. Witt et al., Section 1983 Litigation: Forms, 47–48 Form 1–8; 33–34 Form 1–5 (1994); see also Chapter 23 of the JLM, “Your Right to Adequate Medical Care.”
In General

25. In general, defendants showed deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners, and particularly neglected those of the plaintiffs.

26. Medical care at the prison was inadequate and unprofessional. Medical records, vital in assessing a patient’s potential for future sickness, were not used to assist diagnoses. Deficiencies were the norm, and plaintiffs were unable to obtain examinations or care upon request. Prisoners often had to submit grievances to receive medical care from a physician or hospital.

27. Sick call occurred only once each week, the screening process for determining whether a patient needed attention was inadequate, and in the meantime, plaintiffs would have to beg guards or other staff for basic medical attention.

INADEQUATE LAW LIBRARY AND FACILITIES

28. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #1] filed a case in the district court on May 15, 2003, regarding injuries he received from a prison guard during a prison riot. Plaintiff’s case was dismissed because he failed to use the Inmate Grievance Program prior to filing his case, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).

29. Plaintiff was unable to file his lawsuit again because the statute of limitations in New York had passed by the time he received notice that his case had been dismissed.

30. Plaintiff did not know about the PLRA because the legal materials available to him in prison contained no cases or information regarding the state of the law after 1995.

31. The prison library was shockingly inadequate. The most recent case reporters in the library dated from 1994 and several volumes were missing, specifically all of the United States reporters from 1990 and 1992.

32. Plaintiffs, relying on these reporters, suffered actual injury because they could have succeeded under a different claim if they had access to current statutory and case law.

33. The prisoners on each block were supposed to have access to the law library at least three times a week. However, they were regularly called only once a week or less. Five prisoners at a time were sent to the library for a period of ninety minutes, not enough time to adequately conduct research and prepare legal documents. No books were allowed to be checked out of the library. As a result, it was extremely difficult for the prisoners to get more than a small amount of work done each time they went to the library.

INADEQUATE MAIL FACILITIES (CORRESPONDENCE)

34. The mail processing system at the prison was extremely inadequate. Mail was frequently lost or misplaced.

35. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #2] prepared a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Three weeks after giving it to prison authorities to be mailed, plaintiff discovered it at the bottom of a three-foot stack of undelivered mail. In addition, the envelope was battered and dirty.

36. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #3] notified the mail clerk that he was expecting a letter and photographs from his wife and children. Three months later Plaintiff [Plaintiff #3] received a torn envelope with no photographs. The envelope was marked “Received” with the date of two months before stamped on it. Plaintiff [Plaintiff #3] suffered extreme emotional harm and depression due to this lack of expected correspondence with his family.

37. In addition, the prison did not have any secure place for incoming or outgoing mail to protect against the mail being stolen or lost.

INADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO PRACTICE RELIGION

38. Plaintiffs were not permitted to meet or practice their religion. Even though numerous grievances were filed and the majority of the prisoners were Muslim, the prison did not allow any Muslim services.

39. Despite the fact that plaintiffs’ religion strictly forbids them from eating pork and foods cooked with pork fat, the prison offered no vegetarian or alternative diet plan.

UNSAFE ENVIRONMENT

40. From approximately April 2005 through December 2005 plaintiff was mercilessly beaten and savagely raped by defendant [Defendant #1] and other fellow prisoners whose names are unknown to plaintiffs.

41. As a result of these assaults, plaintiff [name] suffered [describe injuries such as: broken jaw, severe facial lacerations requiring stitches, anal bleeding, and severe anxiety]. Defendant [Defendant #2] knew about the injuries: despite plaintiff’s request for hospitalization, defendant [Defendant #2] denied plaintiff access to medical care.

42. [Specify other acts or omissions that defendants knowingly and negligently committed, which tended to cause the injuries received by plaintiff, such as: A number of prison guards knowingly and negligently opened the cell doors of _____ and allowed the intermingling of prisoners, many of them in prison for the commission of extremely violent crimes. These guards were well aware of the severe danger to plaintiff. The prison guards failed to properly supervise the prison and provide for plaintiff’s safety. They also purposely and recklessly failed to provide plaintiff with medical assistance, thereby depriving plaintiff of his civil rights, guaranteed by the Constitution and Laws of the United States and of the State of _______.].

43. Defendants [Defendants #2, #3, and #4]’s recklessness, failure to properly train and manage [prison guards or medical doctor] of the County of _____, State of _____, and failure to adequately supervise and protect plaintiffs from the acts complained of caused the deprivation of plaintiffs’ rights.


A-9. SAMPLE FULL COMPLAINT

[The following is a sample full complaint. DO NOT COPY THIS as your facts will be different than this example. NOTE, you will want to DOUBLE SPACE the body of your complaint. This complaint is single-spaced.]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF STATE

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x

Scott Martin,                                      Plaintiff,

v.                                                COMPLAINT

Captain Jack Williams,                             Jury Trial Demanded
Sergeant John Doe, Acting
Sergeant Joseph Franks,                            No. 12345
Correctional Officer Steve Doe,
Dr. Stanley Thomas, Correctional
Officer Ronald C. Smith, and
Warden Justin A. Kent, individually
and in their official capacities.

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x

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Scott Martin, by his attorneys, for his second amended complaint against defendants Captain Jack Williams, Sergeant John Doe, Acting Sergeant Joseph Franks, Correctional Officer Steve Doe, Dr. Stanley Thomas, Correctional Officer Ronald C. Smith, and Warden Justin A. Kent, alleges as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1343(3) and (4). The matters in controversy arise under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

2. Venue properly lies in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b)(2), because the events giving rise to this cause of action occurred at Plaineville Correctional Center ("Plaineville") in City, State, which is located within the Northern District of State.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff Scott Martin is and was, at all times relevant hereto, a prisoner in the custody of the State Department of Corrections ("SDOC"). At the time of the events relevant hereto, Martin was incarcerated at Plaineville. Martin is currently incarcerated at the Smithville Correctional Center ("Smithville").

4. Defendant Jack Williams is an SDOC officer with the rank of Captain, who at all times relevant hereto was assigned to Plaineville.

5. Defendant Dr. Stanley Thomas was, at all times relevant hereto, a physician employed or retained by SDOC to provide medical services at Plaineville.
6. Defendant Sergeant John Doe is an SDOC officer with the rank of Sergeant, who at all times relevant hereto was assigned to Plaineville.

7. Defendant Acting Sergeant Joseph Franks was, at all times relevant hereto, a correctional officer at Plaineville, who at the time of the events described below was serving as an Acting Sergeant.

8. Defendant Officer Steve Doe was, at all times relevant hereto, a correctional officer at Plaineville.

9. Defendant Ronald C. Smith was, at all times relevant hereto, a correctional officer at Plaineville.

10. Defendant Justin A. Kent was, at all times relevant hereto, Warden of Plaineville. As Warden of the prison, Defendant manages its day-to-day operations and executes its policies.

**PREVIOUS LAWSUITS BY PLAINTIFF**

11. Plaintiff has filed no other lawsuits dealing with the same facts involved in this action or otherwise relating to his/her imprisonment.

**EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES**

[Read Chapter 14 of the JLM, “The Prison Litigation Reform Act.”]

**FACTS**

12. On or about January 1, 2003, plaintiff was assigned to and resided in cell 1, Unit 1, at Plaineville with his cellmate, Mr. Joshua Nixon (“Nixon”).

12. On several occasions prior to January 1, 2003, plaintiff informed defendant Williams that he feared for his personal health and safety due to serious conflicts he was having with Nixon, and plaintiff requested that one of them be transferred as soon as possible.

13. Prior to January 1, 2003, plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant Williams that again informed Williams of his fear for his personal health and safety due to the situation between plaintiff and Nixon and asked that plaintiff be transferred from the cell.

14. On January 1, 2003, Nixon also made a request to defendant Williams for a cell transfer due to conflicts between himself and plaintiff. Defendant Williams denied the request.

15. On January 1, 2003, plaintiff personally asked defendant Williams if he could be transferred from his cell because he feared for his personal health and safety due to conflicts between himself and Nixon. Defendant Williams refused plaintiff’s request.

16. On January 1, 2003, Nixon asked Correctional Officer Washington whether he could be transferred from his cell to an adjoining cell occupied only by Charles Jones, because he and plaintiff were having serious problems living together. Officer Washington agreed to make such a transfer. However, without explanation, defendant Sergeant John Doe refused to permit Officer Washington to supervise the move.

17. Charles Jones also discussed with both Officer Washington and defendant Williams Nixon’s request for a move into Jones’s cell, and he notified Washington and Williams that he was not opposed to Nixon moving into his cell.

18. On January 1, 2003, the same day that plaintiff and Nixon repeatedly asked various correctional officers at Plaineville for a cell transfer, the two engaged in a verbal argument about the volume level of Nixon’s radio. A few hours later, plaintiff was sleeping when he heard his cellmate making noise. Plaintiff awoke to see Nixon putting on his boots. After Nixon had put on his boots, he attacked plaintiff without provocation. Plaintiff struck plaintiff numerous times, causing injuries to his eyes, nose, mouth, and chest.
Nixon also used various objects to strike plaintiff, including the radio and a property box. During the attack, Nixon stomped on plaintiff's bare feet with his heavy boots, causing injury to plaintiff's feet.

19. As Nixon beat him, plaintiff yelled for a “med tech” and summoned prison officials for assistance via a buzzer in his cell. When Acting Sergeant Franks and Correctional Officer Steve Doe arrived, they refused to open the cell door while plaintiff was being attacked. The two officers acknowledged to plaintiff that they saw that he was being attacked but failed to intervene until later.

20. Immediately following this assault, plaintiff was taken to the emergency room at Plaineville Hospital. Plaintiff suffered from cuts and lacerations on his body and his face, as well as multiple bruises and swelling on his face and body. Plaintiff was informed by medical personnel that a deep, 1.25 inch cut in his mouth required stitches. In addition, plaintiff was given an X-ray to determine whether or not his nose was broken, but the amount of blood in plaintiff's nose rendered the X-ray inconclusive.

21. Despite the severity of his injuries and the excruciating pain plaintiff suffered as a result of these injuries, only two Tylenol were administered to plaintiff after the attack. Plaintiff endured severe pain throughout the night from his extensive injuries. The next day, despite the serious pain, Dr. Thomas prescribed only Motrin for pain relief. Although plaintiff’s pain was not alleviated, no stronger pain killer was administered.

22. Notwithstanding the opinion of other medical personnel that plaintiff required stitches, defendant Dr. Thomas refused to administer any stitches for the deep cut in plaintiff’s mouth. He instead told a colleague that plaintiff was “a crybaby” and discharged him from any further care. Despite plaintiff’s repeated requests, defendant Dr. Thomas refused to arrange for any follow-up care for his injuries.

23. At plaintiff’s request, he was given a pass permitting him to return to the Hospital the following day for follow-up medical care, but he was never called to return to the Hospital. Plaintiff wrote to defendants Warden Kent and Dr. Thomas to tell them that he had not been taken back to the Hospital for follow-up treatment for his injuries and to request such treatment, but he never was sent back to the Hospital for follow-up care. The only further action any member of the prison staff took with respect to plaintiff’s injuries was to advise plaintiff in the future to avoid going to sleep before resolving disagreements with a cellmate.

24. Following his visit to the emergency room, plaintiff continued to suffer from migraine headaches, dizziness, and general physical pain as a result of his injuries. He continued to bleed from the unstitched cut in his mouth for days afterwards, making it difficult or impossible to eat.

25. Soon after, plaintiff filed a grievance and a civil suit against the above-named defendants for their deliberate indifference to harm caused to him throughout the above-mentioned period.

26. After filing the civil suit, plaintiff was the target of harassment and retaliation from both defendant Williams and defendant Smith.

27. On January 14, 2004, plaintiff exited his cell and approached defendant Smith to ask him when lunch was being served. Defendant Smith stuck out his arm and threw plaintiff backwards, nearly causing him to fall. Plaintiff then approached defendant Williams, who witnessed the event, to ask him if he would let this act go without reprimand. Defendant Smith then threatened plaintiff by telling him that “next time, I will bust your head.” To this, defendant Williams responded to plaintiff, “you know what you’ve got to do, take care of your business.” On subsequent occasions, defendant Smith verbally harassed plaintiff for filing grievances and lawsuits.

28. Defendant Williams also harassed plaintiff in retaliation for grievances plaintiff had filed against Williams. For example, on February 1, 2004, during an alcohol “shake down,” plaintiff and only two other prisoners were forced to submit to a strip search, even though plaintiff had never had an alcohol violation, nor had he ever failed any drug test administered by the prison.
29. Similarly, on March 12, 2004, defendant Williams loudly berated plaintiff from the gallery for accusing him of being a racist in one of the grievances plaintiff had filed against him. Defendant Williams then approached plaintiff’s cell, opened the cell door, and told plaintiff that he does not harass prisoners and only tries to help and protect them. In doing so, Williams used the precise language that plaintiff had used in his grievance against Williams, thus emphasizing that he was acting in retaliation for the grievance.

COUNT ONE: BREACH OF DUTY TO PROTECT

31. Defendant Williams exercised deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s health and safety by failing to protect him from a prison attack even though he had been informed of a threat to plaintiff’s health and safety. Defendant Williams received repeated requests, oral and in writing, from both plaintiff and his cellmate, Nixon, for a cell transfer due to conflict between the two and refused to act upon them. Defendant Williams’ deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s health and safety was further demonstrated when he spoke to plaintiff the day after plaintiff had been attacked and laughed at plaintiff’s injuries.

32. Defendant Acting Sergeant John Doe exercised deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s health and safety by refusing, for no reason, to authorize a cell transfer of either plaintiff or Nixon to an available cell, when he knew that there were serious conflicts between plaintiff and Nixon and that plaintiff’s health and safety were at risk.

33. Defendants Sergeant Franks and Correctional Officer Steve Doe exercised deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s health and safety by failing immediately to protect plaintiff from an attack by his cellmate as soon as they knew it was occurring. Instead, these defendants merely acknowledged to plaintiff that they saw the attack and, despite seeing that plaintiff had suffered and was suffering serious injuries, the defendants failed to stop the attack immediately.

34. As a result of the deliberate indifference exercised by the aforementioned defendants, plaintiff suffered serious harm at the hands of his cellmate. Plaintiff sustained multiple physical injuries, including deep cuts in his mouth and upon his face, bruises upon his face and body, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness. Plaintiff also suffered extreme emotional distress from the incident.

COUNT TWO: FAILURE TO ADMINISTER ADEQUATE MEDICAL REMEDY

36. Defendant Dr. Thomas exercised deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s health by failing to provide adequate medical care to him following the attack by Nixon. Defendant Dr. Thomas intentionally did not administer stitches to a deep cut in plaintiff’s mouth and refused to fulfill any of plaintiff’s requests for follow-up care. Instead, defendant Dr. Thomas mocked plaintiff in front of other medical personnel.

37. As a result of Dr. Thomas’s deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s condition, plaintiff suffered further pain and mental anguish. He continued to suffer from migraine headaches and general pain throughout his body, and Dr. Thomas refused to provide adequate pain medication for plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff was unable to eat properly for days after receiving care from defendant Dr. Thomas, because the unstitched cut in his mouth did not properly heal.

COUNT THREE: RETALIATORY TREATMENT FOR FILING SECTION 1983 CLAIM AND FOR FILING GRIEVANCES

39. Almost immediately after plaintiff filed grievances against him, defendant Williams repeatedly harassed and caused harm to plaintiff in retaliation for the grievances. Defendant Williams forced plaintiff to submit to a strip search, even though he had no reason to do so. Defendant Williams came on the gallery and loudly berated plaintiff for allegations he made in one of the grievances filed against Williams.
40. After plaintiff filed a civil rights action against defendant Williams, plaintiff suffered retaliation by defendants Williams and Smith. When plaintiff approached defendant Smith to speak with him, defendant Smith stuck his arm out straight and struck plaintiff, throwing him backward and nearly knocking him down. Defendant Williams looked on and failed to correct or chastise defendant Smith as a result of this battery, merely warning plaintiff that “you know what you’ve got to do, take care of your business.”

41. A few months later, after plaintiff had filed a grievance against defendants Smith and Williams for the above incident, Officer Smith verbally harassed plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff’s filing of the grievance. Defendant Smith told plaintiff that he “was the type who liked to file grievances and that it didn’t matter if [Plaintiff] filed a [lawsuit] because [Plaintiff] wasn’t going to be getting any money and that nothing [was] going to be done.”

42. These acts represent a pattern of events demonstrating intentional retaliation against plaintiff by defendants Williams and Smith for filing grievances and a civil rights action and have caused plaintiff further mental anguish as a result.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment in his favor and damages in his favor against all defendants in an amount sufficient to compensate him for the pain and mental anguish suffered by him due to the deliberate indifference and intentional misconduct of defendants, but in no event less than $300,000, together with his attorneys’ fees and costs, and such additional relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

______________________________
Plaintiff Name, Plaintiff